State v. Waite

• Decision Date: 07 April 1897
• Citation: 101 Iowa 377,70 N.W. 596
• Parties: STATE v. WAITE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

101 Iowa 377

70 N.W. 596

STATE

v.WAITE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 7, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Howard county; A. N. Hobson, Judge.

The defendant is charged with threatening to accuse another of a crime in order to compel him to do an act against his will. From judgment of conviction, imposing a fine of $250, the defendant appeals. Affirmed.Cato Sells, Frank Sayre, and Fred. W. Reed, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., for the State.

LADD, J.

The defendant at the time of the alleged offense was a clerk in the pension department of the United States, detailed as special examiner. As such, he was directed to investigate the application of one D. P. Andrus for an increase of pension. The latter had made an affidavit, before an examiner named Perham, declaring three letters, purporting to have been written by himself to his wife during the Civil War, genuine. It is claimed by the state that defendant, in order to compel Andrus so to do against his will, threatened him that, unless he made affidavit saying the one before Perham was false, he (defendant) would accuse and prosecute him for the crime of perjury.

1. It is insisted the indictment is defective, in that the intent with which the threat was made, and against whom made, is not alleged. The statute provides that if any person, verbally, maliciously threaten to accuse another of a crime or offense, with intent thereby to compel the person so threatened to do an act against his will, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary or by fine. The words “in order to compel” are used in the indictment, instead of “with intent thereby to compel,” as in the statute. The expressions are of similar import, and alike signify the purpose with which an act is done. The language of the statute need not be followed, but words equivalent in meaning may be employed.

2. That the indictment should state against whom the threat is directed cannot be doubted. State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa, 473, 51 N. W. 25;Kessler v. State, 50 Ind. 229. In this case it is charged that the defendant did maliciously “threaten verbally to accuse one D. P. Andrus, then and there being,” and describes the threat and its purpose, to compel Andrus to make the affidavit against his will. This clearly indicates for whom the threat was intended, and that it was within the hearing of Andrus.

3. The statute, it is said, contemplates only such crimes and offenses as are defined by the laws of Iowa. So narrow a construction cannot be adopted. The people are under the same obligations of obedience to the statutes of the United States as to those of this state, and a crime is none the less such because defined by an act of congress rather than of the legislature. Any crime or offense which may be prosecuted within the territorial limits of the state is undoubtedly intended.

4. The defendant urges that as he was an officer of the United States, performing his duty as such, his acts cannot be made the subject of inquiry by the state courts. He claims to have been detailed by the commissioner of pensions to examine claims made under and by virtue of the pension laws, and to aid in the prosecution of any person violating the same, and that he “went to his [Andrus'] house, pursuant to instructions from the pension officer, to talk with Mr. Andrus about some letters which had been filed in the pension office in support of his pension case.” So the defendant had not been directed to procure the affidavit, or to do so in the manner alleged. Nor do the laws of congress permit the pension department to resort to duress and intimidation for the purpose of obtaining information. The officers of the general government owe obedience to the laws of this state, when within its limits, and may be detained and prosecuted for the commission of felonies thereunder. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482. Also, as bearing hereon, see Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266, 11 Sup. Ct. 565. The defendant relies on In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658. In that case, Neagle was discharged because it appeared that he killed Terry in pursuance of a law requiring him to protect Justice Field while traveling through his circuit in the discharge of his official duties, and the act was necessary for that purpose. The defendant, if he committed the offense charged, was not, in doing so, acting within...