State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 08 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20110979–CA.,20110979–CA.
• Citation: 740 Utah Adv. Rep. 46,308 P.3d 573
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Fredrick C. WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

308 P.3d 573

740 Utah Adv. Rep. 46

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Fredrick C. WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20110979–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Aug. 8, 2013.

David Paul White, for Appellant.

John E. Swallow and Ryan D. Tenney, for Appellee.

Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in which Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.

Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant Fredrick C. Walker appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of sexual abuse of a child. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In September 1984, Defendant's stepmother reported that then twenty-one-year-old Defendant had molested her three sons. At the time, the victims were twelve, ten, and four years of age. On September 20, 1984, the State charged Defendant with one count of sodomy on a child, a first degree felony, seeUtah Code Ann. § 76–5–403.1(1), (2) (Allen Smith Supp.1983), and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, both second degree felonies, see id. § 76–5–404.1(1), (2) (Supp.1984). That same day, Defendant was brought before the trial court for his initial appearance. The court's minute entry from that hearing states that Defendant was “advised of [his] rights” and counsel was appointed to him.

¶ 3 One week later, Defendant appeared in court with his appointed counsel. After discussion with the State and the trial court, Defendant agreed to take a polygraph test. The parties agreed that if Defendant passed the test, the State would dismiss the charges, but if Defendant failed the test, the results would be admitted as evidence at Defendant's trial. Defendant failed the polygraph test. A preliminary hearing was held on October 18, 1984. At the close of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound Defendant over for trial, and Defendant hired private counsel shortly thereafter. At his subsequent arraignment, Defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges and the court scheduled the case for trial. Prior to trial, Defendant underwent a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. The competency evaluator determined that Defendant “ha[d] an understanding of the [ ] charges filed against him ..., of the processes of the court and sufficient factual information surrounding the charges to aid in his own defense in a court of law.”

¶ 4 On the morning of the February 28, 1985 trial, Defendant informed the trial court that he had accepted a plea offer from the State. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child in exchange for the State's dismissal of the other charges. No transcript exists for this proceeding; however, the record does contain the trial court's minute entry of the hearing. The court's minutes indicate that Defendant was advised of his rights and the consequences of entering into a guilty plea.

¶ 5 Following this change of plea hearing, Adult Probation and Parole prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI). The Diagnostic Staff of the Utah Department of Corrections also prepared a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation report (Diagnostic Report). On June 21, 1985, the trial court sentenced Defendant to one to fifteen years in prison.

¶ 6 In late 1986, Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, which the trial court denied. No records from that action remain, but Defendant has provided a copy of his notice of appeal and a pro se docketing statement stemming from the denial of that petition.

¶ 7 Well after his release from prison, Defendant filed a motion on August 10, 2010, to withdraw his guilty plea—more than twenty-five years after he originally entered into a plea agreement with the State. In support of his motion to withdraw his plea, Defendant produced affidavits from each of the three victims wherein they recant their original accusations of abuse. The State responded by contesting the trial court's jurisdiction based on the timing provisions contained in the plea withdrawal statute. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Defendant's motion and requested supplemental briefing on the merits of Defendant's claim. In his supplemental brief, Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing. After considering the victims' recantations and all other available records, the court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on three grounds: (1) factual innocence, based primarily on the victims' recantations; (2) violations of Utah Code section 77–35–11(e) (now rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), see Utah Code Ann. § 77–35–11(e) (Allen Smith Supp.1985) (repealed 1989) (providing that a court, in accepting a guilty plea, must ensure that a defendant's guilty plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily); and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel and undue pressure. “[W]e review [t]he denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ... under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact and reviewing questions of law for correctness.” State v. Person, 2006 UT App 288, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 584 (omission and second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 9 In the alternative, Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his request for an evidentiary hearing so that he could have further developed the facts supporting his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We review a trial court's decision to rule on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 10 Before reaching the merits of Defendant's claims on appeal, we must resolve three issues raised by the State. First, the State renews its argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea. “This presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, granting no deference to the district court.” State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ¶ 3, 148 P.3d 990.

¶ 11 Second, assuming the trial court had jurisdiction to review Defendant's motion, the State argues that res judicata nevertheless bars the court's review of Defendant's motion to withdraw. Even though the State raised this argument before the trial court, the court did not rule on the issue because it resolved the case on other grounds. “Whether a claim is barred by res judicata is a question of law that we review for correctness.” Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2012 UT 38, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 622.

¶ 12 Finally, we must determine which legal standard applies to Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Either we will apply the withdrawal of plea statute in effect when Defendant entered his plea in 1985, which requires a showing of good cause, seeUtah Code Ann. § 77–13–6 (Allen Smith 1982),¹ or, as the State urges, we will apply the law in effect when Defendant filed his motion in 2010—now the current law—requiring analysis of whether the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, see id. § 77–13–6(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012).² “Determining which version of [a] statute applie[s] is a matter of statutory interpretation, which presents a question [ ] of law which we review for correctness....” In re T.M., 2003 UT App 191, ¶ 9, 73 P.3d 959 (second and third alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Preliminary Issues Raised by the State

A. Jurisdiction

¶ 13 The State argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was untimely. The State maintains that “when Defendant waited to file his motion to withdraw, he became subject to the changing jurisdictional requirements that the [Utah] Legislature imposed on those motions—including the statute of limitations.” Because time limitations on causes of action become operative when they are enacted, the State argues that Defendant's motion is governed by the 1989 amendment to the plea withdrawal statute. That amendment requires motions to withdraw a guilty plea to be filed within thirty days following entry of the guilty plea. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 77–13–6(2)(b) (Michie Supp.1989) (“A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and shall be made within thirty days after the entry of the plea.”). Prior to the 1989 amendment, no such time restriction existed. See id. (Allen Smith 1982). The State asserts that Defendant was put on constructive notice when the statute changed in 1989, and therefore, Defendant had thirty days from the moment the new time limitation became effective to file his motion to withdraw. According to the State, because Defendant failed to file his motion within the thirty-day limit, no court had jurisdiction to hear his motion to withdraw.

¶ 14 The State raised this jurisdictional argument below. The trial court concluded that, consistent with the supreme court's decision in State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), the 1989 amendment did not apply to Defendant's motion. Accordingly, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion.

¶ 15 We agree that Abeyta is dispositive here. As in this appeal, Abeyta involved a defendant who pleaded guilty before the 1989 amendment took effect and moved to withdraw his guilty plea more than thirty days after the 1989 amendment took effect. See id. at 995. In determining whether jurisdiction was proper, the supreme court observed that the 1989 amendment could not be retroactively applied to the defendant's guilty plea because the plea withdrawal statute provided no express statement allowing for retroactive application and because the 1989 amendment was a substantive, not procedural, change in the law. See id. Accordingly, the supreme court held that the trial court erred in barring the defendant's motion to withdraw his...