State v. Vincent M.

• Citation: 52 Conn.Supp. 267,43 A.3d 839
• Decision Date: 16 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2491526.,2491526.
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. VINCENT M.

52 Conn.Supp. 267

43 A.3d 839

STATE of Connecticut

v.VINCENT M.¹

No. 2491526.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury.

Feb. 16, 2012.

RUBINOW, J.

This memorandum of decision addresses issues related to the competency evaluation of Vincent M. The state of Connecticut has filed an information alleging that Vincent engaged in delinquent acts when he was approximately ten years old. Through counsel, Vincent moved for, and the court granted, an evaluation of his competency to stand trial, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 54–56d.²

After a hearing held pursuant to § 54–56d (e), the court finds that the movant has failed to meet his burden of proving that he is not competent. See General Statutes § 54–56d (b). Accordingly, Vincent is presumed competent to stand trial on the pending delinquency charges. See General Statutes § 54–56d (a); see also State v. Juan L., 291 Conn. 556, 969 A.2d 698 (2009).

IPROCEDURAL HISTORY

Through its information filed August 11, 2010, the state alleges that on or about May 24, 2010, Vincent committed delinquent acts by way of sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70, and sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–73a.

Vincent, who was born in March, 2000, first appeared before the juvenile court on August 18, 2010. On August 26, 2011, after the case had been pending for more than a year, Vincent's attorney moved for a competency evaluation. The court granted defense counsel's motion, and an examination was conducted as requested.³ The competency hearing was conducted on November 3, 2011. Called by the moving party, Dr. Kathleen Rivera, the evaluator, was the sole witness; she was subject to direct examination and cross-examination, and the court inquired of this witness as authorized by § 54–56d (b).

IIAPPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

In State v. Juan L., supra, 291 Conn. at 556, 969 A.2d 698, our Supreme Court specifically considered “whether General Statutes § 54–56d (m), which governs the commitment or release of criminal defendants who are not competent to stand trial, applies in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id., at 557–59, 969 A.2d 698.⁴Juan L.concluded that § 54–56d (m) does apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and confirmed that the statute provides lawful options for disposition of children examined and found to be not competent and not restorable in delinquency cases. Id., at 559, 569, 969 A.2d 698. In reaching this conclusion, the Juan L. court's examination of the legislative history and relevant amendments to § 54–56d in general, and § 54–56d (m) specifically, “eliminates any doubt that the legislature intended the [competency evaluation] statute to apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings.” Id., at 570–71, 969 A.2d 698. The Supreme Court thus held that “the relevant provisions of § 54–56d, and particularly subsection (m), govern competency questions arising in juvenile matters proceedings.” Id., at 574, 969 A.2d 698; see also In re Jan Carlos D., 297 Conn. 16, 24 n. 13, 997 A.2d 471 (2010) (use of § 54–56d competency protocol for children is “consistent with the goals of the juvenile system as set forth in General Statutes § 46b–121h”), citing State v. Juan L., supra, at 572–73, 969 A.2d 698.

Accordingly, given the application of § 54–56d (b) to the present delinquency matter, Vincent is presumed to be competent. In re Jan Carlos D., supra, 297 Conn. at 24 n. 13, 997 A.2d 471;State v. Juan L., supra, 291 Conn. at 574, 969 A.2d 698. As the moving party, Vincent bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he is not competent because he is “unable to understand the [juvenile] proceedings against him ... or to assist in his ... own defense.” General Statutes § 54–56d (a).

The court has assessed the issue of Vincent's competency to stand trial in juvenile court in the context of Connecticut's juvenile justice legislation as a whole.⁵ This statutory scheme both acknowledges that young children may commit delinquent acts, and provides consequences for such misconduct. Our legislation establishes the jurisdiction of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters over the prosecution, conviction and imposition of dispositional consequences upon children, even of tender years, whose conduct offends the law. See chapter 815t of the General Statutes. For instance, the Division of Criminal Justice is statutorily obligated to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by juveniles.⁶ In addition, legislation requires the judicial branch, as further discussed herein, as well as the Department of Children and Families, to provide responsive services for juveniles who are found by the court to be delinquent.⁷

