State v. Vega
| Decision Date | 12 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16391) |
| Citation | 259 Conn. 374,788 A.2d 1221 |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOE BURGOS VEGA |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, JS. Conrad Ost Seifert, for the appellant (defendant).
Richard F. Jacobson, special assistant state's attorney, with whom was Cornelius P. Kelly, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
William B. Westcott filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.
G. Douglas Nash, chief of legal services, and Gerard A. Smyth, chief public defender, filed a brief for the office of the chief public defender as amicus curiae.
The defendant, Joe Burgos Vega, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-591 and one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94.2 He was sentenced to a total effective term of sixty years and appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant raises several issues on appeal. First, he claims that he was deprived of his federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel due to the refusal of the trial court, Gormley, J., to remove his counsel after he had informed the court that he had filed a grievance against his attorney and the attorney had moved to withdraw as defense counsel. The defendant argues this refusal resulted in a per se violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.3 Alternatively, the defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to remove defense counsel violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel because the filing of a grievance against his attorney resulted in a lapse of representation and created a conflict of interest on the part of the defendant's counsel. The defendant also argues that this action by the trial court violated his rights under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut.4 Additionally, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly allowed a clinical social worker to testify as an expert witness on battered women's syndrome, and improperly permitted the social worker to testify as to case specific facts relative to the victim as a battered woman. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly permitted the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct and evidence that was the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. We conclude that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated and that the trial court properly admitted the expert testimony of the clinical social worker and the defendant's prior misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the fall of 1995, the then sixteen year old victim and the twenty-nine year old defendant began a sexual relationship. Over the next several months, the couple traveled from Allentown, Pennsylvania, where they both lived, to various destinations in New Jersey, New York and Connecticut, staying with various relatives and friends of the defendant. Throughout this period of time, there developed an escalating pattern of violence perpetrated against the victim by the defendant. This pattern began with an incident in the fall of 1995, in which the defendant hit the victim, tore her clothes and forced her to stay in his apartment instead of attending her high school classes that day. Thereafter, the pattern of violence progressed. In later incidents, the defendant hit the victim, stabbed her with a fork and knives, hit her with a beer can during a drive in November, 1995, and burned her with a cigarette at the end of December, 1995. At one point over the Christmas holidays in 1995, he held her down and cut her hair with a knife. At another point during this time period, he carved the name "Joey" on her chest with a piece of glass.
The incident at issue in this case occurred on January 7, and continued into the early hours of January 8, 1996. During that time, the defendant and the victim were staying in the apartment of Albert Gebeau, a friend of the defendant, at 142 Charles Street in Bridgeport. They had been there for a few days, during which time the defendant kept the victim locked in a bedroom with her eight month old son, providing her with food once a day. On the evening of January 7, the defendant entered the room and stabbed the victim repeatedly with a knife and then threw an air conditioner at her.5 Thereafter, he cut the victim's nipple off of her right breast and forced her to swallow it. After administering further beating to the victim, the defendant ordered her to get up, clean herself off and to pack their bags because they were leaving the Charles Street apartment immediately. As they were leaving the bedroom in which the attack had transpired, they encountered Gebeau. Gebeau and the defendant argued and Gebeau said he was going to call 911 "because the blood was all over the place." Gebeau subsequently called 911.6
Meanwhile, the victim and the defendant left the Charles Street apartment, the victim carrying her child and the suitcases. There was a blizzard raging. After several attempts, the defendant was able to remove the car from the snow and he and the victim and her child left the Bridgeport area and drove to the Branford Motel. Due to the inclement weather conditions, which prohibited the car from traveling at normal speeds, it took them a "[c]ouple of hours" to get to the Branford Motel from Bridgeport. At no time did the defendant permit the victim to receive medical attention, despite her request for such aid. At the Branford Motel, they checked into a room. The defendant washed the victim's clothes in order to remove the blood and then forced her to smoke crack and to have sex with him. Thereafter, the telephone rang and, after the defendant answered it, the police arrived at the door. The police arrested the defendant and the victim was taken to Yale-New Haven Hospital for treatment for her injuries.
Initially, the victim told the police that Gebeau had inflicted her injuries because she was frightened of the defendant and did not want to implicate him. The next day, however, after learning that the defendant was imprisoned, the victim told the police that she had lied and that the defendant was the individual who had assaulted her. Additional facts will be provided where necessary.
We first address the defendant's primary argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of the trial court's refusal to permit his counsel to withdraw. He originally made two claims: (1) that the trial court's refusal to remove counsel in light of the grievance the defendant had filed constituted a per se violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) if not a violation per se, the trial court's refusal to remove counsel created a conflict of interest that violated the fairness of the defendant's trial. The following additional facts are necessary for our analysis of the defendant's claims. Prior to the appointment of Lawrence Hopkins as special public defender, the defendant had been assigned three other attorneys as his trial counsel.7 Hopkins had represented the defendant since January 15, 1997, and during that time he had filed at least seventeen motions on the defendant's behalf and had spoken with him on at least a few occasions. On September 2, 1997, the defendant alerted the trial court, Maiocco, J., that he had filed a motion to dismiss his counsel on May 19, 1997. The court then conducted a preliminary inquiry8 and subsequently granted the defendant a continuance until the following week to try to retain private counsel.9 The court then granted Hopkins' request for a competency hearing for the defendant, stating: "[T]he court is having some thoughts about whether or not you fully are capable to assist any attorney in your defense and certainly evaluation may help the court in making that determination."10 When next before the trial court, Ronan, J., the court stated that the defendant was competent and cautioned the defendant, who had not attained private counsel, that it would be both unwise and difficult to change attorneys at such a late stage in the case's progress.11
The trial began on December 3, 1997. Before the start of jury selection, the defendant addressed the court, Gormley, J., arguing that Hopkins had not told him jury selection was commencing that day and that he was, as a result, dressed inappropriately for his appearance in court.12 The defendant also reiterated his complaints against Hopkins, saying: The court refused to remove Hopkins from the case and jury selection ensued. On December 5, 1997, the court announced that it had been advised that the defendant had filed a grievance against Hopkins with the statewide grievance committee.13 The court gave the defendant the opportunity to express his dissatisfaction with his representation. The defendant stated: Hopkins then made a motion to withdraw his appearance as the defendant's counsel. Hopkins stated: "[W]hen it is brought to my attention that in fact a grievance was filed, I feel that it is incumbent on me to move to withdraw simply because at the very...
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...the law and [whether it] reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 392, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 In the present case, the record reflects that the trial cour......
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...rule, evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or misconduct is not admissible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 396, 788 A.2d 1221 (2002). "The rationale of this rule is to guard against its use merely to show an evil disposition of an accused, and especiall......
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...525 U.S. 1125, 119 S.Ct. 911, 142 L.Ed.2d 909 (1999)], and cases cited therein." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 384 n. 15, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S.Ct. 152, 154 L.Ed.2d 56 (2002); accord Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 469 n. 15,......
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