State v. Vaughn

Decision Date13 May 1986
Citation508 A.2d 430,199 Conn. 557
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Ralph VAUGHN, Jr.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Thomas J. Ullman, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Robert J. O'Brien, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and Roseann Bocciarelli, Legal Intern, for appellee (state).

Before HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Ralph Vaughn, Jr., was charged with the crime of robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-135(a)(1). The defendant moved before trial for a line-up and to suppress identification testimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the court, Chernauskas, J., denied the defendant's pretrial motions. Following a jury trial in which the defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years. In his appeal the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to order a pretrial line-up and in denying his motion to suppress identification testimony. These contentions are interrelated and the contention basic to the entire argument is the reliability of the identification testimony of the victim of the robbery. The defendant also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that related to other crimes. We find no error.

The testimony adduced at the hearing on the pretrial motions for a line-up and to suppress identification testimony was substantially the same as that given at trial. The evidence presented was not complicated. To the contrary, the principle issue of fact before the jury was whether they believed the victim and his identification testimony despite the testimony of the defendant and his alibi witnesses.

There is no controversy as to the occurrence of the robbery itself. The victim, Eugene Cornelius, testified that at about 8:15 in the evening of November 19, 1981, he was walking on Chapel Street near the corner of Kensington Street in New Haven when he was accosted by two men. The street lighting was good in the area and nothing obstructed his view of the two men facing him. He saw one of the men step toward him, and, for several seconds, Cornelius stood staring at the man he identified as the defendant, who was only about six feet away and closing in upon him. The man was unmasked and made no attempt to hide his identity. Cornelius consistently testified that he was positive of his identification of the defendant, but that he had not had the opportunity to get a good view of the other man. Throughout the period he eyed him continuously until he was distracted by something he heard behind him. As he turned his head forward to face the defendant again, Cornelius was struck and slumped to the sidewalk where he collapsed. He awoke while the robbers were going through his pockets. They stole his wedding ring, wristwatch, briefcase and his wallet which contained money, charge cards, his driver's license and a Mobil credit card. After the robbers ran away, the victim found his glasses which had fallen off and he called the police.

New Haven police department officers Phillip Timothy and Dennis Kelly were on patrol duty when they were dispatched to the intersection of Chapel and Kensington Streets. There they found Cornelius. He was described by the police as upset and physically battered, and his face was described as bruised, bleeding, and his teeth as chipped. Cornelius was briefly questioned. He stated that he had just been mugged by four black males; that he was hit from behind; and that he did not see the person who assaulted him. Cornelius said on this occasion that he was unable to identify any of his assailants. He later testified that throughout the time he was with the police officers he was dazed and in pain, emotionally disturbed and afraid. Shortly thereafter the victim was taken by Timothy to a nearby hospital for medical assistance. Kelly remained at the scene of the crime to continue the investigation. He found nothing. He then rejoined Timothy at the hospital. Further questioning elicited no additional information. Before leaving Cornelius at the hospital, both officers advised him that if he had any further information to contact the police department. Kelly also informed him that photographs were available at the police department, if he wanted to view them.

The next day while he was at the office of his dentist to undergo treatment of his damaged teeth, Cornelius recalled his encounter with the defendant on the previous evening. What happened was clear in his recollection. He remembered the defiant, fearless expression on the defendant's face. He recalled how he stood only about six feet from the defendant and, aided by the illumination provided by good street lighting, observed that the man before him was a muscular black male, about twenty-five years old, five feet, five or six inches tall, weighing approximately 150 pounds, of average complexion, with very short hair and no distinctive facial features or facial hair except a small mustache. Later that day he wrote down a description of the defendant. On November 21, 1981, Cornelius contacted the police with reference to his briefcase. He then went with a police escort to the intersection of Chapel and Kensington Streets. A search for the briefcase was fruitless. He did not indicate to the police at that time that he could identify any of the robbers.

