State v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 09 March 1899
• Citation: 71 Conn. 457,42 A. 640
• Parties: STATE v. VAUGHAN.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

42 A. 640

71 Conn. 457

STATE

v. VAUGHAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 9, 1899.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Milton A. Shumway, Judge.

Prosecution against Gertrude A. Vaughan for keeping a maternity hospital without having a license therefor. Verdict of guilty. Before sentence, the defendant appealed. Appeal dismissed.

The statute (Pub. Acts 1895, p. 496) places maternity hospitals in each city or town under inspection of certain of the municipal authorities, and punishes any person keeping such hospital who has not previously obtained a license therefor from said authorities. The complaint contained four counts, each charging a violation of the statute on a specified day between February 15, 1898, and the filing of the information. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The court ordered a stay of sentence until the next term of court, and until further order of court. A finding of facts was made by the court, and the defendant appealed, alleging errors in the decision on a plea in bar which had been filed, and in the charge of the court.

Jacob P. Goodhart and Robert C. Stoddard, for appellant .

William H. Williams, State's Atty., and Alfred N. Wheeler, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). An appeal lies only from a judgment. It appears by the record that after conviction the court suspended sentence. In a criminal case, sentence is the judgment against the accused. There can be no judgment against him until sentence is pronounced. After a verdict of guilty, accepted by the court, the judgment may still be in favor of the accused; or, if against him, the sentence may be such that the judgment for that reason is erroneous. Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485, 487, 2 Atl. 752; 1 Chit Cr. Law, 663, 699; 2 Swift, Dig. 442. In the case at bar the verdict was a general one, on four counts. It may be claimed that the offense charged is a continuing one, so that, if the trial court should render judgment for a punishment greater than could be imposed for a single offense, the judgment would be erroneous. If the present appeal were valid, there would either be no mode of presenting such a claim by proceedings in error, or we would have two appeals from one judgment, in plain violation of the statute.

When this court was first organized, the only process provided for invoking its jurisdiction was the writ of error. This could only issue when there had been a final judgment. Afterwards a motion in error, instead of a writ of error, was also authorized. Pub. Acts 1823, c. 1. This motion could be allowed only "when final judgment is rendered." The court early permitted the superior court, upon a case reserved, to take the advice of this court as to what judgment should be rendered, and such reservation has since been regulated by statute. A reservation can take place only before judgment In 1807, by rule of court, a process in error, by way of a motion for new trial, was devised. 3 Day, 28. In 1830 this motion was regulated by statute, and made a matter of right. Pub. Acts 1830, c. 1, § 145. The motion for a new trial might be allowed either before or after judgment. By our early practice, it did not suspend judgment, but judgment was first rendered, and then the motion allowed. Execution only was stayed. Lockwood v. Jones, 7 Conn. 439; 4 Day, 120, 468. In Tomlinson v. Derby, 41 Conn. 268, 269, it was claimed that a judgment was necessary to lay the foundation of a motion for new trial, but we held that it was within the discretion of the court to allow the motion before or after judgment. In State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 339, error was claimed in rendering judgment of death before passing on a motion for new trial, but we said: "By our practice the judgment is not necessarily suspended by the presentment of a motion for a new trial. Usually final judgment is rendered, and afterwards the motion is allowed." In 1882 the process by appeal was substituted for the process by motion in error and by new trial, serving the purposes of both, and was allowed only after judgment, from which alone the appeal could be taken. Pub. Acts 1882, p. 144. The act applied to both civil and criminal cases, and provided for a stay of execution pending the appeal. Before 1882 a writ of error and a motion in error could not be had before judgment, while a motion for a new trial might be allowed before or after judgment; the general practice being to render judgment before the motion was allowed. Since 1882 an appeal, whether it serves the purpose of a motion for a new trial or of a motion in error, cannot be taken until after judgment, and, if taken before, must be dismissed. White v. Howd, 66 Conn. 264, 266, 33 Atl. 915; Cothren v. Atwood, 63 Conn. 576, 29 Atl. 13.

Counsel urge that trial courts have granted a stay of sentence pending a motion for a new trial. Trial courts had that power, but now an appeal to this court cannot be taken until after judgment, and without sentence there is no judgment. It is further urged that since 1882 appeals in criminal cases have been taken where the record of the court below, as in this case, shows a judgment in form, which is not one in fact, because the sentence which is the judgment has not been pronounced, and that such appeals have been considered by this court. This has happened. It is not always that the formal parts of a record, as to which no question is raised, are examined very critically; and it is not surprising that when the trial court makes out a judgment apparently regular in form, when none has in fact been rendered, the defect should escape notice. But such...