State v. W. S. Buck Mercantile Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1928
• Docket Number: 1426
• Citation: 38 Wyo. 47,264 P. 1023
• Parties: STATE v. W. S. BUCK MERCANTILE CO. [*]
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

264 P. 1023

38 Wyo. 47

STATE v. W. S. BUCK MERCANTILE CO. ^[*]

No. 1426

Supreme Court of Wyoming

February 28, 1928

RESERVED CASE from District Court, Laramie County; WILLIAM A RINER, Judge.

The W S. Buck Mercantile Company and another were charged with selling a wool blanket without a label showing the quantity of virgin wool content, in violation of the Truth in Fabrics Act (Laws 1925, c. 96), and on defendants' plea of guilty and motion in arrest of judgment the District Court certified questions.

R. S Mentzer, W. C. Mentzer, and W. O. Wilson, Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Defendants pleaded guilty to a violation of Chap. 96 L. 1925, known as the Truth in Fabrics Act, and moved an arrest of judgment on the ground that the Act was invalid as in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The trial court reserved and certified constitutional questions to this court for answer. Defendants assumed the burden of establishing the invalidity of the Act, Zancanelli v. Co., 25 Wyo. 511; State v. Snyder (Wyo.) 212 P. 758; People v. Scott (Colo.) 120 P. 126; Smeltzer v. Co., 158 F. 649; Logan v. Co., 157 F. 570; every reasonable presumption obtains as to the validity of the Act, People v. McBride (Ill.) 84 N.E. 865; Nipges v. Thornton (Wash.) 206 P. 17; State v. Board (Mont.) 238 P. 316; McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120; Burton v. Co., 18 Wyo. 362; McMillan Co. v. Clarke (Calif.) 194 P. 1030. The trial court reserved four questions, the third of which is whether the Act violates Art. I, Section 6, and the fourth whether it violates Art. I, Section 7, of the State Constitution. The Act requires the labeling of goods containing wool sold, or offered for sale, and is a reasonable police regulation, 12 C. J. 429-430, Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501; Patapsco Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345; Products Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427; Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338; Parrott v. Benson (Wash.) 194 P. 986; State v. Sherod (Minn.) 83 N.W. 417; People v. Bishop, 89 N.Y.S. 709; Oil Co. v. Wheaton (S. D.) 125 N.W. 127; State v. Williams, 100 N.W. 641 and cases cited; Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, 270 F. 429; Weller v. State, (Ohio) 40 N.E. 1001; Comm. v. Schaffner, (Mass.) 16 N.E. 280; 12 C. J. 891; McCray v. U.S., 195 U.S. 27; Hamilton v. Co., 251 U.S. 146 and cases cited. When the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be susceptible of two interpretations, courts will adopt that which will save the statute from infirmity, State v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500; Burton v. Co., 18 Wyo. 362. One cannot question the statute who is not affected thereby, Zancanelli v. Co., supra; Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11; questions of policy are for the legislature, Zancanelli v. Co., supra, Otis v. Gassman, 187 U.S. 606; Booth v. Illinois. 184 U.S. 425; Town of Cicero v. Haas, (Ill.) 91 N.E. 574. The first question reserved is whether the Act violates Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution; the due process clause is without application to laws enacted by the state legislature in the exercise of police power, Co. v. Brown, (Wash.) 187 P. 399; McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120; Plumley v. Mass., 155 U.S. 461; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501. Reasonable police regulations requiring labeling and branding merchandise have been generally upheld, Hebe Co. v. Calvert, 246 F. 711; Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297; Standard Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540; Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325. Defendants are not affected by the provision of the Act relating to the display of samples, Zancanelli v. Co., supra; Standard Co. v. Wright, supra; Tyler v. Court, 179 U.S. 405; State v. Co. (Wash.) 149 P. 330; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U.S. 415; State v. Ross, supra; State v. Sheldon (Wyo.) 213 P. 92. Reasonable police regulations are not invalid because they may incidentally affect interstate commerce, Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497; New Mexico v. R. R. Co., 203 U.S. 38; Amos Bird Co. v. Thompson, 274 F. 702. Inspection laws are upheld as police regulations, Savage v. Scovell, 171 F. 566; Capital Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238 and cases cited.

Edward T. Lazear, for defendants.

