State v. Villa-Guzman
| Decision Date | 24 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46494 |
| Citation | 166 Idaho 382,458 P.3d 960 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Christina VILLA-GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant |
Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Reed P. Anderson argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
In 2017, Christina Villa-Guzman was charged with trafficking marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Villa-Guzman was tried and a jury found her guilty of a lesser-included misdemeanor offense of being present where there are controlled substances. She was acquitted on two of the charges and the jury could not reach a decision on the remaining charge. After trial, the State requested restitution in the amount of $5,176.32 for the expenses incurred prosecuting Villa-Guzman pursuant to Idaho Code section 37-2732(k). The district court ordered Villa-Guzman to pay restitution in the full amount requested. Villa-Guzman appeals the district court's restitution award. We affirm.
On August 22, 2016, officers with the Jerome County Sheriff's Office responded to a call at the Days Inn in Jerome, Idaho. The call ultimately led to the arrest of Jesus Malagon and appellant, Christina Villa-Guzman. Villa-Guzman was originally charged with trafficking marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia and frequenting a place where controlled substances are known to be located. However, the State moved to dismiss the frequenting charge before trial, which the district court granted. A three-day trial ensued. During closing argument, Villa-Guzman argued that the jury should acquit her of all charged offenses, and, if necessary, only find her guilty of a lesser-included offense of being present where there are controlled substances. The jury did just that, finding Villa-Guzman not guilty of the trafficking marijuana charge, but convicting her of being present where there are controlled substances. She was acquitted of the possession of drug paraphernalia charge and the jury could not reach a verdict on the possession of a controlled substance charge. A judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor lesser-included offense was subsequently entered.
Prior to sentencing, the State requested restitution under Idaho Code section 37-2732(k) in the amount of $5,176.32. As evidence of the costs incurred, the State attached to the restitution request an itemized cost sheet detailing the dates, attorneys, activities, hours, and costs associated with working on Villa-Guzman's case. Although the restitution request was signed by the prosecutor, neither the request nor the attached cost sheet were supported by a sworn statement.
The district court briefly heard the parties’ arguments about restitution at the sentencing hearing on September 17, 2018. Villa-Guzman objected to the restitution request, arguing she was convicted only on the lesser included misdemeanor offense and that the restitution request was almost entirely attributable to the charges for which Villa-Guzman was acquitted or not convicted. Villa-Guzman argued that no restitution should be awarded in the case. The district court took the matter under advisement and issued its written decision a few days later, concluding:
The offense falls squarely within the purview of the statute notwithstanding the conviction was on a lesser included offense. The Court has reviewed the State's itemized restitution request and finds that the items for which the State is requesting reimbursement also fall squarely within the purview of the statute. The Court further finds the request to be reasonable given the lengthy procedural history of this case including a suppression motion, the defendant's switching of counsel midway through the proceedings and a three day jury trial. Finally, although at the time of the sentencing the Court reserved ruling on the restitution amount, the sentence imposed took into consideration that the defendant would nevertheless have a significant restitution obligation, albeit the exact amount had yet to be determined.
The State's restitution request of $5,176.32 was granted in full. Villa-Guzman made no further objections and the district court entered a judgment as outlined in the written decision. Villa-Guzman timely appealed.
Whether the district court's restitution award in the amount of $5,176.32 was an abuse of discretion.
’ " State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 691, 390 P.3d 412, 417 (2017). Thus, this Court reviews the district court's award for abuse of discretion. State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700, 390 P.3d 424, 426 (2017).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). The district court must "base the amount of restitution upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator." Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700, 390 P.3d at 426 (quoting State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014) ). The proper amount of restitution to award is a question of fact and the district court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Villa-Guzman argues the district court's restitution award constituted an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, Villa-Guzman asserts the State failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden because the restitution request and attached cost sheet were unsworn and contained numerous errors which prevented the district court from determining costs actually incurred. Second, Villa-Guzman argues restitution can be awarded only for time spent on charges for which she was convicted. According to Villa-Guzman, the State's request did not specify which expenses were incurred for prosecuting the lesser included misdemeanor offense. Instead, the cost sheet included a global summary of expenses incurred for prosecuting all charges originally brought against Villa-Guzman. We hold that Villa-Guzman's arguments are either (1) unpreserved for appeal; or (2) unsound. Thus, we affirm.
Villa-Guzman cites a general rule that an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence can be made for the first time on appeal. See State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (). While we support this legal principle as it pertains to the evidence necessary to sustain a burden of proof at trial, we disagree that such a standard pertains to matters affecting restitution evidence.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(d)(7) generally applies the rules of evidence to restitution hearings unless modified by Idaho Code section 19-5304(6), which permits the admission of hearsay in some cases. State v. Cunningham , 164 Idaho 759, 763, 435 P.3d 539, 543 (2019). We hold that defects in the documents admitted to support restitution are foundational errors, which require an objection at the time of the restitution hearing to preserve those arguments for appeal. Thus, the broad-sweeping statement in Yeoumans about allowing an appellate challenge to evidence on appeal without specific action in the trial court does not apply to evidence necessary to sustain a burden of proof in restitution hearings under section 37-2732(k). See also I.R.E. 103(a)(1). Errors such as those raised by Villa-Guzman can easily be remedied in the trial court by counsel making a contemporaneous objection. Since Villa-Guzman failed to make such an objection in the trial court, she cannot do so now. State v. Draper , 151 Idaho 576, 593 n.7, 261 P.3d 853, 870 n.7 (2011) (). Thus, we decline reaching the merits about the alleged defects in the State's proof.
Turning to the substance of Villa-Guzman's argument, the district court made two determinations in its restitution order: (1) the misdemeanor conviction was one for which restitution may be ordered pursuant to Idaho Code section 37-2732(k) ; and (2) the items listed in the State's restitution request fell squarely within the purview of that statute. Villa-Guzman argues that the district court's second determination constitutes an abuse of discretion because the costs requested by the State necessarily included costs for charges of which she was acquitted or not convicted of. Thus, she contends the award was not in accordance with the legal requirements of section 37-2732(k) and the district court's decision did not reflect the exercise of reason. For the reasons discussed below, Villa-Guzman's arguments are unpersuasive.
"[S]ection 37-2732(k), by its plain terms, grants discretion to award restitution to the State for prosecution expenses ‘actually incurred .’ " Cunningham , 161 Idaho at 702, 390 P.3d at 428. Idaho Code section 37-2732(k) provides:
Upon conviction of a felony...
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