State v. Victor

• Citation: 300 S.C. 220,387 S.E.2d 248
• Decision Date: 30 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 23118,23118
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. William Keith VICTOR, Appellant. . Heard

Page 248

387 S.E.2d 248

300 S.C. 220

The STATE, Respondent, v. William Keith VICTOR, Appellant.

No. 23118.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 30, 1989.

Decided Dec. 11, 1989.

Deputy Chief Atty. Elizabeth C. Fullwood and Asst. Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, both of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Staff Atty. Miller W. Shealy, Jr., Columbia, and Sol. Donald V. Myers, Lexington, for respondent.

GREGORY, Chief Justice:

Appellant was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and grand larceny. He was sentenced to death for murder plus a ten-year term of imprisonment for grand larceny. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The State's case in the guilt phase of trial rested almost entirely on the testimony of Matthew Helms. At the time of the murder, Helms was nineteen years old and shared a trailer with appellant and the victim, Earl Jackson. Appellant, who was in his late twenties, had lived with Earl for nearly eight years; Earl was in his early fifties. Several weeks before the murder, Helms came to live with them.

Helms testified as follows. He was home with Earl on the night of January 4, 1988, when Earl asked him to go get appellant from a neighbor's trailer. Earl apparently wanted appellant to move out. Helms delivered the message and returned home. An hour and a half later, appellant came home intoxicated. He went back to the bedroom and got a gun. At gunpoint appellant ordered Earl to lie on the living room floor while he handcuffed Earl's hands behind his back. Appellant forced Helms to gag Earl with a bandanna then struck Earl on the head with a nightstick causing him to bleed profusely. Appellant led Earl outside to Earl's truck, ordering Helms to accompany them, and drove to a rock quarry where he forced them out of the truck at gunpoint.

Appellant dragged Earl by the handcuffs through the woods onto the rocks on the edge of the quarry. Helms saw appellant hurl Earl off the rocks. Helms was frightened and ran back to the truck. He then heard two gunshots. Appellant returned to the truck alone and the two returned to the trailer where they removed and disposed of the bloody carpet from the living room.

Appellant, however, testified to a different version of events. He stated that before the murder, Earl had discovered some cocaine in the trailer. Earl suspected Helms and was angry with him. On January 4, appellant came home intoxicated after being out the whole evening. Helms told him he had handcuffed Earl and struck him on the head causing bloody stains on the carpet and asked appellant to help him dispose of the carpet at the dump. On the way home from the dump, Helms told appellant he had gagged Earl and taken him out to a field and shot him.

On cross-examination, the solicitor questioned appellant extensively about a statement he gave police after his arrest. The statement indicated appellant was in the trailer while Helms handcuffed, gagged, and struck Earl and that appellant drove the truck to the quarry. According to the statement, appellant took Earl to the rocks on the edge of the quarry to scare him because he wanted to teach Earl a lesson for pulling a gun on him. Earl was frightened and kicked out at appellant. He slipped off the rock into the quarry. Before appellant could save him, Helms ran up and shot Earl several times.

Throughout cross-examination, appellant claimed his prior statement to police was untrue. He acknowledged that he received Miranda ¹ warnings and signed a waiver form, but protested that police threatened him on several occasions with the electric chair. He claimed he lied to police because he was threatened.

On appeal, appellant contends the trial judge erred: (1) in failing to conduct a Jackson v. Denno ² hearing to determine the voluntariness of his statement; and (2) in failing to submit the issue of voluntariness to the jury. We agree.

An accused's involuntary incriminating statement is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (statement taken in violation of fifth amendment right to counsel admissible for impeachment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (statement taken without proper Miranda warnings admissible for impeachment). Appellant was erroneously deprived of an initial determination of the voluntariness of his statement before consideration by the jury as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, supra.

The State contends the appropriate remedy is to remand for a suppression hearing only. This remedy is inadequate in this case because the jury never considered the issue of voluntariness as required by state law. State v. Drayton, 287 S.C. 226, 337 S.E.2d 216 (1985). ³

The State further argues failure to submit the issue of voluntariness for the jury's consideration was harmless. This Court has held this error harmless only when there is no other reasonable inference but...