State v. Villela

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Citation: 450 P.3d 170
• Decision Date: 17 October 2019
• Docket Number: No. 96183-2,96183-2
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Joel A. VILLELA, Respondent.

450 P.3d 170

STATE of Washington, Petitioner,
v.
Joel A. VILLELA, Respondent.

No. 96183-2

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued September 10, 2019
Filed October 17, 2019

Kevin James McCrae, Katharine W. Mathews, Grant County Prosecutor's Office, P.O. Box 37, 35 C Street NW, Ephrata, WA 98823-1685, for Petitioner.

Lila Jane Silverstein, Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-3647, for Respondent.

William H. Block, Attorney at Law, 3002 Cascadia Avenue S., Seattle, WA 98144-6214, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, 901 5th Avenue, Suite 630, Seattle, WA 98164-2086, for Amicus Curiae (American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation).

William R. Maurer, Institute For Justice, 600 University Street, Suite 1730, Seattle, WA 98101-2925, for Amicus Curiae (Institute For Justice).

Teymur Gasanovich Askerov, Black Law PLLC, 705 2nd Avenue, Suite 1111, Seattle, WA 98104-1720, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).

Magda Rona Baker, Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Place S., Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Defender Association).

Shelley Anne Williams, Attorney General Office, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98104-3188, for Amicus Curiae (Washington State Patrol).

González, J.

450 P.3d 172

¶1 Our state constitution protects our right to privacy. CONST. art. I, § 7. Under our constitution, the State and its agents may not disturb our "private affairs ... without authority of law." Id. "Authority of law" generally means a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate or a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement.

¶2 We are asked today whether the legislature has created "authority of law," as understood in our constitution, by passing RCW 46.55.360. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 167, § 3. Under RCW 46.55.360, officers are required to impound a vehicle any time they arrest its driver for driving under the influence. This impound is mandatory, regardless of whether the vehicle is safely off the roadway or whether another person is able to safely drive it away. The trial court below found that RCW 46.55.360 violates our constitution because it requires what the constitution allows only under limited circumstances. We agree. Our constitution cannot be amended by statute, and while the legislature can give more protection to constitutional rights through legislation, it cannot use legislation to take that protection away. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶3 Late one night in January 2018, Sergeant Paul Snyder stopped a jeep driven by Joel Villela for speeding. Sergeant Snyder smelled alcohol on Villela's breath and, after Villela declined a roadside field sobriety test, arrested him on suspicion of driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). Sergeant Snyder also impounded Villela's jeep under RCW 46.55.360. Following the dictates of RCW 46.55.360, Sergeant Snyder did not consider whether there was a reasonable alternative to impounding Villela's jeep, such as releasing it to one of Villela's two passengers.

¶4 After the jeep was impounded, Sergeant Snyder did an inventory search of its contents. Sergeant Snyder found sandwich bags, digital scales, black cloth, pipes, and $340 in cash, all of which he believed was associated with drug dealing. A search incident to arrest discovered cocaine on Villela himself. Villela was charged with DUI and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances.

¶5 Villela moved to suppress the fruits of the inventory search on the grounds that the mandatory impound of his jeep (which was the only grounds for the search) was not a lawful seizure under article I, section 7.¹ At the hearing, the trial judge noted that this issue had come up several times before in the Grant County Superior Court, including in his own courtroom. Villela offered evidence that the costs associated with even a brief vehicle impound can easily exceed $1,000 and may result in the loss of the vehicle. The trial

450 P.3d 173

judge granted the suppression motion, concluding:

[W]hile a state may impose more restrictive standards than the constitution requires, it may not, as the Washington legislature did when it enacted RCW 46.55.360, expand the scope of police authority to [search] and seize under the constitution. See Nathanson v. United States , 290 U.S. 41, [54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159] (1933). That statute, therefore, is unconstitutional.

Clerk's Papers at 50.

¶6 The parties agreed that there was good cause for immediate review. RAP 2.4, 2.3(b)(4). Thus, there has been no trial yet. Our commissioner granted the State's motion for direct review. The Washington State Patrol submitted an amicus brief supporting the State. The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, the Washington Defender Association, the Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Institute for Justice filed a joint amicus brief supporting Villela.

ANALYSIS

¶7 "The right to be free from searches by government agents is deeply rooted in our nation's history and law, and it is enshrined in our state and national constitutions." State v. Day , 161 Wash.2d 889, 893, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV ; CONST. art. I, § 7 ). "Generally, officers of the State must obtain a warrant before intruding into the private affairs of others, and we presume that warrantless searches violate both constitutions." Id. However, "[t]hat presumption can be rebutted if the State shows a search fell within certain ‘narrowly and jealousy drawn [exceptions] to the warrant requirement.’ " Id. at 893-94, 168 P.3d 1265 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Stroud , 106 Wash.2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled in part by State v. Valdez , 167 Wash.2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009) ).

¶8 Villela challenges the constitutionality of the mandatory seizure statute, RCW 46.55.360. " ‘We presume statutes are constitutional and review challenges to them de novo.’ " State v. Lanciloti , 165 Wash.2d 661, 667, 201 P.3d 323 (2009) (quoting City of Seattle v. Ludvigsen , 162 Wash.2d 660, 668, 174 P.3d 43 (2007) ). As the challenger, Villela bears the burden of establishing that the statutorily mandated seizure of his vehicle violates our constitution. Id. (citing Heinsma v. City of Vancouver , 144 Wash.2d 556, 561, 29 P.3d 709 (2001) ).

¶9 RCW 46.55.350 -.360, also known as "Hailey's Law," was in part a response to a tragic car accident. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 167, § 1. It says in most relevant part:

(1)(a) When a driver of a vehicle is arrested for a violation of RCW 46.61.502 [driving under the influence] or 46.61.504 [physical control of a vehicle while under the influence], the vehicle is subject to summary impoundment and except for a commercial vehicle or farm transport vehicle under subsection (3)(c) of this section, the vehicle must be impounded.

....

(2)(a) When a driver of a vehicle is arrested for a violation of RCW 46.61.502 or 46.61.504 and the driver is a registered owner of the vehicle, the impounded vehicle may not be redeemed within a twelve-hour period following the time the impounded vehicle arrives at the registered tow truck operator's storage facility ... unless there are two or more registered owners of the vehicle or there is a legal owner of the vehicle that is not the driver of the vehicle. A registered owner who is not the driver of the vehicle or a legal owner who is not the driver of the vehicle may redeem the impounded vehicle after it arrives at the registered tow truck operator's storage facility.

RCW 46.55.360. The legislature was concerned that under existing law, those arrested for DUI could "go[ ] to the tow truck operator's storage facility and redeem[ ] the vehicle while still impaired." RCW 46.55.350(1)(b). The statute includes detailed exceptions for commercial and agricultural vehicles and immunity provisions for officers, government agencies, and tow truck operators. RCW 46.55.360(1)(c), (3)(c), (4). The legislature's intent was

450 P.3d 174

(a) [t]o change the primary reason for impounding the vehicle operated by a person arrested for driving or controlling a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The purpose of impoundment under [ RCW 46.55.350 -.360] is to protect the public from a person operating a vehicle while still impaired, rather than to prevent a potential traffic obstruction; and

(b) [t ]o require that officers have no discretion as to whether

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