State v. Vistuba
| Decision Date | 30 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 67267,67267 |
| Citation | 251 Kan. 821,840 P.2d 511 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Kenneth J. VISTUBA, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A civil or criminal infraction is not always essential to justify a vehicle stop. Safety reasons alone may justify the stop if the safety reasons are based upon specific and articulable facts.
2. A vehicle stop does not violate either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts which constitute adequate grounds to believe that a driver is falling asleep.
Thomas J. Drees, Asst. County Atty., argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., was with him on the brief, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
This is a first impression vehicle "safety stop" case. The issue is whether a law enforcement officer is justified in stopping a vehicle based on specific and articulable observations of erratic driving which could reasonably lead to an officer's belief that the driver is falling asleep. The reason for the stop is the safety of the driver and other highway users.
The State appeals the dismissal of a complaint charging Kenneth J. Vistuba with driving while under the influence (DUI) (K.S.A. 8-1567).
Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1) (). Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Ward, 233 Kan. 144, 145, 660 P.2d 957 (1983).
We hold that such a safety stop is permissible. We find an abuse of discretion and reverse the trial court. The complaint is reinstated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
During the early morning hours in July 1991, Vistuba was arrested and charged with DUI. He pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The basis for the motion rested on the theory that the arresting officer, a deputy sheriff, did not have a K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402 reasonable suspicion to stop Vistuba.
The deputy testified that while on routine patrol she: (1) observed Vistuba driving below the speed limit and hugging the curb; (2) followed Vistuba out of the city limits for approximately two and one-half to three miles (the county road is blacktop with no curbing); and (3) observed Vistuba's pickup go towards the ditch, turn back, go towards the ditch again, and then be jerked back. The pickup did leave the roadway onto the dirt shoulder; however, it always returned to the roadway.
The deputy testified:
The direct examination of the deputy by defense counsel concluded as follows:
On cross-examination by the State, the deputy testified that Vistuba did leave his lane of traffic when he drove off the right side of the road, but he did not cross the center line. She then testified:
Vistuba, asserting that the stop was illegal, relied on the deputy's testimony that she had no reasonable suspicion, as required by K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402, that he was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime.
The trial court dismissed the DUI charge, reasoning:
The State contends that the deputy had "probable cause" to stop Vistuba under K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402 because she observed a traffic violation, i.e., failure to maintain a single lane of traffic (K.S.A. 8-1522). The State, in requesting that the complaint be reinstated, emphasizes that the trial court erred in finding the stop illegal.
The State asserts that the deputy observed Vistuba commit the traffic violation of failure to maintain a single lane of traffic. This assertion is true in that the deputy did observe the violation; however, the traffic violation was not the reason Vistuba was stopped.
K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402(1) provides:
"Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand ... the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions."
K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402(1), the Kansas stop and frisk statute, is a codification of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. 506, 508-09, 819 P.2d 644 (1991).
The stop of a vehicle being driven on the streets always constitutes a seizure. "The 'stop' authorized by K.S.A. 22-2402 requires that a law enforcement officer must have prior knowledge of facts or observe conduct of a person which causes the officer to reasonably suspect that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime." State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, Syl. p 2, 703 P.2d 761 (1985).
The deputy testified that she had no reason to believe Vistuba was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime. When asked on cross-examination whether Vistuba's driving on the shoulder constituted failing to maintain a single lane of traffic, she stated: "I would have to read the wording on it, but yes, it would be."
The stop, based on specific and articulable facts, was made for safety reasons.
We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me.1989) (...
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