State v. Washington

• Decision Date: 16 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2012–KK–2203.,2012–KK–2203.
• Citation: 104 So.3d 401
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Frederick WASHINGTON.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

104 So.3d 401

STATE of Louisiana

v.Frederick WASHINGTON.

No. 2012–KK–2203.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 16, 2012.

PER CURIAM.¹

[2012-2203 (La. 1]Granted. The ruling of the district court granting the defendant's motion to suppress drug and paraphernalia evidence seized from a residence is reversed; this case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Louisiana and Federal constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Lee, 05–2098, p. 14 (La.1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122;seeU.S. Const. amend. IV and La. Const. art. I, § 5. Therefore, the pivotal question in this case is whether the police officers acted reasonably in the following series of events: 1) entering the front yard of a residence with an open front door and standing at the door; 2) announcing their presence and asking if anyone was inside; 3) hearing no response to their announcement, further pushing the door open; 4) viewing lit candles inside; 5) then entering the residence to extinguish the candles to prevent a fire; and 6) seizing contraband the officers viewed while extinguishing the candles. Given only these facts, we might well have found the third action by police of further pushing the door open unreasonable. See Lee, 05–2098 at 14–15, 976 So.2d at 122 (“Warrants ... are generally required to search an individual's home or person, ‘unless “the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable [2012-2203 (La. 2]under the Fourth Amendment.’ ”). However, as found by the district court, these were not the only facts and circumstances prompting the officers to push the door open further. The district court erred in not considering the totality of the circumstances when ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence seized from the residence at the end of the above-described series of events. See State v. Bush, 12–0720, p. 1 (La.6/1/12), 90 So.3d 395, 396 (describing the standard on motion to suppress for admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant as a “totality of the circumstances” test).

The series of events just recounted was preceded by the defendant's arrest stemming from an encounter with police officers in the street in front of the residence. The arrest itself was the result of a lengthy series of events, which included a traffic stop and the defendant fleeing the scene on foot and being subdued by a taser. However, for present purposes and in the interest of brevity, the most significant events in the first series, i.e., the earlier series of events occurring on the street outside the residence, included: 1) the defendant making the unsolicited statement to police officers that the residence was his, but he did not live there because the residence was under renovation; 2) police officers observing from their vantage point on the street that the front door of the residence was partially open; 3) a search incidental to the arrest yielded a substantial amount of drugs and over $4,000 in currency; 4) the defendant's identification, also seized incidental to the arrest, indicated the residence with the open door to be the defendant's residence.

With these facts from the first series of events serving as predicates (so as to assist in evaluating the totality of the circumstances), we return to the actions taken by police officers at the residence to determine whether those actions were [2012-2203 (La. 3]reasonable. See Lee, 05–2098 at 14, 976 So.2d at 122. This court has explained the basic standard for evaluating the reasonableness of police officers entering a residence without a warrant:

Warrantless entries into the home for arrest or seizure are invalid in the absence of exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the home, and a police officer therefore needs both probable cause to arrest or search and exigent circumstances to justify a non-consensual warrantless intrusion into a private premises. State v. Talbert, 449 So.2d 446 (La.1984); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074 (La.1982).

State v. Brisban, 00–3437, p. 5 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927. Measured against this standard, we find each of the six actions by police officers at the residence to be reasonable and, therefore, not offensive to the Fourth Amendment or to La. Const. art. I, § 5, as follows.

First, police officers may approach the front door of a residence, just as members of the public may do so. In Brisban, we explained that when a residence has a front porch, police officers may access the front door:

The front porch of a private residence falls within the curtilage of the home and is therefore accorded Fourth Amendment protection. State v. Deary, 99–0627, p. 1 (La.1/28/00), 753 So.2d 200, 201. A front porch does not necessarily enjoy the same measure of Fourth Amendment protection that a home does, however, because of “an almost implicit understanding and custom in this country that, in the absence of signs or warning, a residence may be approached and the occupants summoned to the door by knocking.” Deary at p. 1, 753 So.2d at 201 (citing State v. Sanders, 374 So.2d 1186, 1189 (La.1979)).

In Deary, this court reaffirmed its prior holding in State v. Dixon, 391 So.2d 836 (La.1980), that “the police have the same right as other members of the public to approach the doorway of a home and see what was exposed by the owner to the view of the general populace.” Deary at p. 2, 753 So.2d at 201 (internal quotation omitted).

Brisban, 00–3437 at 5–6, 809 So.2d at 928. Here, the police officers had legitimate concerns about the security of the residence because the door was open, it was [2012-2203 (La. 4]night time, and the police officers had just arrested a person claiming to be the owner of the residence. So, the police officers acted reasonably and lawfully in approaching the front door.

Second, it was reasonable for the police officers to announce their presence through the residence's partially open door. Although defendant urges that the only permissible course of police action at this point was to close the door, neither the facts of this case nor the constitutional jurisprudence restricted the police officers to that singular course of action. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officers testified that this particular residence was known to them for complaints of trespass and burglary. Because the police officers were lawfully at the front door to secure the residence, it was both prudent and constitutionally permissible for them to call out through the open door to better ascertain if the residence was indeed secure. As this court previously explained: “police with legitimate business may enter the areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open to use by the public, and ... in so doing they are free to keep their eyes open and use their other senses.” Brisban, 00–3437 at 6, 809 So.2d at 928,quoting Deary, 99–0627 at 2, 753 So.2d at 201 (emphasis added).

Third, and similarly, it was permissible for the police officers to push the partially open door open further, so they could see if the residence was secure. Although it was prudent for the police officers to first call out, the lack of a response to the announcement that the police were at the front door hardly excludes the possibility of a burglary or trespass taking place inside. Even without entering the residence—police did not yet enter at the point of opening the door further—it was reasonable to expect the police officers could glean much information about the security of the house by viewing the area just inside the [2012-2203 (La. 5]partially open door. See Brisban, 00–3437 at 6, 809 So.2d at 928. Thus, the fact that the door was partially open is central to the justification for the police to see inside, without actually entering, when the police already have concerns for the security of the residence.²

The fact the door was partially open is important not only for the practicalities of police work, but also for reasons at the heart of the search and seizure doctrine. A door that is unattended and open to the public...