Connecticut law does not ascribe any minimum age that a child must have reached before he or she can be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of delinquent acts.⁸ See General Statutes § 46b–120 (1), (2), (5) and (10), as amended. Effective as of January 1, 2010, and relevant to the date when he is alleged to have engaged in sexual assaults, Vincent was defined as a “child” within the scope of our delinquency statutes, given his date of birth: § 46b–120 then provided, in relevant part, that the term “(1) ‘Child’ means any person under sixteen years of age, except that for purposes of delinquency matters and proceedings, ‘child’ means any person ... under eighteen years of age ....” (Emphasis added.) Section 46b–120 (10) established that “ ‘ delinquent act ’ means the violation of any federal or state law, or the violation of any order of the Superior Court, other than the commission of (A) an infraction or violation by a youth [a person sixteen or seventeen years of age] under subsection (b) of section 51–164n [enumerating violations], or (B) a motor vehicle violation by a youth for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed....” (Emphasis added.) Section 46b–120 (11) defined violation of § 53a–70 as a “ ‘serious juvenile offense.’ ” Without referencing any minimum age at which a child would be eligible for conviction as delinquent, § 46b–120 (5) provided that “a child may be convicted as ‘delinquent’ who has violated (A) any federal or state law, other than the commission of (i) an infraction or violation by a youth under subsection (b) of 51–164n, or (ii) a motor vehicle violation by a youth for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, (B) any order of the Superior Court, except as provided in 46b–148 [no detention permitted for child violating Family With Service Needs orders], or (C) conditions of probation as ordered for the court [for delinquency matters]....” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b–140 (a) provided the protocol for the court's disposition of a delinquent child, without identifying any minimum age-eligibility for such consequences, as follows: “(a) In determining the appropriate disposition of a child convicted as delinquent, the court shall consider: (1) The seriousness of the offense, including the existence of any aggravating factors such as the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense and the impact of the offense on any victim; (2) the child's records of delinquency; (3) the child's willingness to participate in available programs; (4) the existence of other mitigating factors; and (5) the culpability of the child in committing the offense including the level of the child's participation in the planning and carrying out of the offense.” ⁹ Yet again, without specifying any minimum age, General Statutes § 46b–141 (a) established the court's jurisdiction to order commitments for children who have been convicted as delinquent, in relevant part, as follows: “[C]ommitment of children convicted as delinquent by the Superior Court to the Department of Children and Families shall be for (1) an indeterminate time up to a maximum of eighteen months, or (2) when so convicted for a serious juvenile offense, up to a maximum of four years at the discretion of the court, unless extended,” as allowed by law.

Accordingly, as with any “child” as defined by § 46b–120 (1)(A), who, engaging in conduct alleged to be sexual assaults, Vincent was eligible to be charged with delinquent acts as defined by § 46b–120 (10) or (11). The lack of any threshold age which a “child” must have reached before he or she can be charged with a “delinquent act” is fully consistent with the legislation creating and governing our juvenile justice scheme, which promotes the provision of clinical services and rehabilitation, not penalties, for juveniles upon conviction. See In re Earl B., 121 Conn.App. 269, 288 n. 5, 994 A.2d 713 (2010), quoting In re Tyvonne M., 211 Conn. 151, 160, 558 A.2d 661 (1989).¹⁰

A review of the applicable legislation places in context the limited role of the age of a child, such as Vincent, who is subject to delinquency charges.¹¹ The goals of our state's juvenile justice system are codified at § 46b–121h. See In re Jan Carlos D., supra, 297 Conn. at 24 n. 13, 997 A.2d 471.Section 46b–121h explains that the juvenile justice system is designed to provide “individualized supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a manner consistent with public safety to those juveniles who violate the law” without designating any threshold age that a child must achieve before becoming eligible to be charged with committing delinquent acts, or before receiving care, accountability and treatment in response. For those whose conduct and needs are addressed by the juvenile justice system, the goals established by § 46b–121h are to: “(1) Hold juveniles accountable for their unlawful behavior; (2) Provide secure and therapeutic confinement to those juveniles who present a danger to the community; [and] (3) Adequately protect the community and juveniles....” Similarly, no minimum age limit for participation in programs and services to be implemented within the...