State v. Vest
Decision Date | 27 May 2021 |
Docket Number | No. S-1-SC-37210,S-1-SC-37210 |
Citation | 488 P.3d 626 |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Sean VEST, Defendant-Respondent. |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent
{1} Defendant Sean Vest was convicted of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer after he led an officer on a high-speed chase through rain-slicked streets during the early morning hours. Defendant's case regarding a police chase requires us to interpret the aggravated fleeing statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-22-1.1 (2003). In pertinent part, the crime of aggravated fleeing "consists of a person willfully and carelessly driving [a] vehicle in a manner that endangers the life of another person after being given a visual or audible signal to stop" by law enforcement. Id. (emphasis added). The question posed here is whether the statute's requirement that a defendant drive "in a manner that endangers the life of another" means that another person was literally put in danger by Defendant's conduct (actual endangerment) or whether dangerous driving that places a community at risk of harm is enough. Pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1972), we review this case on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. We ultimately conclude that dangerous driving that poses a risk of endangerment is enough.
{2} This case centers on a high-speed police chase. While on patrol near 3:00 a.m., New Mexico State University Officer Jake Capraro came across a vehicle parked near a campus lot. Sitting inside the car were the owner of the vehicle and Defendant. The owner and Defendant had smoked marijuana earlier that night and were in the process of trying to buy more from one of Defendant's local contacts.
{3} As Officer Capraro's vehicle approached the parked vehicle, the owner exited from the driver's side, spotted Officer Capraro, and ran toward him. When the owner reached the police vehicle, he informed Officer Capraro that Defendant had just threatened him with a knife and was currently stealing his car. Officer Capraro then saw the vehicle's brake lights flash as the car pulled away. He engaged his lights and sirens and pursued the vehicle. Defendant sped away from him. Officer Capraro drove at approximately seventy miles per hour trying to keep up with Defendant as he raced down a main street near the university. Defendant was fleeing at a faster speed, and Officer Capraro could not catch up to him. Officer Capraro continued his pursuit as Defendant drove over a bridge crossing Interstate 25 and sped past an apartment complex.
{4} Officer Capraro began to slow down as he reached the apartment complex due both to the slippery conditions and because he could no longer see Defendant, who had maneuvered around an upcoming curve in the road. Having lost sight of Defendant, Officer Capraro used his spotlight to look down the residential streets in the area. Eventually, Officer Capraro came upon Defendant's vehicle abandoned in the middle of a traffic lane. Defendant had driven up onto the sidewalk, crashed into a road sign, and fled on foot. The police canine unit later located Defendant in a nearby arroyo. Defendant was apprehended and subsequently indicted by a grand jury for aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, contrary to Section 30-22-1.1, and armed robbery, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-2 (1973).
{5} Following trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of armed robbery but convicted him of aggravated fleeing. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the crime of aggravated fleeing required evidence that another person was actually endangered by Defendant's careless driving and that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence of this element of the crime. State v. Vest , 2018-NMCA-060, ¶ 1, 428 P.3d 287. As we explain herein, we interpret the aggravated fleeing statute to encompass Defendant's conduct in this case and therefore also hold that there was sufficient evidence of the crime.
{6} This case presents two questions: (1) whether the Legislature intended that a defendant could be convicted of aggravated fleeing in situations where "no other persons [were] in the vicinity of the pursuit"; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard in its review for sufficient evidence of aggravated fleeing. We conclude that a defendant can be convicted without proving that there was another person actually in the vicinity of the pursuit. For that reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Defendant's conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.
{7} We first analyze the question of whether the Legislature intended the aggravated fleeing statute to apply in a situation where Defendant drove "willfully and carelessly" to escape law enforcement, but where no other person was actually in the vicinity of the pursuit. Put another way, we analyze whether careless driving "in a manner that endangers the life of another person," § 30-22-1.1, is satisfied only when a specific individual is exposed to life-threatening harm as a result of a defendant's conduct, or whether this element is satisfied if the defendant drives in such a careless way that it exposes the public to serious risk of danger. This is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Padilla , 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299.
{8} The Court of Appeals concluded that "a conviction under the aggravated fleeing statute requires a finding of actual endangerment." Vest , 2018-NMCA-060, ¶ 1, 428 P.3d 287. In conducting its statutory analysis, the Court of Appeals focused on the word endangers , drawing on a number of dictionary definitions to say that endanger means "the exposure to the peril or harm is an actual or current condition facing the impacted person." Vest , 2018-NMCA-060, ¶ 9, 428 P.3d 287. The Court determined that "[n]one of the[ ] [dictionary] definitions indicate[d] a potential or future condition" and therefore concluded that "the plain language of the statute does not contemplate potential or future harm in its use of the word ‘endanger.’ " Id.
{9} Defendant agrees with the Court of Appeals’ plain language interpretation and urges us to hold that the crime of aggravated fleeing requires proof that a defendant drove in a manner that actually endangered the life of another individual. Defendant asserts that the plain language of the statute compels this interpretation because "[it] does not say, as it easily could, that the defendant drove carelessly in a manner that ‘may’ or ‘was likely to’ endanger another person."
{10} Defendant also sets forth policy reasons as to why this is the proper interpretation. Defendant suggests that a broader interpretation of the statute would minimize the deterrent effect of a statute whose "purpose is to protect the public" because it would treat defendants who flee law enforcement on open, empty roads the same as defendants who flee in crowded areas. Defendant clarifies that endangering the life of another person does not necessarily mean that a defendant must have inflicted death or harm on a particular person, but it at least requires an evidentiary showing that the life of a particular person was actually, not just theoretically, put at risk.
{11} Quoting the Court of Appeals, Defendant argues that to hold as sufficient theoretically putting another person at risk would frustrate the whole purpose of the statute by turning all instances of fleeing into aggravated fleeing, when the "Legislature clearly intended to create ‘a hierarchy of criminal liability.’ " See Vest , 2018-NMCA-060, ¶ 8, 428 P.3d 287.
{12} The State rebuts by asserting that the Court of Appeals failed to give effect to the legislative intent underlying the statute when it announced that aggravated fleeing requires actual endangerment. The State explains that in enacting the aggravated fleeing statute, the Legislature meant to protect the public from the dangers of high-speed police chases. In furtherance of this intent, the State argues, quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth , that the statute does not require "another person to be ‘actually imperiled by an imminent collision.’ " 52 Va.App. 19, 660 S.E.2d 687, 690 (2008). The State argues that the underlying legislative purpose of protecting communities from potential harm due to high-speed chases demands interpreting the language of this statute to mean that holding "careless driving that could result in harm to another person" is enough to convict a defendant of aggravated fleeing. (Emphasis added.) In making its argument, the State stresses that a defendant's culpability should be based on the decision to flee "and drive carelessly and dangerously in doing so." We agree and reverse the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute as requiring actual endangerment.
{13} We interpret the aggravated fleeing statute to require only that a defendant willfully and carelessly drove so dangerously that the defendant created a risk of harm, a risk that could have endangered someone in the community. We come to this conclusion after conducting a thorough statutory construction analysis. See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-18(A) (1997) ().
{14} "This Court's primary...
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