State v. Votta
Decision Date | 16 December 2009 |
Docket Number | No. PD-1366-08.,No. PD-1368-08.,No. PD-1369-08.,No. PD-1367-08.,PD-1366-08.,PD-1367-08.,PD-1368-08.,PD-1369-08. |
Citation | 299 S.W.3d 130 |
Parties | The STATE of Texas v. Joseph VOTTA, a/k/a Joseph Vital,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
John Thomas Floyd, III, for appellant.
Jim Vollers, Jeffrey L. VanHorn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State of Texas.
Appellee, Joseph Votta, was charged with two counts of possession and two counts of bail jumping and failure to appear. Because he was incarcerated in a federal facility while these charges were pending, he sought a speedy disposition under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA). When the State failed to bring Appellee to trial within the 180-day limitation period set out in the IADA, the charges against him were dismissed with prejudice. The State appealed the dismissal, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v. Votta, a/k/a Joseph Vital, 267 S.W.3d 197 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008). The State filed a petition for discretionary review raising seven grounds for review. We reverse the court of appeals.
Appellee was arrested in Jackson County and charged with possession of cocaine and possession of heroin. He told the police his name was Joseph Vital, and this is the name under which he was indicted. He posted bond, but later failed to appear for the charges. As a result, he was also indicted, under the name Joseph Vital, for two counts of bail jumping and failure to appear.
While these charges were pending, Appellee was convicted of a federal crime and incarcerated in the federal correctional facility in Minersville, Pennsylvania, under his real name, Joseph Votta. The Jackson County Sheriff's Department located Appellee and sent a letter asking the institution to place detainers on him. The letter identified Appellee as "Votta, Joseph, aka Vital, Joseph" and listed the warrants as "Possession of a Controlled Substance in Penalty Group 1, to-wit cocaine (Bond Forfeiture) and Possession of a Controlled substance in penalty group 1, to-wit Heroin (Bond Forfeiture)." The only cause numbers listed were for the possession charges.
The Inmate Systems Manager at the federal correctional facility received the detainers from the Jackson County Sheriff's Department and replied with a detainer action letter informing the Jackson County Sheriff's Department that the detainer had been filed for both possession charges against Joseph Votta, alias Joseph Vital. This letter was dated July 19, 2005, and did not mention bond forfeiture or bail jumping and failure to appear.
On July 28, 2005, Appellee requested final disposition of the detainer pursuant to the IADA. The Inmate Systems Manager at the Minersville federal penitentiary sent, by certified mail, a letter to the Jackson County District Attorney's Office, with a notation on the bottom: "CC: Clerk of Court." The certified-mail return-receipt cards were sent to the District Attorney and to "Jackson County, Clerk of Court." In the letter, Appellee was identified as Joseph Votta, and only the possession counts were listed with no cause numbers included. The letter was received by the district attorney's office and the Jackson County clerk's office on August 4, 20052. However, the district clerk's office, where Appellee's charges were pending, did not receive the request. The Inmate Systems Manager sent a letter on November 7, 2005, reminding the district attorney that 90 days had passed since the receipt of Appellee's request for disposition of untried charges under the IADA, and that an individual must be brought to trial within 180 days from the date of receipt of this paperwork. On February 7, 2006, the Inmate Systems Manager sent another letter to the district attorney to inform him that 180 days had elapsed since Appellee's request and that the detainers had expired. Both letters referred to Appellee only as Joseph Votta and did not include cause numbers.
On October 16, 2006, Appellee filed a motion with the Jackson County District Court to dismiss all four counts for failure to comply with the 180-day deadline mandated by the IADA. Both names, Joseph Vital and Joseph Votta were listed within the motion and copies of the IADA paperwork that had been previously sent to the county clerk's office were attached as exhibits. The district attorney was not provided a copy of the motion.
After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictments in all four of the pending causes with prejudice on August 30, 2007. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, a motion requesting that the court enter findings of facts and conclusions of law, and requested a hearing on its motions. Although a hearing was scheduled for September 13, 2007, the trial court cancelled the hearing. In response, the State filed a second motion for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. When no findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered, the State filed a reminder of the court's obligation to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court entered its final order dismissing all charges on October 2, 2007. The State subsequently filed a notice of past-due findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 297 of the Texas Rules of Civil procedure, but no findings of fact or conclusions of law were ever entered.
The State appealed the trial court's order dismissing the indictments. Votta, a/k/a Joseph Vital, 267 S.W.3d 197. The State argued that Appellee failed to comply with IADA's requirement that he deliver his request to the appropriate court. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that Appellee showed that both the trial court and the Jackson County District Attorney had his request on file for more than 180 days prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Id. at 202.3 The State also argued that Appellee failed to provide sufficient notice to the trial court because his request for disposition was filed under his real name, "Joseph Votta," and not the alias he used when he was arrested, "Joseph Vital." The court of appeals again disagreed, noting that the correspondence between the state and the prison contained both Appellee's real name and the alias he had used, thus the state was aware of who was submitting the speedy-disposition request. Id.
The State claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges for bail jumping and failure to appear because no detainer was filed related to those indictments. However, the Court of Appeals determined that by listing "Bond Forfeiture" when it identified Appellee's possession charges,4 the State "clearly shows its intent to prosecute appellee on the pending bail jumping and failure to appear indictments." Id. at 203.
Citing our holding in State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.2006), the State claimed that the trial court erred in failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals concluded that because the trial court's determination did not require credibility determinations, but rather relied only on a facial review of the documents provided by the prisoner, Cullen did not apply in this case. Additionally, the trial court's failure to enter findings did not require the court of appeals to make any assumptions about the facts of the case or about the reasons for the trial court's decision. Therefore, the State was not prevented from presenting the appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that the trial court did not err in failing to file findings of fact. The State's motion for rehearing was denied. Votta, 267 S.W.3d at 204.
The State filed a petition for discretionary review, which we granted to consider the following grounds for review:
1) Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to require the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law?
2) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that respondent made a proper request for final disposition of charges, as required by Art. 51.14, V.A.C.C.P. to both the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court as is required to invoke the jurisdiction of that act and authorize the trial court to dismiss pending indictments?
3) Did the Court of Appeal err in concluding that Respondent's request for final disposition of charges under a name other than the name under which he is charged is sufficient to give the prosecutor notice of Respondent's request?
4) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that a motion filed by Respondent seeking dismissal of charges constituted compliance under article 51.14, V.A.C.C.P. as a request to be returned to the State of Texas for final disposition of pending charges?
5) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the trial court had authority to dismiss Cause Nos. 97-2-5827 and 97-2-5828 ( ) under the requirement of article 51.14 that only causes which were subject to detainers could be dismissed?
6) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that detainers were filed against Respondent in Cause Nos. 97-2-5827 and 97-2-5828 ( )?
7) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that reference to "bond forfeiture" constituted placing a detainer on Respondent under art. 51.14, V.A.C.C.P.?
In Code of Criminal Procedure Article 51.14, Texas adopts The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, which outlines the cooperative procedure between the states to be used when one state is seeking to try a prisoner who is currently imprisoned in a penal or correctional institution of another state. The state with an untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner files a detainer with the institution in the state that is holding the prisoner.5 The prison is required to promptly inform the prisoner that a detainer has been...
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