State v. Walker

• Citation: 394 Mont. 1,433 P.3d 202,2018 MT 312
• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: DA 17-0045
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Randall Bryce WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

394 Mont. 1

433 P.3d 202

2018 MT 312

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Randall Bryce WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 17-0045

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted: August 8, 2018

Decided: December 19, 2018

Rehearing Denied: January 29, 2019

For Appellant: Quentin M. Rhoades (argued), Rhoades, Siefert & Erickson, P.L.L.C., Missoula, Montana

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, William E. Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 A jury found Randall Bryce Walker (Walker) guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of sexual assault. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, sentenced Walker to four, 100-year concurrent prison sentences, with no time suspended. Walker appeals, presenting three evidentiary issues for our review:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant’s polygraph evidence?

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding a defense expert’s testimony that the defendant’s psychosexual profile revealed no sexual interest in children?

3. Did the District Court correctly apply Montana’s Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA, to exclude evidence of a victim’s alleged prior sexual conduct?

¶ 2 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Walker married A.W.’s mother, Kim, when A.W. was an infant. A.W. later disclosed that, when she lived with Walker, he subjected her to a series of sexual assaults, beginning when she was seven or eight years old and ending when she was twelve or thirteen years old. She testified at trial that Walker frequently and regularly sexually assaulted her. Walker and Kim divorced in 2007. The next year, Walker married Laura. Laura’s two daughters, B.W. and R.W., lived with Walker and Laura. Walker and R.W. did not have a good relationship. R.W. testified that Walker constantly made her uncomfortable by doing things like smacking and grabbing her bottom and trying to kiss her on the lips.

¶ 4 R.W. and B.W. both participated in competitive archery. A tournament took place near their home on February 14, 2015. At that time, R.W. was eleven years old. Early that morning, around 6:00 a.m., Laura and B.W. left to help set up the tournament, leaving Walker and R.W. alone at home. R.W. and Walker planned to meet B.W. and Laura at the tournament. Walker and R.W. each testified at trial, recounting different versions of what occurred that morning.

¶ 5 R.W. testified that, after she woke up, she went to Walker and Laura’s bedroom, where Walker was lying in bed. R.W. crawled into the bed on the side where her mother usually slept. She testified that she did so because she wanted to wake up a little bit before she got ready for the tournament, but thought she would fall back asleep if she stayed in her own bed. R.W. then explained, in detail, how Walker initiated sexual contact with her. Walker, on the other hand, testified that R.W. made sexual advances at him and that, as soon as he realized what was happening, he jumped out of the bed. R.W. and Walker went to the archery tournament later that morning.

¶ 6 The State charged Walker with two counts of felony incest and two counts of felony sexual assault based on Walker’s ongoing conduct towards A.W. when she was his step-daughter and Walker’s conduct towards R.W. on February 14, 2015, when she was his step-daughter. Walker denied all charges and maintained his innocence.

¶ 7 In preparing his defense, Walker voluntarily underwent a psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Robert Page (Dr. Page). Walker sought to have Dr. Page testify at trial as to the results of his psychosexual evaluation. Walker made an offer of proof, representing to the District Court that Dr. Page would testify that "Walker’s [psychosexual] profile is that he is not sexually interested in school-age males or females, or preschool age males or females" and that Walker showed "no signs of psychopathology or personality pathology." Dr. Page would further testify that he had no therapeutic recommendations for Walker.

¶ 8 Walker also voluntarily took a polygraph test with Dick Stotts (Stotts). Stotts examined Walker pursuant to the American Polygraph Association’s standard polygraph procedure. During the polygraph test, Stotts asked Walker whether he ever had sexual contact with underage children generally or with R.W. particularly. Walker denied having any such contact. Stotts subsequently issued a report, in which he indicated that Walker’s "polygrams did not contain specific reactions to the relevant questions, indicating no attempt at deception." Stotts further concluded, "After careful analysis of [Walker’s] polygrams, it is the opinion of the examiner that [Walker] told the truth during his examination." Walker planned to have Stotts testify about the polygraph test’s results at his trial.

