State v. Wall, 2005-507.
| Decision Date | 13 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-507.,2005-507. |
| Citation | 910 A.2d 1253 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Rose Marie WALL. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Brennan, Caron, Lenehan & Iacopino, of Manchester (Michael J. Iacopino and Jaye L. Rancourt on the brief, and Ms. Rancourt orally), for the defendant.
The defendant, Rose Marie Wall, appeals rulings of the Superior Court (Coffey, J.) denying her pretrial motions to suppress the results of blood tests conducted while she was a patient at Parkland Medical Center. We affirm.
The record supports the following. In March 2003, the defendant was involved in an automobile accident in which the vehicle that she drove collided with the rear of another vehicle. Police officers arrived at the scene and spoke to fire and rescue personnel, who told them that emergency medical personnel were attending to the defendant and a child who had been a passenger in the defendant's vehicle. The officers were informed that fire and rescue personnel had smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant. The officers instructed an ambulance driver to take her to a New Hampshire hospital. She was then transported to Parkland Medical Center in Derry.
At the hospital, the officers attempted to speak with her in the emergency room. Although she refused to answer the officers' questions, they were able to observe that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that she smelled of alcohol. The officers arrested her for driving while intoxicated. While at the hospital, the officers did not ask hospital staff to draw or test the defendant's blood.
On the following day, a police officer returned to the hospital and requested any blood samples and blood test results taken from the defendant by hospital staff. Although the officer did not have a warrant, hospital staff gave him a report of the defendant's blood test results as well as two blood samples. The report stated that the defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.256. The samples were taken to the State Laboratory for testing. The State Laboratory's testing showed a blood alcohol content of 0.23. The defendant was subsequently indicted for aggravated driving while intoxicated under RSA 265:82-a, III (Supp.2003), which requires a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16 or more, reckless conduct under RSA 631:3, II (1996), and endangering the welfare of a child under RSA 639:3, I (1996).
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood tests conducted both at the hospital and the State Laboratory. The defendant argued that the hospital acted as an agent of the police in drawing her blood, and thus needed a warrant to do so. The defendant also argued that the police's seizure of the blood samples and test results from the hospital violated the State and Federal Constitutions. In addition, the defendant moved to exclude any evidence regarding the blood tests performed at the hospital and the State Laboratory, arguing that the hospital did not follow a proper chain of custody while in possession of the samples. The trial court denied the defendant's motions.
At trial, the State introduced the hospital's test results as a business record. The defendant objected, based upon a lack of a chain of custody, and the court overruled the objection. The defendant also unsuccessfully objected when the State introduced the test results from the State Laboratory. The defendant was found guilty of the charges stated above.
On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) that hospital staff acted as agents of the police in drawing her blood without a warrant or exigent circumstances, thus violating Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution; (2) that there was an insufficient chain of custody established from the time the hospital drew the defendant's blood to its arrival at the hospital's laboratory for testing; and (3) that the police violated the State and Federal Constitutions by seizing the defendant's blood samples and blood test results from the hospital without a warrant and without the defendant's consent.
The defendant argues that the hospital acted as an agent of the State when hospital staff drew the defendant's blood. The agency relationship was created, the defendant argues, at the accident scene, when the police directed the ambulance driver to take the defendant to a New Hampshire hospital. The defendant points to testimony that the officer's purpose in directing the defendant to a New Hampshire hospital was so that he could obtain a blood sample. Had the police not so instructed the driver, the defendant asserts, the ambulance personnel would have transported the defendant to a Massachusetts hospital, which is where they transported the injured passenger. The defendant concludes that the agency relationship established at the accident scene with the ambulance personnel extended to the hospital staff who drew her blood.
The constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply only to State action. State v. Nemser, 148 N.H. 453, 454, 807 A.2d 1289 (2002). Evidence obtained by a private party is generally free of constitutional restraints; however, constitutional restrictions apply to a search or seizure of evidence by a private party acting as an agent of law enforcement. Id. at 454-55, 807 A.2d 1289. This principle, known as the "agency rule," prevents police from having private individuals conduct searches or seizures that would be unlawful if performed by the police. Id. at 455, 807 A.2d 1289.
"A finding of agency relies upon the unique position of the fact-finder, who assesses first-hand all of the verbal and nonverbal aspects of the evidence presented." State v. Heirtzler, 147 N.H. 344, 350, 789 A.2d 634 (2002). The totality of the circumstances must be considered when determining whether the operative facts create an agency relationship. Id. at 349-50, 789 A.2d 634. Because the determination of whether an agency relationship exists is fact-driven, we employ a deferential standard in reviewing the trial court's finding. Nemser, 148 N.H. at 455, 807 A.2d 1289. We will "uphold a trial court's finding of an agency relationship unless it is unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous." Id. (quotation omitted).
A conclusion that an agency relationship existed between the government and a private individual requires proof of an affirmative act by a state official prior to the search or seizure that can reasonably be seen to have induced the search or seizure by the private party. Id. Two kinds of governmental action will meet this standard. Id.
The first is the government's prior agreement with a third party that the latter should act to obtain evidence from a defendant. Whether the agreement is formal or informal, there will be some responsive communication between the parties, and the exchange will evince an understanding that the third party will be acting on the government's behalf or for the government's benefit.
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). Second, a prior governmental request for help may establish that the private individual acted on the government's behalf again, even if the actor makes no reply to the government but responds simply by taking the action requested by the state official. Id.
In the instant case, the defendant argues that the first kind of governmental action took place, and that the trial court erroneously found no agency relationship. We disagree. Although the police affirmatively requested that the ambulance driver bring the defendant to a New Hampshire hospital, the trial court found no evidence that the ambulance personnel notified hospital staff of the officer's request. Thus, the trial court found, any agency relationship created between the officer and the ambulance personnel did not extend to hospital staff, and it was the hospital staff, not the ambulance personnel, who drew the defendant's blood. Further, the trial court found no evidence that the police asked anyone to draw a blood sample from the defendant. Thus, any agency relationship that may have arisen included only transportation, not the drawing of blood. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found that the blood drawn by hospital staff occurred for medical treatment, not because of an agency relationship with law enforcement. We cannot conclude that the trial court's findings are unsupported by the evidence or clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's finding that the police did not establish an agency relationship with the hospital staff members who drew the defendant's blood.
The defendant next argues that because there was an insufficient chain of custody linking the blood drawn from the defendant to the blood tested at the hospital's laboratory and the blood tested at the State Laboratory, all test results should have been excluded from evidence. The break in the chain of custody occurred, the defendant argues, because the hospital could not establish which staff member drew the blood, the method by which the blood was drawn, who labeled the samples, and who transmitted the samples to the hospital laboratory. The trial court admitted the hospital's report as a business record. For reasons discussed below, we need only address the admission of the hospital's laboratory results.
In challenging the chain of custody, the defendant appears to implicate New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 901, which governs the authentication and identification of evidence. The defendant's challenge is not to the authenticity or identity of evidence introduced at trial, however. No blood sample was introduced as evidence. The evidence at issue is...
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