Nothing else happened until the middle of January, 1982. About that time Cornelius was furnished a statement indicating the current balance of his Mobil credit card. The summary of activity showed charges for gasoline he had not purchased. Cornelius immediately contacted the police. Officer Stephen Dunn was assigned to investigate the misuse of the credit card. On February 5, 1982, Cornelius told Dunn that only one person assaulted him and described his assailant as a short, black male with a stocky build. On February 9, 1982, Cornelius notified Dunn that he had received by mail an envelope which contained his driver's license. On February 12, 1982, Cornelius and Dunn exchanged additional information. Dunn reported to Cornelius that he had recovered the Mobil credit card and had interviewed the attendant at the gasoline station where the credit card was used. Cornelius then disclosed to Dunn that he could identify the person who struck him. He told Dunn that he had written down a detailed description of the man on the day following the robbery, including the man's height, weight, build, age and hair length. Dunn at once suggested that the victim attempt to make a photographic identification. Cornelius gave further details of the description in the course of arrangements for a photographic array. Before he looked at any pictures Cornelius gave his written description of the defendant to Dunn.

On February 24, 1982, Dunn brought Cornelius an array of twelve photographs and asked him to take his time and to look at the photographs. Cornelius scrutinized the pictures, removed three or four from the array, and looked at the remaining photographs for about one minute. He picked out the defendant's picture and told Dunn he was positive he had selected his attacker's picture. At trial, Cornelius testified that he was robbed on November 19, 1981; that he had an opportunity to observe the man he identified as the defendant at close quarters for several seconds in good lighting; that he wrote down a detailed description of the man on the day following the robbery; that he did not tell the police what he had done or give them the written description until February 24, 1982; that he had been shown twelve photographs on February 24, 1982; and that he had identified one photograph as that of the robber facing him on November 19, 1981.

The defendant's first contention was raised by a request for a pretrial line-up. After hearing evidence, the trial judge refused the request. This ruling the defendant contends is error. In support of this contention, the defendant argues that since identification of the defendant was the main issue at trial, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse his request for a corporeal line-up. This argument is based on the theory that it was improper to show the victim photographs which made it possible for him to identify in court not the defendant, but the person whose picture he had previously selected from the array prepared by the police. The defendant urges condemnation of any identification procedure which utilizes photographs, even though prior to arrest, unless the danger that use of the technique may result in conviction based on misidentification is lessened by a defendant's right to a corporeal line-up.

A defendant does not have a constitutional right to a line-up. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 420 (3d Cir.1985); United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 593 (2d Cir.1983). "If the state has not employed unduly suggestive methods of identification, its only remaining duty is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the identification is correct." State v. Vass, 191 Conn. 604, 611, 469 A.2d 767 (1983); see State v. Ledbetter, 185 Conn. 607, 612, 441 A.2d 595 (1981); State v. Williams, 170 Conn. 618, 626-27, 368 A.2d 140 (1976). The only provision for a line-up is that contained in Practice Book § 782. Under...

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24 cases
  • State v. Dickson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 9 August 2016
    ...routine procedure that was used unnecessary or impermissible. The defendant had no constitutional right to a lineup; State v. Vaughn, 199 Conn. 557, 562, 508 A.2d 430, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S. Ct. 583, 93 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1986); nor did the state have a constitutional duty to conduc......
  • State v. Harris
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 4 September 2018
    ...right to a photographic array of look-alikes"), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S.Ct. 2515, 138 L.Ed. 2d 1017 (1997) ; State v. Vaughn , 199 Conn. 557, 564, 508 A.2d 430 ("[a]ny array composed of different individuals must necessarily contain certain differences"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 9......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 14 April 1987
    ...476 A.2d 550 (1984), quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); State v. Vaughn, 199 Conn. 557, 563, 508 A.2d 430 (1986). The defendant argues that the pre-trial photographic identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive because: ......
  • State v. Williamson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 29 March 1988
    ...476 A.2d 550], quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); State v. Vaughn, 199 Conn. 557, 563, 508 A.2d 430 (1986)." State v. Williams, 203 Conn. 159, 174, 523 A.2d 1284 The defendant attacks the photographic displays as impermissibly sug......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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