State v. Vonachen
| Decision Date | 04 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 118,361,118,361 |
| Citation | 476 P.3d 774 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Samuel VONACHEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Christina M. Kerls, of Northeast Kansas Conflict Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Andrew R. Davidson, senior assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Keith Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
When he was 14 years old, Samuel Vonachen burned down his family home while his parents and little sister were sleeping inside. His mother and sister died. The State charged Samuel with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson. After being certified to be tried as an adult, he was convicted as charged. In this direct appeal, he advances seven challenges to reverse those results. We reject each one and affirm.
Shortly after midnight on September 26, 2013, Samuel's father, Steve Vonachen, woke up to a smoke alarm. He went to the top of the stairs, saw fire, and went down to the kitchen to call for help. The phone did not work, so he tried to get back upstairs but the fire's spread prevented that. He ran outside, thinking his wife Karla, 14-year-old son Samuel, and 11-year-old daughter A.V. were still inside.
A passerby noticed the house fire and saw Steve running out. They called 911 and kept Steve from going back inside. Firefighters found Karla and A.V. unresponsive in a bedroom. Samuel was missing.
Around 2 a.m., a police officer saw a young man walking towards the Vonachen home. The officer approached and learned the young man was Samuel. The officer asked him what he had been doing the last two hours. Samuel answered, "[J]ust been walking around." Emergency medical personnel noticed Samuel had a rapid heart rate and high blood pressure. Officer Chris Flynn took Samuel to a hospital.
When examined at the hospital, there were no burn marks on Samuel's clothing, skin, hair, or face. His jeans appeared to be new because they still had the clear strip down the pant leg showing the size. A distinct gasoline odor caught Flynn's attention because a gas can was found on the porch and Steve had said the fire traveled in a line up the stairs. Samuel's clean appearance contrasted with Steve's. According to an examining nurse, Steve was "[j]ust completely covered in soot."
Detective Dean Harcrow briefly interviewed Samuel in his father's presence while at the hospital. After that, Samuel was released to Steve, who took him to his grandparents' house and then drove back to check on Karla, who was still alive. Later that same day, Steve went to the police station, where he listened to a 911 recording and recognized Samuel's voice.
Samuel was brought to the police station. Two detectives interviewed Samuel while his father sat next to him. Samuel waived his Miranda rights. About half an hour into the interview, Steve left the room at Samuel's request. Samuel then confessed "how he burnt the house down with his family inside" and described how he did it. He drew a diagram of the fire and the pour pattern he made with the gasoline.
Autopsy reports showed Karla and A.V. died of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries. The State charged Samuel with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson in the juvenile court. The district court granted the State's motion to authorize adult prosecution.
A jury convicted Samuel of all counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison with no possibility of parole for 25 years for the two first-degree murder convictions, 155 months' imprisonment for the attempted first-degree murder conviction, and 59 months' imprisonment for the aggravated arson conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to each other.
Samuel directly appeals to this court. He argues: (1) our state's approach to the insanity defense violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) a court order compelling him to produce personal writings made at a detention center while awaiting trial violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights ; (3) the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the incriminating statements made to police; (4) prosecutorial error occurred during closing arguments; (5) cumulative error adversely affected his right to a fair trial; (6) the court's certification to try him as an adult violated Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) (); and (7) the court abused its discretion in applying the factors set out in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2347(e) to authorize a juvenile's adult prosecution.
Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4) (); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5402(b) ().
For the first time on appeal, Samuel argues he was unconstitutionally denied an ability to pursue what he characterizes as a traditional insanity defense because K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5209 sets out a different approach of how to use mental disease or defect as a defense. The statute declares, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5209. He claims the statute violates his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
These arguments were not raised with the district court, so we must decide whether they can be considered now. Courts generally do not address constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. State v. Harris , 311 Kan. 371, Syl. ¶ 1, 461 P.3d 48 (2020) (). For the reasons discussed, we hold his Eighth Amendment claim is not preserved, and we decline to invoke the exceptions to our general rule as it concerns the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Additional facts
Prior to trial, Samuel filed a notice of mental disease or defect. The district court ordered two licensed psychologists to evaluate his mental status. They prepared a report using psychological test material, objective data, behavioral observations, and interviews, as well as police reports, court and detention facility records, Samuel's confession video, and audio recordings made with Samuel at the scene, while being taken to the ER, and when interviewed at the hospital.
