State v. Vincent
| Decision Date | 11 June 1930 |
| Citation | 231 N.W. 263,202 Wis. 47 |
| Parties | STATE v. VINCENT ET AL. (TWO CASES). |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a Judgment of the Circuit Court for Waupaca County; Byron B. Park, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
The defendants Guy R. Siegel, E. H. Vincent, and Earl Meating were convicted on November 23, 1928, of concealing stolen automobiles, and of kindred offenses, denounced by the statute, from which judgment of conviction the defendants Meating and Vincent separately appeal.
The defendants Siegel, Vincent, and Meating were convicted upon thirty–eight counts. The first fourteen counts charged a violation of section 343.19 of the Statutes, in that they feloniously received and concealed fourteen different stolen automobiles. Counts 15 to 26, inclusive, charged each of the defendants with violation of section 85.04 (12) of the Statutes, in that they did, knowingly, make false statements in certain applications for automobile licenses and certificates of title, each count referring to a separate and distinct transaction. Each of the automobiles described in counts 15 to 26 was also described in counts 1 to 14. Counts 27 to 38 charged each of the defendants with a violation of section 343.183 of the Statutes, in that they did receive, conceal, and have in their possession certain automobiles therein described, from which the manufacturer's serial number had been removed, defaced, and altered for the purpose of concealing and misrepresenting the identity of said automobile. The automobiles described in counts 27 to 38 were all comprehended within counts 1 to 14, inclusive, and again within counts 15 to 26, inclusive.
It appears that for some time prior to 1928 the defendant Guy R. Siegel had been conducting a garage and sales agency at New London, Wis., being a local agent for the Hudson and Essex cars. The defendants Vincent and Meating were salesmen in his employ at all of the times fixed and described in the various counts upon which they were convicted. It plainly appears that for the first six months of 1928 there had been received in Siegel's garage cars which were stolen; that the numbers thereof had been changed; that they had been sold and disposed of; that applications for licenses and certificates of title had been made to the secretary of state in which they were stated to be new cars from the factory. The evidence so conclusively established guilt on the part of Siegel that its sufficiency was not challenged upon his appeal from the judgment of conviction to this court. Siegel v. State (Wis.) 229 N. W. 44. However, the relations of the defendants Vincent and Meating to these transactions are somewhat different, as they were simply in the employ of Siegel as salesmen, and they claim that, although they participated in the sale of most of these cars, they did not know they were stolen cars, and believed that they were all new cars from the factory, or from the state distributor at Milwaukee. The sufficiency of the evidence to establish their guilty knowledge is not challenged upon this appeal, but they rely for reversal upon certain procedural errors, which will be detailed and discussed in the opinion.
Francis J. Rooney, of Appleton (Benton, Bosser & Luttrup, of Appleton, of counsel), for appellant.
John W. Reynolds, Atty. Gen., J. E. Messerschmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lloyd D. Smith, Dist. Atty., of Waupaca, for the State.
The defendants Vincent and Meating took separate and independent appeals from the judgment. Vincent has made no appearance in this court, and his appeal would have been dismissed had not the Attorney General stipulated that his appeal should meet with the same disposition accorded to the appeal of the defendant Meating, who appeared and prosecuted his appeal, for which reason the same disposition will be made of the respective appeals.
[1][2] It is first urged that the court erred in denying the motion of the defendant Meating for a separate trial. This motion was made after the case was called and before the impaneling of the jury commenced. The motion was accompanied by no showing that the interest of the defendant Meating would be prejudiced if he were not accorded a separate trial. It was just a bare motion, and, apparently, rather casually made. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the granting of separate trials in such cases rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145;Mayfield v. State, 142 Wis. 661, 126 N. W. 15;Novkovic v. State, 149 Wis. 665, 135 N. W. 465. In view of the fact that there were no representations made to the court necessitating the granting of separate trials, it cannot be said that a denial of the motion constituted an abuse of discretion.
[3][4] It is next urged that the court erred in admitting evidence showing the relation of all of the defendants to four specified autobiles, not described in the information, and the manner in which they were handled and dealt with in passing through Siegel's hands. The objection to this testimony rests upon the familiar rule that evidence of the commission of other offenses is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. Although this is universally recognized as a general proposition, certain exceptions thereto are just as well established as the rule itself. Evidence of the commission of other offenses has frequently been held admissible by this court where such evidence tends to establish some ingredient of the offense charged, such as knowledge, intent, etc. Fossdahl v. State, 89 Wis. 485, 62 N. W. 185;Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N. W. 166, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 732;Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203 N. W. 749;Smith v. State, 195 Wis. 555, 218 N. W. 822. In prosecutions for adultery, other adulterous acts between the same parties may be shown to establish an adulterous disposition. Gundlach v. State, 184 Wis. 65, 198 N. W. 742. Such evidence has also been held admissible in prosecutions for abandonment of children. Firmeis v. State, 61 Wis. 140, 20 N. W. 663;Hopkins v. State, 126 Wis. 104, 105 N. W. 223;Adams v. State, 164 Wis. 223, 159 N. W. 726. Evidence of other offenses is admissible to prove knowledge, intent, system, or design. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 15. It is also competent to show that the crime...
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State v. Russell
...a matter wholly within the discretion of the court. The Wisconsin case does not mention the statute. The court said in the case of State v. Vincent, supra: "It was just bare motion, and, apparently, rather casually made. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the granting of separ......