The reserved questions relate to the validity of what is known as the Truth in Fabrics Act, Ch. 96, L. 1925, requiring the labeling of certain kinds of merchandise to show, (1st) that the article is of all virgin wool, or (2nd) that it contains less than blank per cent of virgin wool, or (3rd) that it contains no virgin wool, or (4th) that the manufacturer and wholesale vendor of the article has refused to give information as to the content of virgin wool of the article. The Act defines "virgin wool" as wool that previous to its use in the article required to be labeled, has never been spun, woven or knitted into any other yarn, fabric or cloth than that composing the article. The Act contains exceptions applying to articles of apparel which contain lining, facing or trimming, or silk yarn used for decorative purposes, and there is a proviso that the Act shall not apply to used, worn and secondhand garments. The Act carries a penalty for the violation thereof. The right of a state through police power to regulate business and commerce is unquestioned where the regulation is reasonable in character, State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169; Hamp v. State, 118 P. 169; Ex parte Whitwell (Calif.) 32 P. 870; Ex parte Thomas (Calif.) 102 P. 19. The Act can hardly be classified as one to prevent adulteration, which is defined to be the admixture of foreign or inferior substances or impurities, U.S. v. Mills, 189 F. 191; People v. West, 44 Hun. 162. Coloring is not an adulteration unless it affects the quality of the article, Co. v. Lynch, (Minn.) 124 N.W. 994. Whatever justification there might be in requiring a label, as to the percentage of wool in an article offered for sale, the requirement of this act that the content of virgin wool be stated, seems unreasonable, unless it be established that virgin wool, as defined by the Act, is superior to wool that has been spun, woven or knitted into some other yarn, fabric or cloth than that requiring the article to be so labeled. This may be shown by a multitude of illustrations where unreasonable regulations have been prescribed; for example, an Act requiring a package of butter between onehalf and six pounds in weight to have the weight marked in figures not less than one-fourth of an inch in height, ex parte Dietrich, (Calif.) 94 P. 770, 771. Two general principles underlie legislation of this class, first, the public health and welfare, and second, the prevention of deception and fraud; Hebe Co. v. Calvert, 246 F. 711; Parrott v. Benson, 194 P. 986; Ex parte Kohler, (Calif.) 15 P. 438; People v. Aisenstein, 201 N.Y.S. 128. The arbitrary and unreasonable nature of the Act might be illustrated in the case where blankets containing 100% virgin wool might be converted into yarn and spun into cloth used in the manufacture of a suit of clothes; a purchaser has a right to know the character of the goods he is about to purchase, Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427. If a dealer is required to label his goods as required by the fourth section of the Act, they would not be salable; moreover, articles of apparel made wholly of wool that has been used for some other purpose, could not be salable, even though made of pure wool; the obvious purpose and intent of the Act is to stimulate a demand for wool in the interests of the woolgrowers, and nothing else, and as such, constitutes unnecessary use of police power of the state, serving no useful purpose whatsoever; the Act imposes unnecessary burdens and restrictions upon interstate commerce, Silk Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 334. The Act undertakes to restrict the use of samples used for soliciting orders, unless labeled in a manner prescribed by the Act; this feature is an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce.

BLUME, Chief Justice. KIMBALL and RINER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Chief Justice.

An information was filed in this case by the State against the W. S. Buck Mercantile Company, a Corporation, and J. W Brown, defendants, charging them with violating the provisions of Chapter 96, of the 1925 Session Laws of the State of Wyoming, in that they unlawfully offered for sale and sold a first-hand, unused blanket containing wool, without placing on the blanket a label showing the true character and quantity of the wool content of the blanket or a label showing that information as to the true quantity of the virgin wool content of the blanket so offered for sale and sold had been refused. The defendants entered a plea of guilty, but filed a motion in arrest of judgment, alleging the unconstitutionality of the law above mentioned in various particulars, and the District Court thereupon duly certified to this court the following questions: 1. Whether or not the law above mentioned is in conflict with Section 1 of [38 Wyo. 54] the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 2. Whether or not Chapter 96 above mentioned is in conflict with Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States, providing that Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 3. Whether Chapter 96 above mentioned is in conflict with Section 6 of Article I of the Constitution of this state, providing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," or with Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of this state, providing: "Absolute...