The psychologists diagnosed Samuel with "Other Specified Personality Disorder" and "AD/HD, combined type." They noted his "mental status can best be characterized as manifestation of youth psychopathy, or antisocial personality." The sole reason why the diagnosis indicated "Other Specified Personality Disorder" was because Samuel did not meet the age criteria—18 or older at the time of the evaluation—to be diagnosed for antisocial personality disorder.
Their findings included: "his (pre-arrest) family relationships as unremarkable, with no indications of chronic relational problems, serious conflict, or abuse"; he "has expressed little to no emotion about the deaths of his sister and mother"; he has "been an above average to excellent student with no significant behavior issues at school"; "[h]e truly believes he is literally superior to everyone"; "[h]e is impulsive and he is deceitful"; he "clearly appears to have intended to engage in the actions that led to the death of his mother and sister"; and his "plan was carried out impulsively and seemingly without rational cause" but "his initial goal was achieved." The report explained, "Like most kids his age ..., they simply do not think through consequences ... [and, therefore, Samuel] thought through setting the fire, but he simply did not think through what would or should follow afterward."
At trial, Trevor Patton, one of the court-appointed psychologists, testified that he used "the Weschler [sic ] Intelligence Scale for Children" and found Samuel had "a full scale IQ score of 127 which is superior at the 96th percentile compared to same age peers." He did not find "any indicator ... of any kind of cognitive impairment," but instead observed Samuel "had a pretty strong vocabulary, seemed to be at least bright, and ... provided a pretty good account of those specific details regarding his history, schooling, [and] family relationships." Patton noted there was "no history of any kind of trauma or abuse." He discovered Samuel had "some history of ADHD or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder treatment that began in early childhood and then ... around middle school the defendant was no longer treated" since the treatment became unnecessary. He explained that ADHD is a "very common" affliction to children.
Patton said Samuel's personality disorder and his ability to form the intent to commit a crime are "completely different question[s]." The personality disorder simply indicated Samuel could "have a callous disregard for the welfare of others and be willing to sacrifice others for their own gain." But that did not affect his "capacity to form the intent." They are "two separate concepts." Patton concluded Samuel did not have any "mental disease or defect that rendered him incapable of forming the intent to commit these crimes."
Shelby Evans, the other court-appointed...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Frantz
...discretion by preventing Frantz from questioning Patrick about an alleged threat that was never substantiated. See State v. Vonachen , 312 Kan. 451, 460, 476 P.3d 774 (2020) (appellant has burden to provide record sufficient to establish claimed error). Furthermore, the district court did n......
-
State v. Peterson
... ... In addition, ... however, Peterson has not included the videotape in the ... appellate record, an omission that undercuts his claim for ... relief, since we could not readily assess the impact of the ... evidence if we were so inclined. State v. Vonachen , ... 312 Kan. 451, 460-61, 476 P.3d 774 (2020) (court will not ... consider point if appellant fails to furnish record ... sufficient to permit review of claimed error) ... On ... appeal, the State relies on State v. Kackley , 32 ... Kan.App.2d 927, ... ...
-
State v. Baggett
...substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion is based." State v. Vonachen , 312 Kan. 451, 471, 476 P.3d 774 (2020). To the extent the question requires us to interpret a statute, our review is unlimited. See 312 Kan. at 471. K.S.A. 20......
-
State v. Jones
...the issue to prevent a denial of fundamental rights. Both are recognized exceptions to the general rule. See, e.g., State v. Vonachen , 312 Kan. 451, 457, 476 P.3d 774 (2020). Theoretically, both exceptions could apply. See, e.g., U.S.D. No. 503 v. McKinney , 236 Kan. 224, 234, 689 P.2d 860......