State v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 01 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 120,432,120,432
• Citation: 482 P.3d 595 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. James A. VAUGHAN Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

482 P.3d 595 (Table)

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. James A. VAUGHAN Jr., Appellant.

No. 120,432

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed November 1, 2019.

James A. Vaughan Jr., appellant pro se.

Stephanie B. Poyer, of Butler and Associates, P.A., of Topeka, for appellee.

Before Arnold-Burger, C.J., Green and Buser, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam:

"The plain and unambiguous language of K.S.A. [2018] Supp. 60-2403 states that all restitution judgments not void as of July 1, 2015, continue to be enforceable forever." State v. Dwyer , 56 Kan. App. 2d 848, Syl. ¶ 2, 439 P.3d 338 (2019). The plain language also applies to "court costs, fees, [and] fines." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-2403(b).

James A. Vaughan Jr. was sentenced for his seventh driving under the influence (DUI) in April 2010. He was ordered to pay various fines and fees as a result of his conviction. Several years passed and a collection agency sought to garnish his prison inmate account. Among other things, Vaughan argued the judgment was void because of the lengthy delay between the judgment and the first collection efforts.

The district court held that the judgment against Vaughan was not void. We agree. But the district court failed to address whether all or a portion of Vaughan's inmate account was entitled to an exemption from garnishment under state law. So we must remand to the district court for further consideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2010, Vaughan was sentenced for his seventh driving under the influence conviction. As part of his sentence, and under a plea agreement with the State, Vaughan was ordered to pay court costs, fines, and fees.

In January 2018, while in prison on unrelated charges, Vaughan moved to dismiss his fines, costs, and fee assessments. He argued that the judgment against him was dormant and void due to the amount of time between his sentence and the State's collection efforts. The district court denied Vaughan's motion in March 2018.

In April 2018, the collection firm Butler & Associates requested, and the district court granted, a garnishment of nonwages to collect the court costs, fines, and fees from Vaughan's inmate account. Vaughan responded by filing motions to transport to court for a hearing, a motion to appoint counsel, and yet another motion to dismiss his court costs, fines, and fee assessments.

The district court denied Vaughan's motions without hearing oral argument. The district court affirmed the garnishment against Vaughan's inmate account. Vaughan asked the district court to reconsider his motion to dismiss. In September 2018, before the district court ruled on Vaughan's motion to reconsider, he filed his notice of appeal. The district court denied Vaughan's motion to reconsider in October 2018.

ANALYSIS

The judgment against Vaughan was not dormant or void.

Vaughan's first three arguments on appeal relate to the district court's finding that the judgment for fines, fees, and costs for his DUI case was not dormant and void. Whether the judgment against Vaughan was dormant requires interpretation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-2403(b). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc. , 301 Kan. 916, 918, 349 P.3d 469 (2015). We have already decided this exact issue against Vaughan. State v. Vaughan , No. 119,610, 2019 WL 1575358, at *2 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion) (judgment against Vaughan would never become dormant or void because of the application of amendment that was made to K.S.A. 60-2403 [b] in 2015), petition for rev. filed May 6, 2019. Although that case involved fines and fees on his sixth DUI conviction, he raised the same issues he raises here regarding dormancy. We fully incorporate this court's reasoning in Vaughan and find that his claim of error related to dormancy fails for the reasons set forth in that case.

The 2015 amendment to K.S.A. 60-2403(b) did not violate the plea agreement between Vaughan and the State.

Vaughan next argues that the 2015 amendment to K.S.A. 60-2403(b) (judgments for court costs, fees, fines, or restitution which were not void as of July 2015 will never become dormant or void) violates his plea agreement with the State. His argument seems to rely on the general rule that the "penalty for a criminal offense is the penalty provided by statute at the time of the commission of the offense." State v. Sylva , 248 Kan. 118, Syl. ¶ 4, 804 P.2d 967 (1991).

