State v. Victor Tacey

• Decision Date: 07 May 1930
• Citation: 150 A. 68,102 Vt. 439
• Parties: STATE v. VICTOR TACEY
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

150 A. 68

102 Vt. 439

STATE v. VICTOR TACEY

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 7, 1930

February Term, 1930.

Automobiles---"Motor Vehicle"---Laws 1925, No. 70, 87, 3, par 2---Statutes---"Operate" within Meaning of Motor Vehicle Law.

1. In prosecution under Laws 1925, No. 70, 87, for operating a motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor held that automobile which could not be operated on its own power was a "motor vehicle" within meaning of term as defined by Laws 1925, No. 70, 3, par. 2, since manifestly it was the design, mechanism, and construction of vehicle and not its temporary condition, that Legislature had in mind in framing definition.

2. If it can fairly be done, statute must be so construed as to accomplish purpose for which it was intended.

3. Where defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, steered or attempted to steer his automobile while it was being towed, held that he "operated" such automobile within meaning of Laws 1925, No. 70, 87 prohibiting operation of motor vehicle by one under influence of intoxicating liquor.

INFORMATION charging respondent with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of Laws 1925, No. 70, /n 87. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury in Montpelier city court, Fred L. Laird, City Judge, presiding. Verdict guilty, and judgment and sentence thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case. No error.

Judgment that there is no error in the proceedings, and that the respondent takes nothing by the exceptions. Let execution be done.

Burton E. Bailey and Deane C. Davis for the respondent.

C. O. Granai, State's attorney, for the State.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, WILLCOX, and THOMPSON, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

The respondent was convicted of operating a motor vehicle, to wit, an automobile, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of Act No. 70, section 87, Laws of 1925. The first exception is to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for the respondent. Whether this should have been done depends upon the construction to be given to certain provisions of the act referred to, since the evidence respecting what respondent did was undisputed, and no claim is here made but that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Section 3, par. 2 of the statute in question provides that: " Motor vehicle' shall include all vehicles propelled by power other than muscular power, except road rollers, fire apparatus," etc.; and the last paragraph of the same section provides: " Operate,' operating,' or operated' as applied to motor vehicles shall include an attempt to operate and shall be construed to cover all matters and things connected with the presence and use of motor vehicles on the highways, whether they be in motion or at rest."

So far as the record discloses the respondent was first seen on the day in question on Vine Street in the town of Berlin near the intersection of that street with the main highway leading from Montpelier to Barre. He was then in his car, which was being towed by a truck, steering or trying to steer it. How far he had proceeded in this manner did not appear. Subsequently, the car was towed by the truck about a mile toward Montpelier and back to Vine Street, in an attempt to start its engine, which failed to function. On this trip one Gauthier drove the truck, the owner of the truck, Benway, drove or steered respondent's car, and the respondent rode in his car with Benway. When they got back to Vine Street, Benway started to tow the car to respondent's home, a distance of about one-half mile. The respondent again got behind the steering wheel of his car and tried to guide or steer it as it was being towed. They had proceeded but a short distance when they were remonstrated with because of the injury that they were doing to the street, and thereupon they left both the truck and the car and went to respondent's home to get a pair of horses. Before they got back the respondent was arrested.

The respondent insists that, since his automobile could not then be operated on its own power, it was not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute first quoted, and that, in what he did, he did not operate or attempt to operate it within the meaning of the other provisions of the statute quoted.

The first ground is untenable. Manifestly it was the design, mechanism, and construction of the vehicle, and not its temporary condition, that the Legislature had in mind when framing the definition of a motor vehicle. Neither the authorities nor sound logic admit of a different conclusion.

The conviction, therefore, must stand or fall upon the construction given the word "operate," as defined by the statute. According to Webster's International Dictionary this word means: "To put into, or to continue in, operation or activity; to manage; to conduct; to carry out or through; to work; as to operate a machine." See also, Standard Dictionary; Century Dictionary; 29 Cyc. 1496; 5 Words and Phrases, third series, page 629. But our Legislature evidently intended to give to this word a broader and a more inclusive meaning; hence the statutory definition above quoted. In this respect our statute is unlike that of any other state, so far as we have discovered. For this reason, the cases in those states are not directly in point. But since they show what acts have and what have not been held to constitute "...