State v. Wassil, 15142

Citation233 Conn. 174,658 A.2d 548
Decision Date16 May 1995
Docket NumberNo. 15142,15142
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Nicholas J. WASSIL.

John L. Stawicki, Special Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Marjorie Allen Dauster, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was James E. Thomas, State's Atty., and Paul E. Murray, Sr. Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON and NORCOTT, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this criminal appeal is whether the defendant could be convicted of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3) 1 for his role in delivering narcotics to a victim who subsequently injected the narcotics into his own body. In a two count information, the state alleged that the defendant, Nicholas J. Wassil, had committed the crime of sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 2 by providing "to another, to wit: David Groleau, a narcotic substance, to wit: HEROIN ..." and had committed the crime of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 in that he had, "under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, recklessly engage[d] in conduct [that] created a grave risk of death to David Groleau, to wit: the delivery of a narcotic substance to said David Groleau and assisting said David Groleau in administering that narcotic substance to himself, thereby causing the death of said David Groleau...." A jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts, and the trial court rendered judgment thereon. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of December 3, 1991, the defendant and his friend David Groleau were at Groleau's home in New Britain. The defendant knew that Groleau, who was an alcoholic and who previously had used depressants such as Valium and Percocet, "had been drinking and doing pills" during the course of the day. The defendant also knew or should have known that, by early evening, Groleau was very intoxicated. Witnesses who saw Groleau at the time testified that he was visibly inebriated.

Between 6 and 6:30 p.m., the defendant telephoned Danny Kiley, a friend of both the defendant and Groleau. The defendant asked Kiley to give him and Groleau a ride to Main and Glen Streets in New Britain so that they could purchase some heroin. Kiley agreed. Kiley then drove the defendant and Groleau to the requested address, where Kiley and Groleau both gave the defendant money for the purpose of purchasing heroin. The defendant exited the car alone, entered a building on the corner and returned to the car with heroin. Kiley then drove the defendant and Groleau back to Groleau's home.

At Groleau's home, the defendant prepared one "bag" of the heroin and injected the heroin into his own arm. The defendant exclaimed that the heroin was "very, very good," which Kiley took to mean that it was particularly potent. The defendant then gave another bag of heroin to Groleau, who injected the heroin into his own arm. 3 Groleau who was approximately thirty to forty pounds heavier than the defendant, injected the same amount of heroin as had the defendant.

Approximately fifteen seconds after Groleau had injected the heroin into his arm, Groleau lost consciousness and collapsed onto the floor. After determining that Groleau was still breathing, Kiley and the defendant attempted to awaken him by walking him around and placing him in a cold shower. Although Kiley warned the defendant that Groleau needed medical assistance and twice attempted to call 911, the defendant prevented Kiley from completing the calls by hanging up the telephone. The defendant then told Kiley to leave Groleau's house, and Kiley complied. When Kiley left Groleau's house, Groleau was still breathing, although he had not regained consciousness.

At some point thereafter, Groleau stopped breathing. The defendant then attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact Groleau's parents. Thereafter, at approximately 8 p.m., or approximately one hour after Groleau initially had lost consciousness, the defendant called 911 and requested an ambulance.

Paramedics arrived at Groleau's home at approximately 8:08 p.m. and determined that Groleau was unconscious, unresponsive, asystolic, cyanotic and in cardiac arrest. 4 One paramedic asked those present whether Groleau had consumed any drugs. The defendant volunteered no information in response to the paramedic's questions.

Although the paramedics immediately began cardiopulmonary resuscitation of Groleau and established an intravenous line in order to administer various medications to him, including the narcotic antagonist Narcan, they were unable to revive Groleau. At trial, a paramedic testified that the drug Narcan can reverse the effects of heroin and return a patient's breathing and heart rate to normal, but that it is effective only if administered before the patient has suffered a cardiac arrest.

The paramedics thereafter transported Groleau to New Britain General Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 8:47 p.m. After performing an autopsy, the medical examiner determined that Groleau had consumed alcohol, Valium and heroin prior to his death. The medical examiner described the cause of death as "combined acute drug toxicity." At trial, the medical examiner further testified that the levels of alcohol and Valium alone in Groleau's blood were not lethal, that the level of heroin alone was "potentially life-threatening," and that Groleau would not have died but for the administration of the heroin. 5 The defendant offered no evidence to rebut the medical examiner's testimony.

At the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury that, with respect to the charge of manslaughter in the first degree, the jury should return special verdicts on two separate theories of criminal liability. First, the jury was to decide whether the defendant was guilty of manslaughter "by delivery of narcotics." Second, the jury was to decide whether the defendant was guilty of manslaughter by "assisting in administering the narcotics." The jury also was instructed that there was "no requirement that [the two verdicts] be the same verdict."

With respect to the charge of sale of narcotics, the court instructed the jury that "[s]ale is any form of delivery. You were all questioned about your use of common terms and ability, willingness to consider that the law has sometimes different definitions. The definition of sale is delivery. Delivery meaning the actual transfer from one person to another." The court refused the defendant's request that the jury also be instructed that it had to find that the defendant "deliver[ed] the drugs or some portion of them to another ... for a valuable consideration." The defendant then excepted to the charge as given on the grounds that "at the very least the jury instructions should have included the entire statutory definition of sale, which is that [sale is] any form of delivery which includes barter, exchange or gift or offer [therefor].... Not ending the definition of sale with any form of delivery." The court gave the jury no supplemental instructions relating to the definition of "sale."

The jury found the defendant guilty of both counts of the information. As to the charge of manslaughter in the first degree, the jury found him guilty by delivery of a narcotic substance, but not guilty by assisting in the administration of the narcotic substance.

Thereafter, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of manslaughter in the first degree. He argued that, in acquitting him of manslaughter by assisting in the administration of narcotics, the jury necessarily had found that Groleau had administered the narcotics to himself. In light of this factual finding, the defendant contended that he could not, as a matter of law, be held responsible for Groleau's death, because the death was caused not by his delivery of the narcotics but by Groleau's self-injection of the narcotics, which was, therefore, an efficient intervening cause of the death. The trial court denied the defendant's motion.

On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused: (1) to acquit the defendant of manslaughter in the first degree; and (2) to instruct the jury that the crime of sale of narcotics required proof that the drugs had been delivered for consideration. We reject both claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We first discuss whether the trial court improperly refused to acquit the defendant of manslaughter in the first degree. The defendant argues that the jury's implicit finding that Groleau administered the heroin to himself requires an acquittal on the charge of manslaughter by delivery of the drug to Groleau. Specifically, the defendant argues that Groleau's self-injection, as a matter of law, was an efficient intervening cause of Groleau's death, so that the defendant's delivery of the drug, as a matter of law, did not cause Groleau's death. We disagree.

To prove causation, the state is required to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was a "proximate cause" of the victim's death--i.e., that the defendant's conduct contributed substantially and materially, in a direct manner, to the victim's injuries and that the defendant's conduct was not superseded by an efficient intervening cause that produced the injuries. State v. Leroy, 232 Conn. 1, 13, 653 A.2d 161 (1995); State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 233-34, 405 A.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 1248, 59 L.Ed.2d 475 (1979). " 'Proximate cause' in the criminal law does not necessarily mean the last act of cause, or the act in point of...

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