¶ 9 The State filed pre-trial motions to exclude Dr. Page’s and Stotts’s testimony. The District Court accepted briefing on the issues and ultimately granted the State’s motions. Walker’s case proceeded to a jury trial in August 2016. At trial, Walker planned to have Stacy Wood (Wood) testify about alleged past sexual contact between victim R.W. and a three-year-old. Walker represented that Wood planned to testify about a time when she found eight-year-old R.W. in bed with the three-year-old, allegedly engaging in sexual conduct initiated by R.W. The State asked the District Court to exclude Wood’s testimony pursuant to Montana’s Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA. The District Court heard the parties’ arguments and subsequently granted the State’s motion to exclude Wood’s testimony.

¶ 10 After five days of trial, the jury found Walker guilty on all four counts. The District Court sentenced Walker to four, 100-year concurrent prison sentences, with no time suspended. Walker appeals, arguing that the District Court improperly excluded Dr. Page’s, Stotts’s, and Wood’s testimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 District courts have broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence. State v. Daffin , 2017 MT 76, ¶ 12, 387 Mont. 154, 392 P.3d 150. Thus, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Madplume , 2017 MT 40, ¶ 19, 386 Mont. 368, 390 P.3d 142. A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Spottedbear , 2016 MT 243, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 68, 380 P.3d 810. In exercising its discretion, however, a district court is bound by the Rules of Evidence and applicable statutes. State v. Derbyshire , 2009 MT 27, ¶ 19, 349 Mont. 114, 201 P.3d 811. Consequently, to the extent the court’s ruling is based on its interpretation of an evidentiary rule or statute, our review is de novo. Derbyshire , ¶ 19.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant’s polygraph evidence?

¶ 13 Walker included polygraph examiner Stotts on his list of potential trial witnesses and provided the State with a copy of Stotts’s polygraph report. The State filed a pretrial motion, seeking to exclude Stotts as a trial witness and prohibit any reference to the polygraph examination by any attorney, party, or witness. The State based its motion on a line of precedent from this Court excluding polygraph evidence from all court proceedings. See, e.g. , State v. Hameline , 2008 MT 241, ¶ 20, 344 Mont. 461, 188 P.3d 1052 ; State v. Anderson , 1999 MT 58, ¶ 12, 293 Mont. 472, 977 P.2d 315 ; State v. Staat , 248 Mont. 291, 293, 811 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1991).

¶ 14 Walker opposed the State’s motion but did not mention Stotts’s testimony or the precedent upon which the State relied. Instead, Walker asserted that his offer to take the polygraph examination was admissible. Walker stated, "If Walker testifies, he will seek to offer the fact he volunteered to take the polygraph test as evidence relevant to his state of mind—more specifically, evidence relevant to his consciousness of innocence." (Emphasis added.) Walker further argued that, because the jury would know that he offered to take the polygraph examination, it would also need to know the examination’s results. He urged the District Court to consider the interaction of M. R. Evid. 403, 404, 608, and 702 in deciding whether the polygraph examination’s results should be admitted. Walker asserted that each side should "present evidence concerning the general science of polygraph evidence" to assist the court in determining whether the results were admissible under M. R. Evid. 702. Walker further stated that, if the State impeached his testimony, he would use the polygraph examination results to corroborate his truthfulness.

¶ 15 The District Court granted the State’s pretrial motion to exclude Stotts’s testimony and prohibit any attorney, party, or witness from referencing the polygraph examination. In its order, the court recognized the disparity between what the State requested and what Walker argued: "Walker fails to address, or even acknowledge, the Montana Supreme Court’s bright line prohibition of polygraph evidence.... Instead, he contends the issue of the admissibility of an offer to take a polygraph test has not yet been addressed by the Montana Supreme Court." (Emphasis in original.) The District Court found Walker’s argument unpersuasive in view of this Court’s precedent clearly prohibiting polygraph evidence. Walker appeals the District Court’s decision, arguing it should have admitted the polygraph evidence pursuant to M. R. Evid. 702.

¶ 16 We begin our analysis by noting that there are two distinct types of polygraph evidence at issue here. The first type involves the admissibility of Walker’s polygraph test results through Stotts’s expert testimony pursuant to M. R. Evid. 702. The second type of evidence concerns Walker’s offer to take...