State v. Walton
| Decision Date | 20 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 72462,72462 |
| Citation | 796 S.W.2d 374 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert Ladell WALTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Susan Hogan, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Deborah L. Ground, Ronald L. Jurgeson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Robert Ladell Walton was convicted of second degree burglary, § 569.170, RSMo 1986, and stealing, § 570.030, RSMo 1986. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on each count. He appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. After the filing of the court of appeals' opinion, this Court granted transfer. Rule 83.03. With some modifications, this Court adopts the opinion of the appellate court authored by Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., Chief Judge. Affirmed.
When Bobby Harrison, his wife, Deborah, and their son, Brett Harrison, returned to their Lexington home from a ski trip, they found a strange car parked in their barn. At that time they did not investigate, but unloaded their belongings and began to unpack.
While unpacking, Brett Harrison discovered two rings and almost $200 missing from his dresser, and Mrs. Harrison found that someone had rummaged through her jewelry box. Bobby Harrison called the sheriff and reported the losses and the strange car in the barn.
After making the call, the Harrisons thought they heard a noise in their basement. The two men went to check. Deborah Harrison began to go through the closets. Brett heard his closet door moving and, armed with a rifle, went to his room and found defendant Walton in his closet.
Within minutes Deputy Robert Teichman arrived and arrested and handcuffed the defendant. As the deputy escorted the defendant out of the house, the Harrisons asked him what he had done with their property. He then led the Harrisons and the deputy to a bed in the basement. Behind the bed the Harrisons found a plastic bag containing a box; inside the box they found Brett Harrison's rings, Deborah's costume jewelry and several silver dollars.
Brett then asked the defendant whether he had his money, and defendant pointed to the wallet in his pocket. Brett removed the wallet from defendant's back pocket. It held $172, including a $2 bill. Brett testified that he had a $2 bill in the money on his dresser. The defendant did not claim ownership of the money.
At trial, the defendant testified that he had been on his way to Higginsville when he began having car problems. Previous to that time, he and Brett Harrison rode to work together. He said that he parked his car in the Harrison's driveway and went to the front door. The Harrisons arrived soon afterwards. He explained his presence, and they entered the house together. The Harrisons discovered the theft of the money and jewelry and called the police. Deputy Teichman arrived shortly and arrested the defendant. Defendant protested that he did not have Brett's money.
Deputy Teichman repeated the Harrisons' account of what occurred. He also testified that later at the sheriff's office, defendant Walton gave an oral statement that he went to the Harrisons to purchase cocaine from Brett. He entered the house through a basement sliding glass door, went to Brett's room, and found no cocaine but took some money from Brett's dresser before the Harrisons found him.
A jury convicted defendant of second degree burglary and stealing and this appeal followed.
Defendant Walton argues three points on appeal: first, the trial court erred in permitting the trial to proceed after the state used its peremptory challenges to strike all black members of the venire. Second, the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause to Mary Steffens, a member of the venire, depriving him of a full panel of qualified jurors from which to make his peremptory challenges. Third, the trial court plainly erred in allowing the witnesses to testify that he had led them to the missing property and that he had allowed them to remove his wallet, because those acts occurred for the purpose of interrogation while he was in custody but before the officer advised him of his Miranda rights.
In his first point, defendant argues that the state used its peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The court of appeals ordered the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.
At the hearing, J. Armin Rust, the prosecutor, appeared for the state. Defendant appeared in person and by attorney Dennis Rolf. Based on the evidence, the court found that the state had struck the only two blacks on the venire for clear, specific, neutral, and legitimate reasons related to the case.
Mr. Rust testified that he struck Michael Elmore because his brother, then serving a prison sentence, had been prosecuted in Lafayette County within the previous six months. Mr. Rust also testified that he struck Ethel Johnson because he associated her with a case in which, as public defender, he had represented a Johnson, probably either Mrs. Johnson's son or relative. Apparently, Mr. Rust did not ask Ms. Johnson to verify his supposition.
The hearing judge observed Mr. Rust's demeanor and found his explanation to be race-neutral. The judge also found that the defendant had offered no evidence to show a pattern or practice of the prosecutor's office using peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. No such showing need be made; the court will judge each case individually. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 95-96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723; Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, 465 (1977). The Batson court did say, however, that "a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination." 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
The trial court's account of the evidence in this case is quite "plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety" and, therefore, its conclusions are not clearly erroneous, the standard of review in such cases. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988).
In his second point the defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause to a member of the venire, Mary Steffens, because the court thereby denied him a full panel of qualified jurors from which to make his peremptory challenges.
The following dialogue occurred during the voir dire examination:
MR. RUST [Prosecutor]: Does anyone else have any trouble sitting in a case where [Bobby Harrison, Debbie Harrison and Brett Harrison] are the witnesses? Yes, Mrs. Steffens?
* * * * * *
MR. MAGEE [Defendant's attorney]: All right, now, Mrs. Steffens, same question. [Would the fact you are acquainted with the Harrisons influence you in your deliberations in this case, wherein you might be more apt to believe them than somebody else, or you might in the deliberations reflect upon your knowledge or acquaintanceships rather than what you see and hear from the witness stand?]
To qualify as a juror, the venireman must be able to enter upon that service with an open mind free from bias and prejudice. State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 744, 107 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). The trial court has a duty to make an independent inquiry only when a venireman equivocates about his ability to be fair and impartial. Id. However, where an answer to a question suggests a possibility of bias and upon further questioning, the venireman gives unequivocal assurances of impartiality, the bare possibility of prejudice will not disqualify the juror or deprive the trial judge of discretion to seat the venireman. State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). It must clearly appear from the evidence that the challenged venireperson was in fact prejudiced. State v. Thompson, 723 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Mo.App.1987); State v. Edwards, 714 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo.App.1986).
A trial court has wide discretion in determining the qualifications of members of the venire, and on appeal the court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause absent a clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party. State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d at 158. It is for the trial court, and not the venireperson, to determine whether a challenged member of the panel could be an impartial juror, but the testimony of the member concerning his ability to act impartially is evidence to be considered by the trial court. State v....
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