State v. Veal, 95-2002

• Citation: 564 N.W.2d 797
• Decision Date: 21 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-2002,95-2002
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ruthann VEAL, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 797

564 N.W.2d 797

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ruthann VEAL, Appellant.

No. 95-2002.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 21, 1997.

Alfredo Parrish and Andrew J. Dunn of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn & Montgomery, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and D. Raymond Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

The overall issue in this appeal is whether any of a number of alleged errors by the trial court requires reversal of defendant's conviction for first-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code section 707.2 (1993). Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we affirm.

I. Background proceedings. Defendant Ruthann Veal was arrested in June 1993 in connection with the death of Catherine Haynes in Waterloo, Iowa. Veal, who was fourteen years old at the time of her arrest, was waived from juvenile court to criminal adult court and charged by trial information with first-degree murder under Iowa Code section 707.2. The facts leading to that charge will be discussed later in connection with the issues to which they are relevant.

Prior to trial, defendant Veal filed a motion for change of venue, claiming that she could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Black Hawk County because of the publicity the case had generated in that area. The district court overruled the motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

After a three-week trial, the jury found Veal guilty of first-degree murder. Veal filed a motion for new trial, again claiming that the publicity surrounding the case precluded a fair and impartial trial. In addition, she alleged a number of errors by the trial court. While that motion was pending, Veal learned that the trial judge, James C. Bauch, had been present in a bar with members of the county attorney's staff following the guilty verdict, and she filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. Judge Bauch recused himself, and Judge Robert J. Curnan was assigned by the chief judge of the judicial district to preside over the remaining proceedings. After a hearing, Judge Curnan overruled Veal's motion for new trial and sentenced her to serve a life term in prison. See Iowa Code § 902.1.

Defendant Veal appealed from the district court's judgment and sentence. Defendant raises several issues on appeal, contending: (1) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict her of first-degree murder; (2) the district court's denial of her motion for change of venue deprived Veal of her constitutional right to a fair trial; (3) her constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's failure to address the prosecutor's alleged pretextual reasons for his peremptory challenges or strikes to three black prospective jurors; (4) Veal's right to confront witnesses was denied when the trial court prohibited cross-examination of three witnesses regarding their juvenile records; (5) the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded from evidence the juvenile records of the three witnesses; (6) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's motion in limine and overruling defendant's offers of proof and thus prohibiting Veal from offering as evidence statements she had made to the police at the time of her arrest and to another person; (7) the trial court erred in excluding those statements of defendant once the State allegedly had "opened the door" to the statements; (8) testimony by a state's witness regarding Veal's request for counsel violated her constitutional rights; (9) the trial court erred in allowing Tequisha Parsons to testify for the State although prosecutors did not disclose to defense counsel the fact Parsons revised her out-of-court statements two weeks before testifying; (10) the trial court abused its discretion in restricting Veal's cross-examination of Parsons and two other witnesses; (11) the trial court abused its discretion in restricting Veal's closing argument; (12) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit to the jury three jury instructions proposed by Veal; (13) the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury concerning Veal's other criminal acts; (14) Veal was denied her constitutional right to a trial by a fair tribunal; and (15) the cumulative effect of the trial court's alleged errors was a denial of Veal's constitutional right to a fair trial.

II. Standard of review. The variety of issues in this case requires us to employ several standards of review depending on the issue being addressed.

When the defendant asserts constitutional violations, our review is de novo. State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994).

In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the verdict. State v. LeGear, 346 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1984). Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A challenge to the district court's denial of a motion for change of venue requires us to review the record de novo; we reverse if the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Iowa 1990).

The scope of opening statements lies within the discretion of the trial court; we review for abuse of discretion. Kester v. Bruns, 326 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa 1982).

Evidentiary matters are generally left to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Iowa 1992). Thus, we reverse rulings on such matters only when it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining the scope of closing arguments; our review is for abuse of discretion. State v. Melk, 543 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa App.1995).

We review the trial court's rulings with respect to jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 831 (Iowa 1994). In addition, reversal is warranted only when any error is prejudicial. Id.

III. Discussion of the issues. We turn now to the issues raised on appeal by the defendant. Because it affords a factual framework for our review, we begin with a discussion of defendant Veal's challenge to the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal. We then address her other arguments in general according to the chronology of the trial.

A. Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. In her motion for judgment of acquittal, made at the close of the evidence--in accordance with the trial court's request--rather than at the close of the State's case, defendant Veal contended that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 18(8). In particular, she argued that the State's key evidence came from a witness whose credibility is open to doubt. On appeal, Veal challenges the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal.

The trial court instructed the jury that the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the elements in one of the following alternatives:

Alternative "A":

1. On or about the 15th/16th day of June, 1993, Ruthann Veal stabbed Catherine Haynes.

2. Catherine Haynes died as a result of being stabbed.

3. Ruthann Veal acted with malice aforethought.

4. Ruthann Veal acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with a specific intent to kill Catherine Haynes.

Alternative "B":

1. On or about the 15th/16th day of June, 1993, Ruthann Veal stabbed Catherine Haynes.

2. Catherine Haynes died as a result of being stabbed.

3. Ruthann Veal acted with malice aforethought.

4. Ruthann Veal was participating in the offense of Robbery in the First Degree.

Alternative "C":

1. On or about the 15th/16th day of June, 1993, Ruthann Veal stabbed Catherine Haynes.

2. Catherine Haynes died as a result of being stabbed.

3. Ruthann Veal acted with malice aforethought.

4. Ruthann Veal was participating in the offense of Willful Injury.

In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the verdict. LeGear, 346 N.W.2d at 23. Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. " We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, making any legitimate inferences that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence." State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Iowa 1996).

A reasonable jury could find the following facts from the record. Catherine Haynes, age sixty-six, was stabbed to death at her Waterloo home sometime between 6:00 p.m. on June 15 and 6:00 a.m. on June 16, 1993. During the early evening hours of June 15, witnesses saw a police officer chase Veal, who had run away from a juvenile home, through a residential neighborhood. Veal, who was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds, was wearing green pants, a white shirt, and hiking boots. She ran through backyards, onto a porch, and into a garage before the police officer gave up his pursuit.

At about 8:45 or 9:00 p.m., victim Catherine Haynes visited briefly at a neighbor's house across the street from her own house. When Haynes returned to her home, her neighbor observed that although the screen door to Haynes' home was shut, the inside door was open. Earlier in the evening, the neighbor had noticed that both the front and back doors to Haynes' home were open.

Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., a number of long-distance telephone calls were placed from Haynes' residence to the residences of friends and relatives of defendant Veal. These friends and relatives of Veal testified that they did not know Catherine Haynes.

At 11:45 p.m. a woman called...