State v. Villegas

Decision Date31 January 2018
Docket NumberAppeal No. 2015AP2162-CR
Citation2018 WI App 9,380 Wis.2d 246,908 N.W.2d 198
Parties STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcos Rosas VILLEGAS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Urszula Tempska of Law Office of Urszula Tempska of Shorewood.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of John S. Greene, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

Before Neubauer, C.J., Gundrum and Hagedorn, JJ.

HAGEDORN, J.

¶ 1 Marcos Rosas Villegas (Villegas)1 is an illegal immigrant who was brought to the United States from Mexico as a young child. When he was sixteen, he and two others broke into a home brandishing weapons, tied up the occupants, and robbed them. The State filed a delinquency petition charging him with armed robbery party to a crime (PTAC) and three other related offenses. The State also filed, and the court granted, a petition to waive Villegas into adult court. Villegas subsequently pled guilty to armed robbery PTAC.

¶ 2 Villegas sought postconviction relief and was denied. On appeal, he challenges both the juvenile and adult court proceedings. He challenges the juvenile waiver proceedings as both an erroneous exercise of discretion generally, and on the grounds that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. He further maintains that he should be able to withdraw his guilty plea in adult court because the plea colloquy was defective and on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel there as well. His plea withdrawal argument is premised largely on the rationale that his attorney failed to inform him that his plea would render him inadmissible to the United States and ineligible for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).

¶ 3 We affirm. Villegas has failed to show that the plea colloquy was defective. Villegas' attorney also did not perform deficiently when he failed to counsel Villegas about DACA and correctly warned Villegas that inadmissibility was a likely result of the plea. Because his guilty plea was valid, Villegas' challenges to the juvenile waiver proceedings—neither of which are offered as separate grounds for plea withdrawal—are forfeited under the guilty plea waiver rule.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Villegas is an illegal immigrant who was brought to the United States when he was five years old. In November 2012, the State filed a delinquency petition accusing Villegas of armed robbery, burglary, and two counts of false imprisonment. Villegas was sixteen at the time of the alleged conduct. The petition set forth the following.

¶ 5 Villegas and two others knocked on the door of an apartment. When a woman, S.A., answered, they pushed their way into the apartment demanding money and marijuana. Two of the housebreakers wielded knives.2 Villegas and his cohorts proceeded to restrain S.A. and another woman by duct taping their hands behind their backs and told them to "stay still" or they would "get hurt." During all of this, S.A.'s two young children were home and in the bedroom. One of the occupants of the apartment was apparently in on the plot; he had arrived earlier to "make things look like they were cool." The accomplice was restrained with duct tape as well. Eventually, the assailants left, stealing an unspecified amount of money and a gaming system.

¶ 6 In light of the seriousness of the offense, the State petitioned the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction, which Villegas' attorney vigorously opposed. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that retaining jurisdiction was contrary to the best interests of the community and Villegas. Accordingly, it granted the petition, and Villegas was charged as an adult.

¶ 7 Villegas reached an agreement with the State and pled guilty to armed robbery PTAC; the other charges were dismissed and read in at sentencing. Before entering the plea, the circuit court engaged Villegas in a colloquy to ensure he understood the agreement and the rights he was giving up. The court explained that armed robbery was "a very serious felony" and carried a potential punishment of forty years in prison. Although there would be a presentence investigation and a sentencing recommendation, the court warned that it was not bound by that recommendation. Villegas indicated that he understood the nature of the offense, the possible punishment, and that the court was not bound by any sentencing recommendation.

¶ 8 The court proceeded to outline that Villegas was giving up his right to a trial, including the associated rights of assistance of counsel during the trial, forcing the State to meet its burden of proof, cross-examining the State's witnesses, and calling his own witnesses. Villegas indicated that he understood. The court also asked whether Villegas had any questions about the plea questionnaire, and Villegas indicated he did not. The court then cautioned that "if you are not a citizen of the United States you are advised that a plea of guilty ... may result in your deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country or even denial of naturalization under federal law." The court followed up and asked Villegas if he understood that Immigration and Customs Enforcement "may look into this case"; Villegas indicated he did. Finally, the court asked Villegas if he understood the factual basis for the charge; Villegas said yes. The court did ask two questions concerning the agreement itself that required clarification by Villegas' attorney—Robert Kennedy.

