State v. Washburne

Decision Date24 December 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-905,96-905
Citation574 N.W.2d 261
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John Lee WASHBURNE, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Barry M. Anderson, Keokuk, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Short, County Attorney, and Bruce C. McDonald, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and NEUMAN, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

ANDREASEN, Justice.

John L. Washburne was found guilty of murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.2 (1995). On appeal, Washburne argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress (1) statements made by him to law enforcement officials, (2) evidence gained after he allegedly consented to the seizure of his tennis shoes, (3) statements made by him after he had invoked his constitutional rights, and (4) statements made by him during the telephone calls that were recorded while he was in jail. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On July 14, 1995, at approximately 7:30 p.m., the body of Karen Owen was found in the Des Moines river in a remote area of Keokuk, Iowa. Owen died as a result of severe injuries to her head inflicted by a blunt instrument. She had been beaten to death close to the river's edge and her body dragged to the river and dumped into the water.

The evening before her body was discovered, Owen had been with Bobby Hooper and Washburne at a tavern. Law enforcement officials interviewed both Hooper and Washburne on July 15. On July 16 a search warrant was obtained to search the residences of Hooper and Washburne and to obtain samples of their blood.

On July 17 Washburne reported to the sheriff of Hancock County at Carthage, Illinois, to begin serving a sentence for an unrelated theft conviction. Iowa law enforcement officials continued questioning Washburne by telephone and in person. On July 24 law enforcement officials seized Washburne's tennis shoes and other personal property from Hancock County jail personnel. Interrogation of Washburne continued until he was charged with murder on August 9.

After entering a plea of not guilty to the charge Washburne filed a motion to suppress, which he later amended. The State filed a resistance to both the original motion and its amendment.

A hearing involving part of the original motion to suppress and part of the amended motion was held on February 1, 1996 before Judge D.B. Hendrickson. The issues presented at the hearing related to suppression of items seized pursuant to a search warrant and the suppression of recorded statements made by Washburne over the telephone while he was in the Illinois jail. On February 2, the judge denied Washburne's motion to suppress.

A hearing on the remainder of the motion to suppress was held on March 12, 13, and 19 before Judge R. David Fahey. On March 26 the judge denied the motion to suppress. The same day jury trial against Washburne commenced.

On April 11, the charge was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty the following day. Washburne requested to be sentenced immediately and the court entered a judgment of conviction on April 12. Washburne filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Scope of Review.

Because Washburne has alleged a denial of his constitutional rights, our review is de novo. State v. Beeson, 569 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1997).

III. Appellate Review of Suppression Rulings.

All issues raised in this appeal arise from the denial of the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Our rules of criminal procedure provide for the filing of pretrial motions including motions to suppress. Iowa Rs.Crim. P. 10(2), 11(1). Here, Washburne strenuously argues the trial court should have suppressed the testimony of Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent Hedlund as to statements made by the defendant to him and all evidence of blood found on his tennis shoes seized without a search warrant.

Hedlund did not testify at the suppression hearing. The State advised the court that Hedlund was in Atlanta, Georgia at a school he was required to attend. At trial, Hedlund testified as to inculpatory statements and admissions made by Washburne, the attending circumstances of those statements, and Washburne's consent to seizure of his tennis shoes.

Washburne urges the State failed to present evidence at the suppression hearing that statements made to Hedlund were voluntary and that the State failed to present evidence of his voluntary consent to the seizure of his tennis shoes. The State contends trial evidence may be considered in support of the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.

Federal appellate courts have held that they may consider evidence first produced at trial to support a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 539 (4th Cir.1996) ("[F]ederal courts have held uniformly that an appellate tribunal may consider evidence adduced at trial that supports the district judge's ruling." ); United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1056 (11th Cir.1995) ("[W]e may consider any evidence presented at the trial of the case and are not limited to the evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion."); United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 504 (5th Cir.1995) ("[W]e may consider not only the evidence from the suppression hearing but also evidence presented during the trial."); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1240 n. 2 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir.1992) ("As a reviewing court, we are not confined simply to the evidence adduced during the suppression hearing. In evaluating the correctness of the district court's rulings, the appellate court may consider the entire record developed from the trial even though such evidence may not have been presented during the suppression hearing."); United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891, 895 n. 6 (1st Cir.1980) ("It apparently is settled law that the validity of an arrest or search can be supported by evidence that was adduced at trial even though this was not presented at the pretrial suppression hearing."); Rocha v. United States, 387 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1967) ("In determining whether a district court erred in admitting evidence claimed to have been seized as a result of an unreasonable search, an appellate court will not ordinarily limit itself to the testimony received at a pretrial motion to suppress, but will also consider pertinent testimony given at the trial.").

The federal courts generally refer to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 555 (1925), in support of appellate court consideration of facts adduced at trial. In Carroll, evidence produced at trial was used to affirm the lower court's refusal to exclude liquor as evidence. The Court stated:

If the evidence given on the trial was sufficient, as we think it was, to sustain the introduction of the liquor as evidence, it is immaterial that there was an inadequacy of evidence when application was made for its return. A conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set aside on such a ground. The whole matter was gone into at the trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.

Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. at 288, 69 L.Ed. at 555. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 418 (7th Cir.1985), stated:

This rule [that evidence adduced only at trial may be used to sustain the denial of a motion to suppress] is an attractive one; because a defendant is entitled to have evidence suppressed only if it was unconstitutionally obtained, sustaining the denial of the motion on the basis of proof of constitutionality adduced at trial avoids a windfall reversal of the defendant's conviction.

Relying on federal authorities, we stated "[i]n determining whether the court erred in overruling the motion to suppress we may consider not only the evidence adduced in the motion to suppress but the later trial testimony." State v. Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 577-78 (Iowa 1976). We continue to follow this rule. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Iowa 1997); State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996); State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996); State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995); State v. Vincik, 436 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Iowa 1989); State v. Schubert, 346 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1984); State v. Brown, 253 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 1977). As recently stated, "[i]t is one of the facts of court life that a pretrial motion in limine is of limited value unless it is sustained." State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 1997). We have considered evidence received at trial in support of the court's denial of a motion to suppress where there is a challenge to the legality of a custodial statement, see Schubert, 346 N.W.2d at 33, and a challenge to the legality of the search and seizure of physical evidence, see Vincik, 436 N.W.2d at 353.

IV. Statements to Law Enforcement Officials.

Circumstantial evidence established Washburne's presence at the murder scene. Owen's blood was found on Washburne's tennis shoe. The interviews of Washburne initially suggested he had little knowledge of the events prior to the murder. As more evidence was gathered by law enforcement officials, Washburne provided information in an attempt to build a case against Hooper. He admitted he picked up Hooper and Owen at a bar and dropped Owen off at her home. He later admitted to transporting them to the crime scene. After stating Hooper had killed the victim, Washburne later said he tried to hit Hooper with a baseball bat but missed and hit Owen.

A. Washburne requested the court to suppress all statements he made to law enforcement officials. He argues the statements were not voluntary and were secured in violation of his constitutional rights. The statements were a result of interviews that occurred between July 15...

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