State v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 07 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-3524-CR.,00-3524-CR. |
| Citation | 2002 WI App 61,642 N.W.2d 549,251 Wis.2d 625 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles A. WALLACE a/k/a LaShawn Thomas, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Martha K. Askins, assistant state public defender of Madison.
On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general, and James E. Doyle, attorney general.
Before Vergeront, P.J., Deininger and Lundsten, JJ.
¶ 1.
Charles Wallace appeals a judgment convicting him of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver it.1 Wallace claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He first contends that he was unlawfully detained after the police stopped his vehicle. Second, he contends that he did not voluntarily consent to a strip search and that the search violated Wisconsin's strip search statute. Finally, Wallace contends that, even if he consented to a strip search, the ensuing visual body cavity search exceeded the scope of his consent. We conclude that Wallace was not unlawfully detained and that he voluntarily consented to a strip search. However, because the trial court made no finding regarding whether Wallace consented to a visual body cavity search, we reverse and remand for a factual determination on this issue.
¶ 2. While City of Beloit police officers executed a search warrant at a Beloit residence, they observed a car drive past the house. One of the officers had information that the car had left the house prior to the search after its passengers were tipped off that police may be coming. He also had information that the individuals in the car were involved in selling drugs from the residence being searched, and that they "kept [drugs] in their underwear or in their rectal area." The officer instructed another officer to stop the car.
¶ 3. The second officer subsequently stopped the car for displaying unauthorized license plates. Wallace was driving the car. Antoine Williams and two juveniles, who attended a local high school but were truant, were passengers in the car when it was stopped. The officer arrested Wallace for displaying unauthorized plates and Williams for contributing to the truancy of the two minors. After Wallace said that he lived in Illinois, the police informed him that because he was an out-of-state resident he would have to post a cash bond. Officers then transported Wallace and Williams to the Beloit Police Department to post bond.
¶ 4. One of the arresting officers testified at the suppression hearing that, while at the police station booking area, Williams was searched first. Prior to the search of Wallace, Williams posted bond for himself and Wallace. Wallace was then taken to a holding cell and searched. An officer testified as follows:
Another officer gave the following account:
¶ 5. The officers arrested Wallace for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver it. Later the same day, Wallace gave a statement. In it, Wallace said that he had consented to a strip search; that he was not threatened or coerced into consenting to the search; that the cocaine was his; and that he was going to use the money obtained from selling the cocaine to rent a car. When asked whether he knew he did not have to allow the search, Wallace replied, "No."
¶ 6. Wallace moved to suppress the seized evidence and the statement. He asserted that the traffic stop was unlawful and that the officers unlawfully detained him when they required him to post bond instead of releasing him. He also claimed that the subsequent strip search violated both state law and the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court denied his motion. In its written decision, the court concluded that both Wallace's stop and his detention were lawful. The court found that police had information that Wallace was an Illinois resident, and that the Beloit Police Department had a policy which requires out-of-state residents to post cash bond before being released.
¶ 7. The court further concluded that although the strip search did not comply with WIS. STAT. § 968.255 (1999-2000),2 Wallace had voluntarily consented to the strip search, and that police therefore did not violate his rights under either the statute or the Fourth Amendment. Wallace subsequently pled guilty and now appeals his conviction.3
[1, 2]
¶ 8. A circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law. We will not reverse the circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Roberts, 196 Wis. 2d 445, 452, 538 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1995). However, whether those facts satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 829, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989).
[3, 4]
¶ 9. We first address Wallace's contention that the Beloit police officers unlawfully prolonged his detention to obtain his consent to a strip search. The detention of a person during an investigative stop, even if only temporary and brief, constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996). Thus, not only the basis for the stop, but also the duration and scope of the stop, must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
¶ 10. Wallace concedes that the police lawfully stopped his car for displaying unauthorized license plates. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)
. He also concedes that he was lawfully taken into custody pursuant to Beloit Police Department policy, which requires out-of-state residents to post bond prior to release. Wallace, however, challenges the duration and scope of the stop. He asserts that, because he was arrested for only a traffic violation, and because officers had already conducted a pat down and determined he was unarmed, their subsequent request to conduct a strip search was unjustified. See id. at 29 (). The strip search request, he argues, unreasonably extended his detention because it was not reasonably related to his traffic violation.
¶ 11. We addressed a closely related issue in State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 558 N.W. 696 (Ct. App. 1996), where we concluded that police questioning on a subject unrelated to the initial reason for the stop did not violate the constitution because it did not unreasonably extend the duration of the detention. Id. at 607-09. Police stopped the defendant in Gaulrapp for a defective muffler. Id. at 603. One of the officers then asked him if he had any drugs or weapons inside his vehicle and he replied that he did not. Id. The officer then asked if they could search his person and his vehicle and he consented. Id. The officers found cocaine on his person and marijuana in his truck. Id. at 603-04. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the police unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking him questions about drugs and weapons. Id. at 604. The circuit court denied his motion and we affirmed. Id. We concluded that "it is the extension of a detention past the point reasonably justified by the initial stop, not the nature of the questions asked, that violates the Fourth Amendment," and we concluded that the police had not unreasonably prolonged Gaulrapp's detention. Id. at 609. ¶ 12. Similarly, we conclude here that the officers' request for consent to conduct a strip search did not unreasonably prolong Wallace's detention. The circuit court's findings based on the evidence at the suppression hearing support this conclusion. The strip search was conducted within thirty minutes of Wallace's arrival at the police station. The officers made their request before Wallace's bond was posted. Because Wallace was still waiting for his bond to be posted, the officer's request for consent did not prolong his detention at all.
[5]
¶ 13. Wallace claims that the officers' motivation for the traffic stop and his subsequent detention was to discover evidence of drug activity, and that this purpose had nothing to do with the traffic...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Popenhagen
...obtained evidence as a sanction." 229 Wis.2d at 787, 601 N.W.2d 287 (citation omitted). 32. Peckham was so interpreted in State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, ¶ 25, 251 Wis.2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549, and State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, ¶ 17, 247 Wis.2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649. 33. Peckham v. Kre......
-
State v. Ramirez
...431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993) ("[D]etention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry's second prong is aimed."); State v. Wallace, 251 Wis.2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549, 554 (2002) ("[I]t is the extension of a detention past the point reasonably justified by the initial stop, not the nature of th......
-
State v. Williams
...car; when she refused telling her he would detain her vehicle until a drug dog was summoned). 16. See majority op. at ¶ 7. 17. State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, ¶ 13, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549; Strickler v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 884, 893, (Pa. 2000) (officer's subjective intentions 1......
-
State v. McGee, No. 2006AP1593-CR (Wis. App. 10/23/2007), 2006AP1593-CR.
...¶ 19 Whether an individual consented to a search is a question of fact which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, ¶16, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549. "Whether the consent was voluntary, however, is a question of `constitutional fact,' which we ......