THE COURT: Do you have any plea agreement other than the court will order a presentence investigation—called a PSI—and that both sides would be free to argue. Do you know anything else that you have been offered?
MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, I don't think he understands you, but in any case the agreement that was just stated today by myself is that, the sole agreement, the only agreement you know of?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: When you leave here do you expect that there will be other concessions?
MR. KENNEDY: I don't know if he understands that either. Do you think that they are going to offer or make any other promises to you or give you any other things other than what we have agreed to?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

Nowhere else in the colloquy did Villegas or his attorney indicate that he did not understand the proceedings. Based on its examination, the court found that Villegas "has freely and voluntarily tendered his plea with knowledge of the factual basis." After Villegas was sentenced, Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued a Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order, which provided that Villegas would be deported upon completing his sentence.

¶ 9 Villegas brought a postconviction motion requesting he be allowed to withdraw his plea. He maintained that the circuit court's plea colloquy was defective, he did not understand the colloquy and was pressured into signing the plea questionnaire, and his counsel rendered ineffective assistance leading up to the plea. The motion also sought reversal of the waiver into adult court on the grounds that the juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion by waiving jurisdiction and that his counsel performed ineffectively in fighting the petition.

¶ 10 The circuit court ordered a hearing on the motion at which Villegas and Kennedy both testified. Kennedy testified he told Villegas that he could appeal the juvenile court's waiver determination, but the "chance of success [was] minimal." As a result, Villegas elected not to appeal the juvenile court's ruling. Kennedy also explained that Villegas never indicated he wished to appeal the juvenile court's decision after pleading guilty or even thought that was a possibility. When asked whether he had specifically informed Villegas that his guilty plea would waive his right to appeal the juvenile court's waiver determination, Kennedy responded that he did not specifically address that point. Kennedy did, however, explain to Villegas that "a plea would waive virtually all rights he had."

¶ 11 Although unaware of Villegas' status as an illegal immigrant during the juvenile waiver hearing, Kennedy testified that he was well aware of that fact before the plea hearing and advised Villegas accordingly.

Kennedy indicated that he spent about two hours going over the plea questionnaire, "explaining it to [Villegas] to make sure he fully understood it." The questionnaire contained the following section addressing the immigration consequences of his plea: "I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, my plea could result in deportation, the exclusion of admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law." Kennedy addressed this section with Villegas and "went over it again and again." Kennedy "pointed out to [Villegas] that it was very likely that he was going to be deported or very likely that his citizenship would be very badly damaged," including the "possibilities of citizenship." In terms of probability, Kennedy explained, "My advice to him was sort of in the 99 percentile range of being deported." In Kennedy's opinion, Villegas "understood" these consequences but "didn't want to face" them. Although Kennedy did not specifically discuss with Villegas whether he would be able to return to the United States after deportation, he "never said anything to [Villegas] to suggest that he might be able to come back."

¶ 12 Given the lack of "any real chance [Villegas] could stay in the United States," Kennedy explained that pleading guilty was part of a "strategy ... to minimize the damage to my client." Kennedy believed it would be "virtually impossible" to win at trial, and going to trial "would probably do a great deal of harm by actually forcing the testimony of those victims and the children." Kennedy explained the relative chances of success to Villegas and "discussed it...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • State v. Al Bawi
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • January 18, 2023
    ...to show that the plea is infirm due to "some factor extrinsic to the plea colloquy," such as ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Villegas, 2018 WI.App. 9, ¶19, 380 Wis.2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198 (quoting v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶74, 301 Wis.2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48). ¶18 Criminal defendants......
  • Commonwealth v. Lopez
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • September 9, 2019
    ...her ability to obtain an adjustment in status, a waiver of inadmissibility, or cancellation of removal"); State v. Villegas, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 269, 908 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 2018) (defense counsel "had no constitutional duty to give specific, direct advice on how pleading guilty would affect ......
  • State v. Kharb
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • March 12, 2019
    ...and convincing evidence, that plea withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Villegas , 2018 WI App 9, ¶18, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198, review denied , 2018 WI 100, 384 Wis. 2d 768, 920 N.W.2d 920. On appeal, Kharb first argues this standard has been met because......
  • People v. Jennings
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • August 19, 2021
    ...claim unless it relates directly to the adequacy of the plea itself, see Stovall , ¶¶ 16-17 ; see also State v. Villegas , 380 Wis.2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198, 215 n.19 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (collecting cases supporting this proposition). To reiterate, Jennings does not contend that her guilty pl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT