State v. Walker
| Decision Date | 20 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | AC 39797 |
| Citation | 183 A.3d 1,180 Conn.App. 291 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Eugene L. WALKER |
Damian K. Gunningsmith, with whom were John L. Cordani, Jr., and, on the brief, Moira L. Buckley, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, and Cornelius P. Kelly, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Alvord, Kahn and Bear, Js.
The defendant, Eugene L. Walker, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54c ; manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a–55a(a) ; attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49(a)(2) and 53a–134(a)(2) ; and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes § 53a–217c(a)(1). The defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his right to confrontation by permitting a laboratory analyst to testify regarding a known DNA sample processed by another analyst in the same laboratory; (2) violated his right to due process when it declined to either strike certain testimony or grant the defendant's motion for a mistrial; (3) erred in admitting certain testimony under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule; (4) erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant; (5) erred in admitting certain evidence at trial; and (6) violated double jeopardy by convicting him of both manslaughter and felony murder. We affirm the judgment in part, and we reverse the judgment in part.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On the night of October 28, 2012, Anthony Adams, the codefendant in this consolidated trial, telephoned Alexis Morrison to ask if she knew "somebody that could sell him some weed." Morrison called Neville Malacai Registe, the victim, to arrange for him to meet with Adams in the parking lot of her West Haven residence. When the victim received Morrison's telephone call, he was with his friend, Stephon Green, at his mother's home in New Haven. After some time, the victim and Green left in the victim's Acura. As they approached the designated parking lot, the victim called Morrison. Morrison then telephoned Adams to tell him that the victim "was there." Adams replied that he had already left because the victim "took too long ... and that Day–Day and GZ [were] going to get the weed." "Day–Day" and "GZ" were nicknames for Daquane Adams, who is Anthony Adams' cousin, and the defendant, respectively, both of whom Morrison knew.
When the victim and Green arrived in the parking lot, the victim backed his car into a parking space. Green, who was rolling a marijuana joint in the front passenger seat, looked up and noticed two men approaching the Acura. He returned his attention to his task, and the victim opened the driver's door to talk to one of the men. The man, who was wearing a black bandana and who was later identified as the defendant, held a revolver inside the car and said, "run it," meaning, A physical altercation ensued. The second man, later identified as Daquane Adams, stepped away from the Acura and placed a cell phone call to someone. A Toyota arrived, and a third man exited that car and asked the defendant for the gun.1 The struggle over the gun continued inside the victim's Acura, and someone knocked Green into the backseat. Daquane Adams and the third man pulled the defendant out of the car and, as Green was climbing back into the front passenger seat, a shot was fired. Green heard the victim say, "oh, shit," and then heard a second shot.
The defendant, Daquane Adams, and the third man got in the Toyota and drove toward the parking lot exit. With the victim slumped over in the driver's seat, Green pursued the Toyota. He caught up to it at the end of the street and rammed the Acura into the back of the Toyota. The victim's Acura was disabled, but the Toyota was able to be driven away. The victim died of a gunshot wound
to his head.
The defendant's case was consolidated for trial with that of his codefendant, Anthony Adams.2 Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. The jury found him not guilty of the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery. The court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-five years incarceration followed by ten years special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that he was deprived of his right to confrontation under the federal constitution when the court permitted a forensic science examiner to testify about the results of a comparison she made between (1) a DNA profile she generated from crime scene evidence and (2) a DNA profile another analyst in the laboratory generated from the defendant's buccal swab, without requiring the other analyst to testify.3 We disagree.
The following additional facts that the jury reasonably could have found are relevant to this claim. The police recovered a black bandana from the Acura and sent the bandana and the victim's bloodstain to the state's Division of Scientific Services laboratory for analysis. The police also obtained and sent additional known samples to the laboratory, including buccal swabs from the defendant, his codefendant and Daquane Adams. Although Heather Degnan, a supervisory forensics examiner, visually inspected all of the samples, including the buccal swab obtained from the defendant, per standard laboratory procedure the known samples were processed by the laboratory's "known processing group" (group). Degnan processed the bandana using the standard forensic DNA typing
techniques used in the laboratory. She isolated DNA from two sites on the bandana and generated DNA profiles (evidentiary profiles) that contained a mixture of DNA from at least two contributors, one of which was deemed a major contributor and the other, a minor contributor. An analyst in the group generated DNA profiles from the known samples (known profiles) and sent them to Degnan. Degnan compared the evidentiary profiles she had extracted from the DNA on the bandana with the known profiles. Degnan's analysis determined that the defendant was included as a major contributor to the DNA that was on the bandana.4 She also entered the evidentiary profile of the major contributor to the DNA found on the bandana into the Connecticut and national DNA databases5 and obtained a "hit" for the defendant because his DNA profile had been entered due to a prior felony conviction. Degnan prepared a report summarizing her findings.6
At trial, Tammy Murray, the detective who took the buccal swab from the defendant, testified that she obtained a subpoena for nontestimonial evidence and testified about the established procedure she followed to take the sample from the defendant. The buccal swab itself was introduced into evidence along with the bandana. After Murray's testimony, the state called Degnan to testify about her analysis and findings. She first testified about the procedures she followed when analyzing the DNA found on the bandana. Degnan explained that she swabbed the bandana and generated an evidentiary profile from each side of the bandana, and that the group processed and generated the known profiles from the defendant's buccal swab and the victim's bloodstain. According to Degnan, this division of tasks took place according to "standard operating procedure." The group then provided the known profiles to Degnan for comparison with the evidentiary profiles.
