State v. VILLANUEVA, JR.

Citation29 Kan. App.2d 1056,35 P.3d 936
Decision Date07 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. 85,260.,85,260.
PartiesSTATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JESSE JOSEPH VILLANUEVA, JR., Appellant.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

Peter Maharry, assistant appellate defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, for appellant.

James L. Spies, assistant district attorney, Nick A. Tomasic, district attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GERNON, P.J., KNUDSON and BEIER, JJ.

KNUDSON, J.:

Jesse Joseph Villanueva, Jr. appeals his conviction for the rape of S.M., contending the trial court erred in admitting opinion testimony of a social worker, failing to give a multiple acts instruction, and permitting prosecutorial misconduct that was prejudicial.

We affirm. The errors committed during Villanueva's trial are harmless and did not impair his right to a fair trial.

S.M. and Villanueva were lovers. The State's theory was that after S.M. decided to end the relationship there was a violent quarrel, and Villanueva raped her. Villanueva acknowledges the quarrel but denies raping S.M. This is the second trial, with the first ending when the jury was unable to reach agreement. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary under each of the issues raised on appeal.

Expert Opinion Testimony

Michele Paynter is a social worker employed as a clinical coordinator for the Metropolitan Organization to Counsel Sexual Assault (MOCSA) located in Kansas City, Missouri. Her duties include supervision of other social workers and individually working with victims of rape.

After the first trial ended in a hung jury, the State moved to endorse Paynter as an expert witness regarding rape trauma syndrome and to further testify regarding the content of S.M.'s clinical file maintained at MOCSA. After the rape, S.M. received counseling services from Shannon Hobbs, a social worker employed by MOCSA. Paynter was Hobbs' supervisor at MOCSA. At the time of the second trial, Hobbs no longer worked for MOCSA. During the period of time MOCSA provided counseling services to S.M., Michele Paynter had no direct contact with her.

Villanueva filed a motion in limine, arguing Paynter was not qualified to testify as an expert witness regarding rape trauma syndrome. The trial court agreed and also specifically ruled Paynter would not be allowed to testify as to the signs and symptoms of the syndrome. However, the court further ruled, under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Paynter would be allowed to testify as to the content of S.M.'s clinical file. Inexplicably, the trial court's order was not followed when Paynter testified before the jury. The following are excerpts of Paynter's testimony on direct examination:

"Q.... [W]hat is your educational background?
"A. I have a Bachelor in Social Work and I have some post graduate work in clinical psych.
"Q. In order to be a licensed clinical social worker, is it necessary for you to have a masters or a post bachelor degree?
"A. No. You can get licensure on a bachelor level as well.
"Q. Okay. Do you have that license?
"A. No, I do not.
....
"Q.... In your training and experience, have you learned what symptoms are common in a woman who has been the victim of a rape?
"A.Yes, sir.
....
"Q.... Are you—you're—fair to say you're not qualified to diagnose [victims of rape] with any—
"A. No, I do not do that.
"Q. —psychological disorders?
"A. Right.
"Q. Okay.
"A. But I keep a DSM 4 handy.
"Q.... In the—in the course of your employment [at] MOCSA and your years in seeing clients and your years of training, have you—are you able to say if there is a common set of symptoms or behavior that is displayed by a victim of rape?
"A. Yes, I—I can say that.
"Q. Can you describe some of those characteristics to the jury?
"A. Yes. They vary of course from individual to individual, but many of the symptoms that I have seen and are clinically researched include depression, displacement of anger, self blame, some self-destructive patterns which may include alcohol abuse, promiscuity, self-mutilation, even manifestation of eating disorders.
"Q.... The list of symptoms you just described, is it fair to say that is not a comprehensive list?
"A. It is fair to say that.
"Q. Okay.
"A. This is [an] overall diagnosis for those symptoms, but as the defense attorney has already eluded to, I am not able to make that diagnosis.
"Q. Okay. And, in fact, you have not diagnosed [S.M.] with anything, have you?
"A. I have never diagnosed any of my clients.
"Q. Okay. Great. In your—in the treatment of [S.M.] at MOCSA, was it documented whether she displayed any of those classic characteristics of a victim of rape?
"A. Yes, it was.
"Q. Specifically what?
"A. Shall I read this?
"Q. Please.
"A. Okay. This was an assessment given by Ms. Hobbs. At the end of each month, as clients see the specialist, we are to assess what their overall impact is and what their impressions were in those sessions. Every week that specialist sees [S.M.], she appears to be more depressed. Appears is the operative word that keeps us from being legal trouble. She has been to court one time and is nervous with the upcoming court confrontations with her alleged rapist.

