State v. Velicka
Decision Date | 08 May 1956 |
Citation | 143 Conn. 368,122 A.2d 739 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Anthony J. VELICKA. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Sebastian J. Russo, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Douglass B. Wright, Asst. State's Atty., Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Albert S. Bill, State's Atty., Hartford, for appellee (state).
Before INGLIS, C. J., BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN and WYNNE, JJ., and COVELLO, Superior Court Judge.
The information charged that the defendant 'did attempt to commit robbery and in perpetration thereof did use personal abuse, force and violence, in violation of Sections 8877 and 8357 of the General Statutes.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty. From the judgment rendered thereon the defendant has appealed, assigning as error the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict.
The jury might reasonably have found the following facts. In the afternoon of December 24, 1954, the defendant entered a clothing and tailoring store operated by Anthony Signorelli on Main Street in Hartford. He walked through the store to the back room, where Signorelli was pressing clothes. The defendant held his right hand in his pocket, making it appear that he was carrying a gun. Actually he had no weapon with him. As he approached Signorelli, he said: Signorelli handed the defendant thirty cents, which he had in his pocket, but the defendant refused to take it, saying: The defendants searched Signorelli but found no more money on him. He then punched Signorelli three or four times in the face. Thereupon Signorelli picked up some scissors and started toward the defendant, who ran toward the front of the store, with Signorelli, scissors in hand, pursuing him. Near the front of the store the defendant picked up an umbrella which he found there and struck Signorelli over the head with it with such force that the umbrella broke in two. As the defendant left the store, he was intercepted by Signorelli's son-in-law, who happened to be on the sidewalk.
Section 8877 of the General Statutes reads: 'Unless otherwise expressly provided, any person who shall attempt to commit any crime * * * prohibited by statute shall be subject to the same penalty as provided by statute for the commission of such crime * * *. Section 8357 provides in part: 'Any person * * * who shall commit robbery, and in perpetration thereof use any personal abuse, force or violence * * * shall be imprisoned * * *.'
The defendant concedes that the jury, under the facts of this case, were warranted in concluding that he was guilty of an attempt to commit a robbery and that his acts in punching Signorelli in the face and striking him over the head with an umbrella constituted personal abuse, force and violence, as those terms are used in § 8357. His sole contention is that the jury were not warranted in concluding that the exercise of abuse and violence occurred in the perpetration of the attempted crime of robbery since it took place after the attempted robbery was completed. This contention requires a decision of the question what is meant by the phrase 'in perpetration' of a robbery as that phrase is used in § 8357.
The question of the meaning of such a phrase arises most frequently under statutes, quite common in all jurisdictions, which provide that a killing done in the perpetration of a felony shall constitute murder in the first degree. It is ordinarily held that under such statutes a killing done at a place in close proximity to the scene of the commission of a felony and in aid of the felon's escape may be found to be a killing done in the perpetration of a felony. People v. Wallace, 36 Cal.App.2d 1, 4, 97 P.2d 256; State v. Messino, 325 Mo. 743, 764, 30 S.W.2d 750; State v. Gimbel, 107 N.J.L. 235, 241, 151 A. 756; Commonwealth v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247, 250, 56 A.2d 84. In Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 408, 413, it was held that where, after a burglar had completed the breaking and entering, he had killed a person within the building, the killing was 'in the perpetration' of the burglary. To the same effect is State v. Burzette, 208 Iowa 818, 828, 222 N.W. 394.
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Michael B., In re
...entry of the Cluny home and his departure therefrom in the Cluny vehicle, all comprising a single transaction. See State v. Velicka, 143 Conn. 368, 122 A.2d 739 (1956). We therefore agree with the transfer court's finding of probable cause to believe that the respondent had violated General......
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State v. Ghere, 11730
...v. Gunning, 183 Conn. 299, 313 n. 12, 439 A.2d 339 (1981); State v. Coston, supra, 182 Conn. 435-36, 438 A.2d 701; State v. Velicka, 143 Conn. 368, 371-72, 122 A.2d 739 (1956); see also 2 Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1980) § 222.1, comment 2. In the present case, although the defendan......
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State v. Manchester
...until the assailant has effected his escape. People v. Anderson, 64 Cal.2d 633, 414 P.2d 366, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238 (1966); State v. Velicka, 143 Conn. 368, 122 A.2d 739 (1956); People v. Sanders, 28 Mich.App. 274, 184 N.W.2d 269 (1970); State v. Hope, 317 N.C. 302, 345 S.E.2d 361 (1986); Rumph ......
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State v. Wright
...v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 177, 120 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952, 76 S.Ct. 850, 100 L.Ed. 1476 (1956); 4 see State v. Velicka, 143 Conn. 368, 371, 122 A.2d 739 (1956); see also, e.g., State v. Hall, 305 N.C. 77, 83, 286 S.E.2d 552 In this case, the defendant abducted the victim only ......