Prior to the admission of Degnan's findings, defense counsel objected to Degnan's testimony and the admission of her report on the grounds that Degnan was not competent to testify about the known profiles and that there was a lack of foundation for this evidence. Specifically, the defendant's counsel objected because Degnan had not been formally qualified as an expert. Counsel for Anthony Adams objected on the ground that Degnan did not process the known samples herself but, rather, obtained the results "second hand."7 The court, Markle, J. , overruled the objections and allowed Degnan to testify as to the results of her analysis.
Degnan testified that, on the basis of her analysis and comparison, the defendant was a major contributor to the DNA found on both sides of the bandana. On cross-examination, Degnan elaborated that she had "examined the known samples and then sent those samples to the known processing group for extraction and amplification," but had not been present for that stage of the process. She was, however, familiar with the group's functions. She noted that the laboratory's use of known control samples ensured that the machines used in the testing processes were working properly. She further explained that whenever a DNA profile is generated, including a known profile, it is analyzed independently by a second analyst, who also reviews the paperwork associated with that analysis to determine if the initial analyst generated the profile properly. Degnan's analysis of both the evidentiary and known profiles was independently reviewed by Dahong Sun, another DNA analyst at the laboratory, who cosigned Degnan's report. The court admitted Degnan's report8 containing her findings but redacted it to eliminate references to the known samples of the other defendants, Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams.
On appeal, the defendant claims that he was deprived of his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution when the court permitted Degnan to testify about the results of her comparison of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Porfil
...that location ...."11 In other words, the state was concerned about the authenticity of the photographs. See State v. Walker , 180 Conn. App. 291, 326, 183 A.3d 1 (to satisfy authentication requirement, photograph "[must] be introduced through a witness competent to verify it as a fair and ......
-
State v. Daniels
..., 289 Conn. 598, 619, 960 A.2d 993 (2008) ; see also State v. Holley , 327 Conn. 576, 590, 175 A.3d 514 (2018)." State v. Walker , 180 Conn. App. 291, 301, 183 A.3d 1, cert. granted, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634 (2018).12 The defendant's location at or near the scene of the collision also wa......
-
State v. Walker
...the Toyota was able to be driven away. The victim died of a gunshot wound to his head." (Footnote in original.) State v. Walker , 180 Conn. App. 291, 296–97, 183 A.3d 1 (2018). The record reveals the following additional relevant facts and procedural history. In December, 2012, the defendan......
-
State v. Johnson
...issued when the present case was tried, the Appellate Court's decision in Walker remained binding precedent. See State v. Walker , 180 Conn. App. 291, 297–307, 183 A.3d 1 (2018), rev'd in part, 332 Conn. 678, 212 A.3d 1244 (2019). In Walker , the Appellate Court held that the confrontation ......
-
A Survey of Criminal Law Opinions
...at 128-29. [266] Id. at 129. [267] Id. at 130-31. [268] Id. at 131-32. [269] Id. at 133. [270] Id. at 134. [271] Id. at 134-35. [272] 180 Conn. App. 291, 183 A.3d 1 (2018). [273] 180 Conn. App. 624, 184 A.3d 773, cert, denied, 328 Conn. 937, 184 A.3d 268 (2018). [274] 322 Conn. 410, 141 A.3......
-
Enforcement
...but also in the context of determining the harm inflicted on account of the non-existence of relevant information. 82 State v. Walker, 183 A.3d 1, 180 Conn.App. 291 (2018). The trial judge has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy for non-compliance with discovery. ENFORCEMENT 1......
-
Civil, criminal, domestic & foreign discovery
...91 To guarantee that victims receive a wide range of information and notice of hearings and proceedings, all 88 State v. Walker, 183 A.3d 1, 180 Conn.App. 291 (2018). Generally, the primary purpose of a sanction for the violation of a discovery order is to ensure that the defendant’s rights......
-
People
...surrounding its preservation and custody, and the likelihood of inter-meddlers tampering with the object. 17 State v. Walker , 183 A.3d 1, 180 Conn.App. 291 (2018). As a general rule, the prosecution is not required to prove every circumstance in the chain of custody beyond a reasonable dou......