She states that she cries a lot and even with the help of medication, she is having difficulty with her seeming depression. [S.M.] has many feelings that she wants to work on and she states that once she resolves some work—that once she resolves some of her issues, she knows that she will feel better. However, [S.M.] still seems scared to explore some of those feelings. At the end, the intervention specialist identifies that she will continue the cognitive process which is the modality that we follow in my department and it is an offset of Dr. Albert Ellis' (ph) work on rationally motive therapy.

"Q. Okay. That's a lot of big, big words.
"A. Right.
"Q. I'll admit I don't understand all of it.
"A. Basically it's looking at the maladaptive thinking patters that trauma victims can possibly have after a trauma.
"Q. Okay. And that type of thinking—those thinking patterns are present in [S.M.]?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay.
"A. As it appears here.
"Q. And anything else that stands out about [S.M.]'s behavior or—
"A. In essence so as not to read verbatim here, it appears that Ms. Hobbs wrote about some possible avoidant behavior and by that I mean many times trauma victims will express anxiety in coming to these crisis intervention counseling sessions and so they may not show without any call to the person with whom they are interacting and that is very, very common.
"Q. Okay. Anything else that stands out to you as important for the jury to know?
"A. Just an ongoing identification of depression—
"Q. Okay.
"A. —and denial.
"Q. Thank you.
"A. Those two things.
"Q. Denial of what?
"A. Denial that this alleged violation really in fact happened to her and that is very, very common with rape victims. I can't believe that this happened to me." (Emphasis added.)

The use of expert testimony at trial is controlled by K.S.A. 60-456. In order to testify as an expert, a witness must be skilled or experienced in the field to which the subject relates. State v. McClain, 216 Kan. 602, 606, 533 P.2d 1277 (1975). Whether a witness is qualified as an expert is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Colwell, 246 Kan. 382, Syl. ¶ 7, 790 P.2d 430 (1990).

In determining whether the trial court erred, we find instructive State v. Willis, 256 Kan. 837, 888 P.2d 839 (1995).

Willis was convicted of rape, and the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony from a licensed social worker that the victim suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and rape trauma syndrome. At trial, Ruth Durham, the alleged victim's outpatient therapist from a mental health center, testified the victim's behavior was consistent with rape trauma syndrome and that the victim suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

The Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Durham to give expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome. In its opinion reversing Willis' conviction, the court stated:

"While Ruth Durham was eminently qualified as a social worker, having been licensed by the behavioral sciences regulatory board, her background, experience, and licensure did not qualify her to diagnose medical and psychiatric conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder.
"[F]or a witness to qualify as an expert on post-traumatic stress disorder and rape trauma syndrome, the witness must possess special training as an expert in that field of psychiatry. Such testimony should be limited to experts with training in the field of post-traumatic stress disorder and rape trauma syndrome and possessing the professional qualifications to make appropriate diagnoses thereof. A clinical social worker with a masters degree in social work falls well below that mark." 256 Kan. at 846-47.

Also helpful to our analysis is State v. Reser, 244 Kan. 306, 767 P.2d 1277 (1989). At trial, Helen Swan, a licensed social worker, testified for the State. Swan evaluated the alleged victim on two different dates for a total of about 4 hours. There was no question but that Swan was a recognized expert in child sexual abuse cases. Justice Herd, writing for the court, summarized Swan's testimony as follows:

"Swan did not use the term post-traumatic stress syndrome before the jury, but testified that children who are sexually abused tend to report fairly consistent symptoms or common patterns of behavior resulting from the trauma. She noted children seldom report sexual abuse immediately, `particularly within family situations.' The great majority `tend to keep it inside because they think it will go away or they don't want to embarrass people or they don't want to embarrass themselves.'
"Swan testified she had sufficient data to form an opinion as to whether the victim showed symptoms consistent with
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2 cases
  • State v. Rivera
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 25 d3 Novembro d3 2009
    ...our court rejected the defendant's claim that a unanimity instruction was needed because the attack "was one continuous event." 29 Kan.App.2d at 1064, 35 P.3d 936. More recently, in State v. Most, 2009 WL 2371008, at *9 (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion), pet. for review pending, the defe......
  • State v. Villanueva
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 12 d5 Julho d5 2002
    ...of jurors, but held that the errors were harmless and did not impair Villanueva's right to a fair trial. See State v. Villanueva, 29 Kan. App.2d 1056, 35 P.3d 936 (2001). We granted Villanueva's petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. On review, Villanueva limits his claims o......

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