State v. Waggoner

• Decision Date: 24 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42067,42067
• Citation: 80 Wn.2d 7,490 P.2d 1308
• Parties: In the STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald Thomas WAGGONER, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 7

80 Wn.2d 7

490 P.2d 1308

In the STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Donald Thomas WAGGONER, Appellant.

No. 42067.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Nov. 24, 1971.

Ingersoll & Ingersoll, Donald M. Ingersoll, Olympia, for appellant.

Smith Troy, Pros. Atty., Edward F. Schaller, Deputy Pros. Atty., Olympia, for respondent.

FINLEY, Associate Justice.

The defendant in this case appeals from his conviction and sentence for unlawful sale of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). At trial, evidence established that Vonnie Crombie, a police informant, had infiltrated and become an accepted member of appellant's social group. From time to time, Mrs. Crombie let it be known that she was interested in purchasing large quantities of drugs. After a period of initial noncooperation, for reasons that remain in dispute, appellant Waggoner telephoned Mrs. Crombie, told her that he had found a potential seller, and arranged for her to meet the seller. Waggoner was to receive a commission for arranging the sale. On May 24, 1970, Bruce Bird, the unsuspecting seller, transferred the drugs to Mrs. Crombie, and was promptly taken into custody by the police. Appellant was arrested soon after at his place of residence.

Appellant first contends that Laws of 1969, Ex.Sess., ch. 256 (including RCW 69.40.060 under which he was convicted) is unconstitutional because the act is in violation of the requirement of Const. art. 2, § 19, that 'no bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.'

We do not agree. The act in question is entitled 'AN ACT Relating to crimes and criminal procedures.' It contains provisions designed to (1) increase the confidentiality and reliability of criminal records, (2) reduce the penalties for crimes involving cannabis or marijuana, and (3) establish new crimes involving the distribution of erotic materials to minors.

We are convinced that the title of the bill adequately expresses its subject. See State ex rel. Scofield v. Easterday, 182 Wash. 209, 46 P.2d 1052 (1935). The crucial question is whether the bill itself embraces more than one subject in a manner prohibited by the constitution.

This court has never favored a narrow construction of the term 'subject' as used in Const. art. 2, § 19. We have consistently held that a bill may properly contain one broad subject embracing many sub-subjects or subdivisions. Robison v. Dwyer, 58 Wash.2d 576, 364 P.2d 521 (1961); Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State, 49 Wash.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956). The act which appellant attacks, as indicated in its title, covers the broad subject of 'criminal law,' dealing with certain specifically mentioned subdivisions thereof. Such breadth of coverage, if properly titled, is permitted under the law of this state. In In re Donnellan, 49 Wash. 460, 95 P. 1085 (1908), this court held that a general statute enacted as a complete penal code, relating to all ordinary crimes, entitled 'an act relative to crimes and punishment and proceedings in criminal cases,' does not violate the Constitution. The act now before us is similar in breadth, and is equally valid.

Appellant emphasizes that the disparate nature of the provisions constituting Laws of 1969, ch. 256, Ex.Sess., is conducive to legislative 'logrolling,' the practice of drafting and submitting a bill to the legislature in such a form that a legislator is required to vote for something of which he disapproves in order to obtain approval of another unrelated law. We have often stated that the prevention of logrolling is one of the purposes of art. 2, § 19, of our Constitution. Robison v. Dwyer, Supra; State v. Winters, 67 Wash.2d 465, 407 P.2d 988 (1965). But logrolling does not exist unless the component provisions of an enactment embrace more than one subject. If an act contains only one broad subject, as in the instant case, the mere possibility that legislators will be forced to vote for a provision of which they disapprove in order to obtain the passage of the whole act will not render that act unconstitutional under Const. art. 2, § 19. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with both the definition of logrolling, Supra, and the efficient operation of our legislature.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give any of the requested entrapment instructions to the jury. We do not agree. Entrapment occurs only where the criminal design originates in the mind of the police officer or informer and not with the accused, and the accused is lured or induced into committing a crime he had no intention of committing. State v. Gray, 69 Wash.2d 432, 418 P.2d 725 (1966); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86 A.L.R. 249 (1932). The mere use of a decoy or informer to present an individual with an opportunity to commit a crime does not in itself constitute entrapment. Seattle v. Gleiser, 29 Wash.2d 869, 189 P.2d 967 (1948); Brainin v. United States, 314 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1963). In the case now before us, the evidence favoring appellant's contention of entrapment indicates only that appellant, for unexplained reasons, was initially reluctant to enter into the transaction. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, it does not support the conclusion that the intention to sell originated in the mind of the informant, Vonnie Crombie.

On the contrary, the record reveals that the offer to sell was made by appellant, on his own initiative, during a telephone call which he made to Mrs. Crombie at least two days after she had last expressed to him her interest in buying a large quantity of drugs. Furthermore, the testimony indicates that Mrs. Crombie employed no more persuasion than would be necessary to effect an ordinary sale. The record itself reveals that the activities of individuals such as Mrs. Crombie have made discretion and suspicion an operating principle for drug dealers in all of their sales. A police informant's use of a normal amount of persuasion to overcome this expected resistance does not constitute entrapment and will not justify an entrapment instruction. People...