State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 27 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 22884,22884
• Citation: 857 P.2d 1,109 Nev. 683
• Parties: The STATE of Nevada, Appellant, v. Dannie Ray WALKER, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 1

857 P.2d 1

109 Nev. 683

The STATE of Nevada, Appellant, v. Dannie Ray WALKER, Respondent.

No. 22884.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 27, 1993.

[109 Nev. 684] Frankie Sue Del Papa, Atty. Gen., Carson City, Rex Bell, Dist. Atty. and James Tufteland and Ulrich W. Smith, Deputy Dist. Attys., Clark County, for appellant.

Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender and George F. Ogilvie, III and Stephen J. Dahl, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Respondent Dannie Ray Walker (Walker) was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree with the use of a deadly weapon. Following the return of the guilty verdict, Walker moved for a new trial. The district court issued an order, accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law, vacating Walker's conviction of murder and granting Walker a new trial on this charge pursuant to NRS 176.515. ¹ The district court based its decision on its finding that "there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of Murder in the First Degree With Use of a Deadly Weapon." The State appeals the district court's order granting Walker a new trial, arguing that insufficiency of the evidence is not a proper ground for ordering a new trial following the return of a guilty verdict. We conclude that, at the time the guilty verdict was returned, this was indeed the state of the law in Nevada.

In Washington v. State, 98 Nev. 601, 655 P.2d 531 (1982), the appellant moved for a new trial after the jury found him guilty of robbery, and the district court denied the motion on the basis that it did not have the authority under NRS 176.515 to consider the motion. Id. at 602, 655 P.2d at 531. We reversed and remanded the matter to the district court, interpreting the language in NRS 176.515 allowing a new trial based on "other grounds" as follows:

We hold that such "other grounds" exist when the district judge disagrees with the jury's verdict after an independent evaluation of the evidence.... "Historically, Nevada has empowered the trial court in a criminal case where the evidence of guilt is conflicting, to independently evaluate the evidence and order another trial if it does not agree with the jury's conclusion that the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id. at 603-04, 655 P.2d at 532 (quoting State v. Busscher, 81 Nev. 587, 589, 407 P.2d 715, 716 (1965)) (citations omitted).

The district judge in Washington found the evidence of guilt to be conflicting, and, by his own evaluation of the conflicting evidence, was not convinced that the appellant had committed the crime. Washington, 98 Nev. at 602, 655 P.2d at 531. In the instant case, the district judge found that there was "insufficient evidence" to support the conviction. There is a marked difference between granting a new trial based on conflicting evidence and granting a new trial based on insufficient evidence. Insufficiency of the evidence occurs where the prosecution has not produced a minimum threshold of evidence upon which a conviction may be based. Therefore, even if the evidence presented at trial were believed by the jury, it would still be insufficient to sustain a conviction, as it could not convince a reasonable and fair-minded jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 273 (Alaska 1975); Houston-Hult v. State, 843 P.2d 1262, 1263-64 (Alaska Ct.App.1992). In contrast, a conflict of evidence occurs where there is sufficient evidence presented at trial which, if believed, would sustain a conviction, but this evidence is contested and the district judge, in resolving the conflicting evidence differently from the jury, believes the totality of evidence fails to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The distinction between conflicting evidence and insufficient evidence is important. In Washington, we concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause ² does not bar reprosecution of a defendant where a new trial is granted because the trial judge disagrees with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. Washington, 98 Nev. at 604, 655 P.2d at 532. However, where the district judge "concludes that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a rational jury [in] finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, ... a new trial is not permitted and the defendant must be released." Id. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44-45, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972-73, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981) (where a trial judge granted the defendant's motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from reprosecuting the defendant); State v. Wilson, 104 Nev. 405, 407, 760 P.2d 129, 130 (1988) ("a defendant is not subjected to double jeopardy when he is granted a new trial because the trial judge disagrees with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence.... [H]owever, ... when the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the defendant may not be retried").

We conclude that, under Nevada law as it existed prior to October 1, 1991, a district judge could grant a new trial following the return of a guilty verdict where he or she disagreed with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, but not where there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdic...