State v. Walton

• Decision Date: 30 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 20403.,20403.
• Citation: State v. Walton, 1999 SD 80, 600 N.W.2d 524 (S.D. 1999)
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Benjamin WALTON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

600 N.W.2d 524

1999 SD 80

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Benjamin WALTON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20403.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 23, 1999.

Decided June 30, 1999.

Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Atty. Gen. and Paul Cremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Edward G. Albright, Pennington County Public Defender's Office, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Walton appeals his conviction of the first-degree manslaughter of Daniel Lehmkuhl. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] On November 8, 1996, Justin Wood drove Emmanuel Geliga, Jorge Geliga and Benjamin Walton to the Baken Park shopping plaza in Rapid City, South Dakota, where the group planned to meet some girls. Wood parked in front of the Conoco gas station, and Emmanuel and he went inside. While they were inside, Jason Tschakert, an individual with whom the group had a prior run-in, approached the vehicle and a verbal altercation ensued.¹ Tschakert spit on Wood's car and challenged Walton and Jorge to leave the car and fight, but neither left the vehicle.

[¶ 3.] After Tschakert departed, Wood and Emmanuel returned to the car and drove to the other end of the Baken Park plaza lot to wait for the girls. Tschakert drove his vehicle near the area where Wood's car was located and then proceeded to the area behind the Conoco station, where he picked up Tony Akers. Tschakert and Akers drove back to the location where Wood's car was parked, and Tschakert parked his vehicle near the passenger's side of Wood's car. After he and Akers exited the vehicle, a verbal altercation occurred.

[¶ 4.] A group of individuals soon gathered near the Wood and Tschakert vehicles. Among the group was Daniel Lehmkuhl, who joined Tschakert and Akers at the passenger's side of Wood's car and also joined in the verbal exchange. Lehmkuhl then approached the driver's side, where Wood was seated in the front driver's seat and Walton was seated directly behind him. Lehmkuhl opened the driver's side door and ordered Wood out of the car. Wood complied and Lehmkuhl entered the car. Thereafter, a fight ensued inside the car, with Lehmkuhl kneeling on the front seat fighting Walton, who was seated in the backseat. Walton was carrying a knife and stabbed Lehmkuhl once in the heart and once in the face. After being stabbed, Lehmkuhl got out of Wood's car, hit the car, and then fell to the ground. Paramedics were called and Lehmkuhl was taken to the Rapid City Regional Hospital. He died ten days later as a result of the stab wound to the heart.

[¶ 5.] Wood, Emmanuel, Jorge, and Walton immediately left the scene and drove to the Crystal Cave area of the Black Hills, where Walton hid the knife. Shortly thereafter, Walton was taken into custody.

[¶ 6.] On November 19, 1996, the Pennington County State's Attorney filed a juvenile petition charging Walton with first-degree manslaughter. On the same date, State made a motion to transfer the charges to adult court. The motion was granted on March 12, 1997, and on March 13 State filed a complaint charging Walton with second-degree murder² and, in the alternative, first-degree manslaughter.³ Walton pleaded not guilty to both counts.

[¶ 7.] On December 1, 1997, a jury trial commenced. Walton was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in the state penitentiary.

[¶ 8.] On appeal, Walton raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in its instructions regarding justifiable homicide.

2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of testimony regarding Walton's character.

3. Whether the trial court erred by denying Walton's request to use prior acts evidence of a State's witness.

4. Whether the trial court erred by allowing Walton to be tried on a second-degree murder charge.

5. Whether State's reference to Walton's post-arrest silence violated Walton's due process rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 9.] A trial court's evidentiary rulings are "presumed correct and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Larson, 1998 SD 80, ¶ 10, 582 N.W.2d 15, 17 (citing State v. Goodroad, 1997 SD 46, ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d 126, 129 (other citation omitted)). "`The test is not whether we would have made the same ruling, but whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could have reasonably reached the same conclusion.'" Id. (citations omitted). A trial court's refusal of a proposed jury instruction is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Eagle Star, 1996 SD 143, ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d 70, 73.

DECISION

[¶ 10.] 1. The trial court did not err in denying Walton's proposed jury instructions.

