State v. Vicknair
Decision Date | 10 December 1906 |
Docket Number | 16,259 |
Citation | 118 La. 963,43 So. 635 |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. VICKNAIR |
On Rehearing on Motion, March 18, 1907. Rehearing on Merits Denied April 29, 1907.
Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St John the Baptist; Prentice Ellis Edrington, Judge.
Renes Vicknair was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.
Hamilton Numa Gautier, for appellant.
Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and Louis Hermann Marrero, Jr., Dist Atty. (Lewis Guion, of counsel), for the State.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Defendant, who was indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter, prosecutes this appeal, which the state moves to dismiss, on the ground that it was not taken within three days, as required by law.
It appears from the record that the jury brought in its verdict on June 19th; that defendant moved for a new trial, and the motion was heard and overruled and sentence pronounced on July 7th; that the court then adjourned until July 12th, and did not sit during the interval in the parish of St. John the Baptist; and that, upon its reopening in that parish, on July 12th, the motion for appeal was presented and the appeal allowed.
Act No. 30, p. 56, of 1878 provides:
Section 4 relates to the return of the appeal.
It will be seen that, under this law, the party desiring to appeal was allowed until the last day of the term at which the sentence was pronounced within which to do so, but he was obliged to take the appeal "either verbally or in writing, in open court," and he was, in express terms, denied the right to appeal after the lapse of the time specified in the act. Hence, if the sentence was pronounced on the last day of the term, it was necessary that the appeal should be taken on that day. By the present Constitution, it is provided that:
Act No. 163, p. 320, of 1898, being an act to carry these provisions of the Constitution into effect, reads, so far as it needs be quoted:
Construing the provisions of section 2, above quoted, this court has held that the General Assembly did not thereby mean to control the judges in the matter of the time during which they shall actually hold court in the respective parishes of their districts, but, merely, that they shall designate, in advance, certain periods, as "terms of court," with the view of furnishing a basis to public officials for fixing dates, for drawing jurors, or doing other acts, which, under existing laws, have to be done a certain number of days before sessions of the court. Webb v. De Baillon, 51 La.Ann. 789, 25 So. 648. Act No. 108, p. 155, of 1898, is entitled "An act to amend and re-enact Act No. 30 of 1878, relative to appeals in criminal cases," and reads as follows, to wit:
At the time that the act thus quoted was adopted, no definite understanding had been reached as to whether the 10 months' "continuous session," provided for by the Constitution, was to be regarded as a "term," within the meaning of the law which granted the accused until the last day of the "term" within which to appeal or whether the term (for that purpose) was to be considered the period of actual, continuous sitting, in a particular parish, and the evident purpose...
To continue reading
Request your trial