State v. Vaughn
| Decision Date | 20 January 1954 |
| Citation | 200 Or. 275,265 P.2d 249 |
| Parties | STATE v. VAUGHN. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Donald H. Joyce, Portland, for appellant.
J. Raymond Carskadon, Dep. Dist. Atty., Portland, John B. McCourt, Dist. Atty. for Multhomah County, Portland, Charles E. Raymond and Charles W. Robison, Dep. Dist. Attys., Portland, on the brief, for respondent.
The defendant in this case was convicted of assault while armed with a dangerous weapon. The jury was duly instructed by the trial court and no exceptions to the instructions as given or to the refusal to give requested instructions were taken by the defendant. After the jury had retired, and during its deliberations, through the bailiff the jury addressed to the court two requests: (1) To have the word 'feloniously' redefined, and (2) to have the testimony read as to when the defendant picked up the stick [dangerous weapon], before, after or during the dog fight. The trial court in answer to the request made the following statement:
'So I will ask you to resume your deliberations.'
The refusal of the court to redefine the word 'feloniously' or to have read certain testimony pertaining to the time of the taking up of the alleged dangerous weapon, to which an exception was taken by the defendant, is assigned as error.
The defendant contends that he had an absolute right to have the court redefine the word 'feloniously' upon the request of the jury, relying upon § 5-313, O.C.L.A., now § 17.325, ORS, which reads as follows:
It is to be noted that the mandatory obligation of the statute is that if any information as to the law is given by the trial court it shall be given in the presence of the attorneys or after due notice has been given to the parties or their attorneys. This statute does not in itself require the court to reinstruct a jury. It is, of course, necessary that the court state to the jury all matters of law which it thinks necessary for their information in giving their verdict. § 5-308, O.C.L.A., now § 17.255, ORS. This was done by the trial court in its charge to the jury at the conclusion of the trial, and the word 'feloniously' was defined in words as follows:
'Feloniously means with...
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State v. Ramirez
...used); State v. Dickey, 125 Ariz. 163, 170, 608 P.2d 302, 309 (1980) (discussing discretionary nature of rule 22.3); State v. Vaughn, 200 Or. 275, 265 P.2d 249, 250 (1954) (citations omitted). Thus, "[w]hen a jury asks a judge about a matter on which it has received adequate instruction, th......
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People v. Queen
...In the absence of such a statute we do not believe that the defendant has an absolute right to have testimony repeated. See State v. Vaughn, 200 Or. 275, 265 P.2d 249; State v. Close, 106 N.J.L. 321, 148 A. 764. Even where such a statute is present it has been held that it is not mandatory ......
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State v. Miller
...requests that testimony be repeated the decision on that request lies within the discretion of the trial court. State of Oregon v. Vaughn, 200 Or. 275, 265 P.2d 249 (1954); State v. Jennings, 131 Or. 455, 282 P. 560 (1929). Further, if the court in the exercise of its discretion decides tha......
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State v. Flett
...17.325. The advisability of reinstructing rests within the discretion of the trial court, subject to the statute. State of Oregon v. Vaughn, 200 Or. 275, 265 P.2d 249 (1954) and authorities cited therein. In the case at bar there was no abuse of Error has also been assigned to the refusal o......