State v. Watkins, 2001-172.
| Decision Date | 24 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-172.,2001-172. |
| Citation | 813 A.2d 435 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Bruce WATKINS. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, and David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord (Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rothstein on the brief, and Mr. Johnson orally), for the defendant.
The defendant, Bruce Watkins, was convicted in Superior Court (Hampsey, J.) for driving after having been certified a habitual offender, see RSA 262:23 (1993) (amended 2000, 2001), and disobeying a police officer, see RSA 265:4(I)(b) (1993). In his brief on appeal, he seeks reversal of only the driving after certification conviction. We reverse and remand.
The record supports the following facts. The defendant was stopped for a traffic violation on June 3, 2000. When it was discovered that he had given the officer who stopped him a false name, the defendant was arrested for disobeying a police officer. He was also charged with driving after certification as a habitual offender, having been certified on January 27, 1993.
After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on both charges. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: 1) failing to dismiss the indictment for driving after certification as a habitual offender where the certification occurred more than seven years prior to his arrest; 2) failing to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense; 3) allowing the State to introduce his prior conviction for driving after certification as a habitual offender; and 4) failing to instruct the jury regarding the State's misrepresentation of the law in its closing argument.
The defendant first contends that the habitual offender charge should have been dismissed because his certification as a habitual offender expired prior to June 3, 2000. Specifically, he argues that as a matter of statutory interpretation, a person may not be certified as a habitual offender for a period longer than four years. Alternatively, he argues that if the applicable statutes are interpreted to allow a longer certification period, they violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine by delegating unlimited legislative power to an administrative agency.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Scheffel v. Krueger, 146 N.H. 669, 671, 782 A.2d 410 (2001). Appeal of Mikell, 145 N.H. 435, 439, 764 A.2d 892 (2000) (quotation omitted).
RSA 259:39 defines a habitual offender as a person whose driving record shows a specified number of convictions for certain offenses committed within a five-year period. See RSA 259:39 (1993) (amended 2001). RSA 262:19, in turn, provides a mechanism for revoking the driver's licenses of persons determined to be habitual offenders. It provides, in part:
If the director [of the division of motor vehicles of the department of safety] finds that [a] person is the same person named in the transcript or abstract [of the person's conviction record] and that the person is an habitual offender, the director shall, by appropriate order, revoke the person's driver's license and direct the person not to drive a motor vehicle on the ways of this state for a period of one to 4 years effective upon the date of the order or upon dates of final conviction of the offense that resulted in certification.
RSA 262:19, III (Supp.2002); see also RSA 262:19, I (Supp.2002); RSA 259:20 (1993).
The defendant asserts that RSA 262:19, III restricts the period for which a habitual offender may be certified to a maximum of four years. Although he recognizes that a habitual offender must petition to have his license restored, he argues that "[t]he question posed by this case concerns the status of a person after the habitual offender certification period has ended, but before any request for the return of the license is made." He contends that because his certification as a habitual offender had expired prior to June 3, 2000, he could not be convicted of the offense of driving after certification.
We find nothing in the statute to support the defendant's interpretation. RSA 262:19, III makes no reference either to a period of certification or to a time limitation on habitual offender status. Rather, the time period of one to four years referred to in RSA 262:19, III is the period for which the habitual offender's license may be revoked and he may be ordered not to drive upon the ways of this State. This period of license revocation is referred to as such in two other provisions of the statute. Thus, RSA 262:22 provides:
No license to drive motor vehicles in New Hampshire shall be issued to an habitual offender:
I. Until such time as the period of revocation imposed pursuant to RSA 262:19, III has been served;
II. Until such time as financial responsibility requirements are met; and
III. Until the license of such person to drive a motor vehicle in this state has been restored in writing by an order of the director or of a court of record entered in a proceeding as hereinafter provided.
RSA 262:22 (1993) (emphasis added). RSA 262:24 provides:
Upon the expiration of the revocation period imposed pursuant to RSA 262:19, III, or under conditions established by the commissioner [of safety] pursuant to RSA 262:19, VI, such person may petition the director for restoration of his license to drive a motor vehicle on the ways of this state. Upon such petition, and for good cause shown, the director may restore to such person the license to drive a motor vehicle on the ways of this state upon such terms and conditions as the director may prescribe subject to other provisions of law relating to the issuance of drivers' licenses.
RSA 262:24 (1993) (emphasis added); see also RSA 259:13 (1993).
Read together, these statutes provide that the director is authorized to revoke a habitual offender's license for one to four years, at the end of which time the habitual offender is entitled to petition for restoration of his license. Thus, the revocation period of one to four years specified in RSA 262:19, III constitutes the time during which issuance of a license to a habitual offender is absolutely prohibited. At the end of that period, and upon petition of the habitual offender, after satisfying the requirements for licensure including those of financial responsibility, see RSA 262:22, II, and for good cause shown, the director may restore the habitual offender's license. See RSA 262:24.
Moreover, RSA 259:90 provides, in part:
After a license, registration, permit or privilege has been revoked, no application for reissue of said license, registration, permit, or privilege may be acted upon by the department until the expiration of the period of revocation. The revocation of any license, registration, permit, or privilege shall remain in effect until a license, registration or permit has been reissued or the privilege has been restored by the department.
RSA 259:90 (1993). In State v. Batchelder, 125 N.H. 694, 695, 484 A.2d 1186 (1984), we held that "[i]f the revokee fails to seek restoration of his driving privileges after the four years have expired, he is still an habitual offender because the original order remains in effect until he takes the affirmative step of seeking restoration." The evidence presented at trial, in this case, indicated that the defendant's license had not been restored as of June 3, 2000.
Finally, we note that RSA 262:23 itself, the section under which the defendant was convicted, says nothing about a certification period or the expiration thereof, but rather requires for conviction that an order prohibiting a person from driving be in effect. See RSA 262:23; see also State v. Crotty, 134 N.H. 706, 710, 597 A.2d 1078 (1991). RSA 262:23, I, provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive any motor vehicle on the ways of this state while an order of the director or the court prohibiting such driving remains in effect. If any person found to be an habitual offender under the provisions of this chapter is convicted of driving a motor vehicle on the ways of this state while an order of the director or the court prohibiting such operation is in effect, he shall be sentenced ... to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 5 years.
(Emphasis added.) Reference to the order remaining in effect, rather than to the duration of the revocation period, accords with the language of RSA 259:90, reiterating that a license remains revoked until restored, even after the initial revocation period has expired. Thus, we conclude that the defendant could properly have been charged with violation of RSA 262:23 and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss.
The defendant nevertheless argues that if RSA 262:23 is so interpreted, it is unconstitutional. Specifically, he contends that it violates the separation of powers doctrine because it delegates unlimited legislative power to the director to continue the habitual offender status of a person indefinitely. The defendant argues that this case is similar to Guillou v. State, 127 N.H. 579, 503 A.2d 838 (1986), in which we struck down a statute that allowed the director of motor vehicles to suspend or revoke a license for any cause he deemed sufficient. We also noted in Guillou, however, that an "example of motor vehicle statutes which contain adequate standards for administrative determinations and court review is the habitual offender law." Id. at 583, 503 A.2d 838. Accordingly, we reject the defendant's argument.
The defendant next argues that the trial...
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