But the actual collection of Vaughan's fines, costs, or restitution is a civil matter. See K.S.A. 22-3801(a). There is no indication that the actual fines and court costs to which the parties agreed in the plea agreement changed as a result of any legislative action. The only change that occurred here is what the State needed to do to revive a dormant judgment. There was no guarantee in the plea agreement that the State would forgo its statutory ability to renew or revive the judgment to prevent it from going dormant in the first place. The plea agreement dealt only with the assessment of fines, fees, and costs—not their future collection. Because nothing in the plea agreement guarantees the future dormancy of the judgment for fines, fees, and costs, the 2015 amendment did not violate the plea agreement.

Vaughan's attempt to challenge the sentence imposed in his underlying conviction in this garnishment proceeding fails.

Vaughan's next argument relies on his assertion that the district court needed to consider whether Vaughan was able to pay the fine or whether some other payment option, such as community service, was more appropriate.

The DUI statute in effect at the time of Vaughan's conviction stated that instead of payment of an imposed fine, "the court may order that the person perform community service specified by the court." K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j). The sentencing court in this case was required to consider, on the record, Vaughan's financial resources when determining whether he should pay the monetary fine or complete community service. See K.S.A. 21-4607(3) (now K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6612 [c]); State v. Copes , 290 Kan. 209, Syl. ¶ 8, 224 P.3d 571 (2010). The defendant can certainly waive his statutory rights regarding consideration of the method of payment if such a waiver is set out on the record or in the plea agreement. There was no such waiver in Vaughan's plea agreement. See 290 Kan. at 217-18 (knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, of statutory rights may be accomplished through the provisions of a plea agreement). But Vaughan's claim fails for several reasons.

First, Vaughan is, in essence, challenging the underlying debt or order of the court to pay court costs. That judgment of conviction and sentence is final. Vaughan did not appeal. Vaughan cannot attack the underlying judgment through a garnishment proceeding unless he can establish that the judgment is void. See Riney v. Riney , 205 Kan. 671, Syl. ¶ 4, 473 P.2d 77 (1970) ("A judgment which has been entered in a case and which has become final cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding unless it appears that the judgment is void."). We have already found that the underlying judgment for fines and costs is not void due to the passage of time. Vaughan , 2019 WL 1575358, at *2. And Vaughan makes no claim on appeal that the judgment is void due to a claimed failure to comply with K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j), K.S.A. 21-4607(3) —now K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6612(c), and Copes , 290 Kan. 209, Syl. ¶ 8. So even if we assume that the court erred in not considering his financial resources, " ‘[a] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ " Ford v. Willits , 9 Kan. App. 2d 735, 744, 688 P.2d 1230 (1984), aff'd 237 Kan. 13, 697 P.2d 834 (1985).

Although Vaughan asserts he was denied due process of law because the court failed to consider his financial resources and the method of payment, he does not claim that the court denied him an opportunity to present information concerning his financial circumstances. See State v. Wilkinson , 269 Kan. 603, 608, 9 P.3d 1 (2000) (basic elements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner). In fact, the court noted on the sentencing journal entry that it had considered Vaughan's financial resources at least as they related to reimbursement of BIDS fees. Again, a judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. Ford , 9 Kan. App. 2d at 744.

Second, Vaughan did not raise noncompliance with K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1567(j) ; K.S.A. 21-4607(3) ; or Copes , 290 Kan. 209, Syl. ¶ 8, in his initial filings before the district court. He did not raise it as an issue until his motion to reconsider after Judge Vokins' order denying him relief was filed. A motion to reconsider is not a place to raise new issues or obtain a second chance to present a stronger case. See Servants of Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[A] motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law. It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing."); Sithon Maritime Co. v. Holiday Mansion , 177 F.R.D. 504, 505 (D. Kan. 1998) ("Appropriate circumstances for a motion to reconsider are where the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position on the facts or the law, or the court has mistakenly decided issues outside of those the parties presented for determination. A party's failure to present its strongest case in the first instance does not entitle it to a second chance in the form of a motion to reconsider."). Accordingly, he abandoned his claim by not raising it his initial motions...