State v. Washington

• Decision Date: 02 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-461-C,89-461-C
• Citation: 581 A.2d 1031
• Parties: STATE v. Jeffrey WASHINGTON. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1031

581 A.2d 1031

STATE v. Jeffrey WASHINGTON.

No. 89-461-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 2, 1990.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Jeffrey Greer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Richard Casparian, Public Defender, Barbara Hurst, Asst. Public Defender, for defendant.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal by the defendant, Jeffrey Washington (Washington), from his conviction of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In his appeal, the defendant seeks the following: that he be awarded a new trial on the grounds that certain evidence was improperly admitted; that his conviction be reduced to one of second-degree murder and the matter be remanded for resentencing; and, in the alternative, that his sentence be vacated and a sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole be imposed. We reject the defendant's arguments and affirm.

The record discloses the following material facts. On Christmas Day 1987, seventy-three-year-old Alice Carcieri, a double amputee, entertained friends and family members until late in the evening. The defendant, who was employed by Carcieri's brother-in-law and occasionally cleaned house for Carcieri, entered the house through the back door while her guests were present and hid in the cellar, where he slept, ate, and smoked some crack. Sometime around midnight, after the last visitors had gone, defendant went upstairs to Carcieri's bedroom, where she lay asleep. The defendant covered her head with the bedclothes and proceeded to tie her hands to the bedposts with some rope taken from the cellar. By this time Carcieri awoke and yelled once. The defendant then removed her panties and raped her. Carcieri struggled a little, then went limp.

To create the appearance of a burglary, defendant pulled out some drawers and took an envelope from the table before departing. At some point during or shortly after the assault, Carcieri suffered a heart attack and died, still tied to the bedposts. She was found in that position when the police were called the following morning.

After learning of Carcieri's death, defendant changed clothes and discarded what he had been wearing. He stayed high on drugs until Monday, when he realized what he had done. He then stole a car and drove to New York, where he was ultimately apprehended by police in Riverhead, Long Island, for attempted theft of a wallet. While in custody in Riverhead, defendant informed the police of his involvement in the death of Carcieri. The Providence police were contacted, and defendant ultimately confessed and was brought to trial for the sole purpose of sentencing.

Following the presentation of the state's evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal based on a novel construction of G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-23-1, which defines first-degree felony murder. The trial justice rejected the argument and denied the motion. The defense presented no evidence on its behalf. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and, after receiving instructions on the aggravating circumstances of aggravated battery and torture, concluded that the murder involved aggravated battery. The trial justice denied defendant's motion for new trial and, finding both aggravated battery and torture as well as a lack of any mitigating circumstances, sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole.

With this factual and procedural background in mind, we shall examine the various issues raised by defendant in his appeal.

I ADMISSIBILITY OF DR. SWEENEY'S TESTIMONY

The defendant raises two issues pertaining to testimony by Dr. Kristin Sweeney, the medical examiner. First, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Sweeney to render an opinion on the manner of death. Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Sweeney to testify to the extent of pain Alice Carcieri experienced.

The defendant contends that Dr. Sweeney's classification of the manner of death as homicide was an improper application of legal principles. As a medical examiner, Dr. Sweeney is charged by law with investigating those deaths that fall within the category of homicide. General Laws 1956 (1989 Reenactment) § 23-4-3 and § 23-4-4. Black's Law Dictionary defines "homicide" as "[t]he killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another." Black's Law Dictionary 661 (rev. 5th ed.1979). An autopsy conclusion of homicide therefore signifies that some human action caused injury to the victim and the victim died as a result. Manocchio v. Moran, No. 89-1310, slip op. at 35 (1st Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1990) (reversing the decision of the District Court of Rhode Island and upholding the manslaughter conviction in State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1 (R.I.1985)). In Manocchio v. Moran the First Circuit analyzed the admissibility of an autopsy report containing a conclusion of homicide, where the victim had died as a result of an undisputed beating. While finding the autopsy report's conclusion arguably admissible, the court determined that any error caused by its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 38. The court distinguished those cases in which the same admission could amount to constitutional error:

"If, for example, decedent had fallen from a window, and the question was whether he was pushed out or had fallen accidentally, a medical examiner's finding of 'homicide' would likely be inadmissible. Such a finding could be highly prejudicial, since it would contradict defendant's claim of accident, and would almost certainly have to be based on a police report or similar extrinsic evidence." Id. at 35.

In our present case Dr. Sweeney's conclusion of homicide was based on her objective findings from the autopsy and the undisputed circumstances of the assault. Therefore, we find that her testimony was not an improper application of legal principles but a proper medical conclusion.

Although it is true that causation may have been an ultimate issue of fact for the jury to determine, we do not believe that Dr. Sweeney's testimony was an impermissible invasion of the jury's province. An expert witness's opinion on an ultimate issue of fact may be admitted if the trial justice believes it will help the jurors to clarify an area of inquiry beyond their knowledge. Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91, 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974). If, however, the jury readily understands the facts as they are presented, and comes to the appropriate conclusions, then such expert testimony is unnecessary. Id. In this case we believe that the trial justice did not err in finding Dr. Sweeney helpful to the jurors in their assessment of the evidence. As we have previously stated, the admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a determination well within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 325 (R.I.1981); State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 837 (R.I.1980); Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., 105 R.I. 13, 18, 249 A.2d 48, 51 (1969).

The defendant further contends that Dr. Sweeney's testimony on the manner of death was improper as sheer speculation. We reject this classification because it is evident from the record that Dr. Sweeney was a qualified expert, had conducted a thorough post-mortem examination, and was stating her opinion with the requisite "reasonable degree of medical certainty." As we stated above, Dr. Sweeney's conclusion did not impermissibly invade the jury's province.

The defendant's second argument challenges Dr. Sweeney's testimony that the lacerations to Carcieri's vagina were comparable to those that might occur during childbirth. The defendant challenges the admissibility of this testimony as sheer speculation on the extent of pain suffered by Carcieri. He fails to take note, however, of the true reason the information was elicited. It was not elicited to establish how painful Carcieri's final moments of consciousness were; in fact, the trial justice had made it clear that any opinion on the amount of pain experienced by Carcieri would be inadmissible. Rather, the state was asking Dr. Sweeney to aid the jury in comprehending the type of lacerations inflicted. Doctor Sweeney complied by stating that they would have been painful and that they might be comparable to lacerations resulting from childbirth. We believe, therefore, that Dr. Sweeney, an experienced medical examiner, was properly testifying within her scope as an expert witness.

Furthermore, even had Dr. Sweeney's testimony been excluded, the conviction and sentence were amply supported by the remaining evidence. Therefore, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion and the motion for new trial was properly denied.

II

DEFENDANT'S ANALYSIS OF THE

FELONY-MURDER STATUTE

The defendant seeks to rewrite statutory law in order to reduce his conviction from first-degree murder to second-degree murder. He argued unsuccessfully at trial below, and reiterates the argument here, that statutory first-degree felony murder requires actual malice aforethought, rather than malice imputed from the felony. Because defendant's malice may only be inferred from the circumstances of the rape, defendant argues that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder.

In State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976 (R.I.1985), we made it quite clear that any homicide committed during the course of a felony enumerated in § 11-23-1 is first-degree murder. While noting that other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion by inferring the necessary malice from the elements of the underlying felony, we went on to state that "felony murder is murder in the first degree simply because the Legislature has said so." 491 A.2d at 980.

The defendant tries to distinguish his own case from typical felony murders in that Alice Carcieri's death was unintentional on his part and due to...