State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 09 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 69732–3–I.,69732–3–I.
• Citation: 185 Wash.App. 790,344 P.3d 227
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Vernon Maurice WALKER, Appellant.

185 Wash.App. 790

344 P.3d 227

STATE of Washington, Respondent

v.Vernon Maurice WALKER, Appellant.

No. 69732–3–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Feb. 9, 2015.

Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Donna Lynn Wise, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Opinion

SPEARMAN, C.J.

¶ 1 Vernon Walker pleaded guilty to one count of murder in the second degree and one count of assault in the second degree arising from a 2003 shooting.

At his sentencing hearing, jail security officers transported him to court wearing handcuffs and leg restraints. The trial court denied Walker's motion for an order removing the handcuffs for the hearing. On appeal, Walker argues that the denial of his motion violated his constitutional right to appear before the court free of physical restraint. He also contends the error was not harmless and he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 On June 25, 2003, Vernon Walker shot and killed Darreion Roche. He also fired shots at another man, Quency Cummings–Williams. Five days later, the State charged Walker with murder in the first degree and assault in the first degree. Before Walker could be arrested on these charges, he fled to Canada. When apprehended there, he contested extradition for over seven years. He was eventually returned to King County where he pleaded guilty to amended charges of murder in the second degree and assault in the second degree. Before sentencing, Walker noted a motion to appear at the sentencing proceeding unshackled, on the grounds that it would be “very prejudicial” for him to appear before the sentencing judge in restraints. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (10/26/12) at 9.

¶ 3 The King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (DAJD) filed a brief in opposition to the motion, which was supported by a declaration from Corinna Hyatt, the facility major for the King County Correctional facility and an employee of the DAJD. Hyatt's declaration detailed Walker's violent criminal history, his documented gang affiliation, his lengthy attempt to fight extradition in the present case, and his various admitted infractions for violence and other misconduct in the jail. Hyatt acknowledged that there was no evidence that Walker had a present plan to escape. She also did not allege that Walker had previously engaged in any misconduct in court or in transport to or from the courtroom. The State deferred to the DAJD on the issue of restraints.

¶ 4 On November 9, 2012, the judge heard argument on Walker's motion. Walker argued he had a constitutional right to appear in court free from restraints, regardless of whether a jury was present, and that there was no factual basis to support his shackling. He contended that because he had no history of disrupting court proceedings or attempting to escape from the courtroom, there was no reason to believe that he would do so at his sentencing hearing. He argued that the DAJD's claims otherwise were speculative. Walker also asserted that restraints would dehumanize him and prejudice the sentencing judge.

¶ 5 In response, the DAJD first argued that under the separation of powers doctrine the question of whether and how Walker should be restrained in the courtroom was solely within the discretion of DAJD. It also contended that Walker's constitutional right to appear free from restraint applied only when a jury was present, and that judges are presumed not to be prejudiced by a defendant's appearance in restraints. Lastly, the DAJD argued that Walker's violent criminal history, his misconduct in jail, his gang affiliation, and his history of eluding law enforcement, justified the use of restraints on him during court proceedings.

¶ 6 The trial court concluded that, while it was “not prohibited from exercising some authority over security, the Court, any court, is wise to take into account the judgment and the information that's available to the Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention.” VRP (11/9/12) at 10. The judge denied Walker's motion, finding “ample reason” for keeping Walker restrained during sentencing. VRP (11/9/12) at 11.

¶ 7 At the December 11, 2012, sentencing hearing, Walker renewed his objection to appearing in restraints. The court overruled the objection and sentenced him to a standard-range sentence of 270 months of confinement on the murder charge and forty-three months on the assault charge, to run concurrently.¹ This sentence fell below the top, but above the midpoint of the standard range, and was two years less than the sentence recommended by the State. Walker appeals the sentence.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 It is well settled that in a proceeding before a jury a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to appear free from restraints or shackles of any kind. In State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 50 P. 580 (1897), the defendant's conviction for burglary was reversed because the trial court, without justification, denied the defendant's motion that he and his witnesses be unmanacled before the jury during the trial. The court cited article 1, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution which provides “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person,” and stated:

The right here declared is to appear with the use of not only his mental but his physical faculties unfettered, and unless some impelling necessity demands the restraint of a prisoner to secure the safety of others and his own custody, the binding of the prisoner in irons is a plain violation of the constitutional guaranty.

Id. at 51, 50 P. 580.

¶ 9 Although, the right found in Williams, was in the context of a jury trial, the court did not expressly limit application of that right to proceedings in which a jury was present. The court cited the rule at common law that not only is a defendant entitled to be free of shackles at trial, “prior to 1722, when a prisoner was arraigned or appeared at the bar of the court to plead, he was presented without manacles or bonds, unless there was evident danger of his escape.” Id. at 49, 50 P. 580. The court further noted that the common law of England was “expressly adopted by legislative enactment at the first session of the legislative assembly of this territory, and there is no doubt that the ancient right of one accused of crime under an indictment or information to appear in court unfettered, is still preserved in all its original vigor in this state.” Id. at 50, 50 P. 580.

¶ 10 Many subsequent cases, in Washington and other jurisdictions, have addressed the right to appear in court free of physical restraint, but nearly all have addressed the right in the context of a jury trial. See State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 842–43, 975 P.2d 967 (1999) and cases cited therein.² Walker asks us to expressly extend the right to include appearances at all court proceedings, regardless of whether a jury is present.

¶ 11 As an initial matter we address the DAJD's argument below that, under the separation of powers doctrine, it has sole discretion to determine whether and in what manner an inmate may be required to appear before the court in restraints.³ The DAJD argued that prison administrators have plenary authority to determine whether an inmate defendant must wear restraints in the courtroom. In support of this position, it cites Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) ; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) ; and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). These cases hold only that courts generally accord prison administrators wide deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices which are necessary to preserve order, discipline, and security within penal institutions. See e.g. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (holding that prison administrator's rules and regulations affecting the sending of publications to prisoners are generally valid if they are “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ”) (Quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 ). But the issue before us is whether to accord similar deference to the decisions of prison administrators regarding the use of restraints on an inmate defendant once the defendant is in the courtroom.

¶ 12 The interests of prison administrators in the security of their institutions and the resulting decision to use restraints are readily distinguishable from the interests of the court. To be sure, on matters of courtroom security, those interests may overlap because of common concerns about preventing injury to those in the courtroom, preventing disorderly conduct in the courtroom, and preventing escape. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 846, 975 P.2d 967 ; Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 398, 635 P.2d 694. But, unlike in a penal setting, a court is also required to balance the need for a secure courtroom with the defendant's presumption of innocence, ability to assist counsel, the right to testify in one's own behalf, and the dignity of the judicial process. Finch, at 844–45, 975 P.2d 967. While prison officials may be well positioned to assist the trial court in deciding matters of courtroom security, they are in no position to weigh and balance the many factors the court must consider when determining whether, and in what manner a defendant should be restrained during a court proceeding. We hold that regardless of the nature of the court proceeding or whether a jury is present, it is particularly within the province of the trial court to determine whether and in what manner, shackles or other restraints should be used.

¶ 13 Next, we consider Walker's claim that he has a right under the Washington State constitution to appear for sentencing free from restraints. Because no case expressly finds such a right in the Washington constitution, Walker relies primarily on California cases as persuasive authority in support of his claim.⁴...