[¶ 11.] The trial court refused four of Walton's proposed jury instructions, two justifiable homicide instructions and two fourth-degree burglary instructions. Walton claims the instructions were essential to his defense theory that he was defending himself against Lehmkuhl, who was committing a fourth-degree burglary. He argues that the court's failure to adequately provide the jury with a full and correct statement of the law applicable to the case denied him a right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. We disagree.

[¶ 12.] "Trial courts possess broad discretion in instructing the jury." State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 9, 577 N.W.2d 590, 594 (citations omitted). It is the trial court's duty "to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case." Eagle Star, 1996 SD 143, ¶ 15, 558 N.W.2d at 73 (citing Black v. Gardner, 320 N.W.2d 153, 158 (S.D.1982) (citations omitted)). In addition, "[u]pon proper request, defendants are entitled to instructions on their defense theories if evidence supports them." Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 9, 577 N.W.2d at 594 (citations omitted). "`[J]ury instructions are adequate when, considered as a whole, they give the full and correct statement of the law applicable to the case.'" State v. Rhines, 1996 SD 55, ¶ 111, 548 N.W.2d 415, 443, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1013, 117 S.Ct. 522, 136 L.Ed.2d 410 (1996) (quoting State v. Fast Horse, 490 N.W.2d 496, 499 (S.D.1992) (citation omitted)). To reverse a trial court's refusal to give an instruction, the defendant must be unfairly prejudiced by the refusal. Id. Moreover, the defendant must show that "`the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if [the] instruction had been given.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bartlett, 411 N.W.2d 411, 415 (S.D.1987) (other citation omitted)).

[¶ 13.] When viewing the instructions as a whole, we find that they adequately provided a correct statement of the law. The jury was instructed on justifiable homicide and self-defense. Even though the instructions given were not identical to those proposed by Walton, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the case. As we have previously stated, "[i]t is not error for the trial court to refuse a requested instruction which amplifies the principle embodied in a given instruction." Eagle Star, 1996 SD 143, ¶ 13, 558 N.W.2d at 73 (citations omitted). Furthermore, as this Court stated in State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306, 310 (S.D.1992), "[w]hile the justifiable homicide instructions and self-defense instructions are not identical, the giving of either one would require the jury to consider whether or not it believed [Walton] was defending himself[.]"

[¶ 14.] In addition, the jury was instructed that State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Walton was not acting in self-defense. The jury heard testimony that Lehmkuhl entered Wood's car and a fight ensued. It also heard Walton testify that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed Lehmkuhl. After hearing the evidence and the instructions, the jury found Walton guilty of first-degree manslaughter. We cannot say, and Walton has not established, that had the jury been instructed as he proposed, it would have reached a different verdict. Therefore, we find no error in the court's refusal of Walton's proposed instructions. See Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 18,577 N.W.2d at 598.

[¶ 15.] 2. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence that Walton had previously carried a knife.

[¶ 16.] Prior to trial, State moved to introduce evidence that Walton had previously carried a knife, wielded it on more than one occasion, and had spoken about, and gestured as to, the way in which he would use the knife if needed. The trial court determined that, under SDCL 19-12-5,⁴ the evidence regarding Walton's other acts with a knife was not relevant to any material issue in the case, and its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. As such, it denied State's motion.

[¶ 17.] Also prior to trial, Walton filed a motion in limine to prevent the admission of evidence of his having previously carried a knife. The trial court denied Walton's motion, stating that the evidence would be admissible if, at the time of its introduction, it was relevant.

[¶ 18.] At trial, over Walton's objection, the court allowed the testimony of two witnesses who stated that they had seen Walton carry a knife on previous occasions.⁵ Walton claims this testimony was improper character testimony and was inadmissible under SDCL 19-12-4⁶ and SDCL 19-12-5. We disagree.

[¶ 19.] Initially, for evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant. See SDCL 19-12-2. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." SDCL 19-12-1; see State v. Litschewski, 1999 SD 30, ¶ 12, 590 N.W.2d 899, 902; State v. Knecht, 1997 SD 53, ¶ 7, 563 N.W.2d 413, 417. When considering the admissibility of prior act evidence, this Court has stated that "no `preliminary showing is necessary before such evidence may be introduced for a proper...