State v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 24 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 20090866–CA.,20090866–CA.
• Citation: 678 Utah Adv. Rep. 25,250 P.3d 1019,2011 UT App 96
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Anthony WATKINS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

250 P.3d 1019

678 Utah Adv. Rep. 25

2011 UT App 96

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Anthony WATKINS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20090866–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 24, 2011.

Michael K. Mohrman, John A. Quinn, and Mitchell S. Maio, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.Before Judges DAVIS, ROTH, and BENCH.¹

OPINION

DAVIS, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Anthony Watkins appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–404.1(5) (2008). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In September 2008, Watkins accepted a job with his niece's husband (Father). Watkins temporarily moved in with his niece (Stepmother) and Father until he could afford to get a place of his own. Three of Father and Stepmother's children lived with them during the time Watkins stayed at their home. Additionally, Father's ten-year-old child from a previous relationship (Child) visited Father and Stepmother “regularly” while Watkins was living with them.²

¶ 3 Three years prior, Watkins had lost his son and stepdaughter in a tragic accident. Following the accident, his marriage suffered and he and his wife were eventually divorced. On approximately October 15, 2008, Watkins's ex-wife remarried. That same day, Child stayed at Father's home overnight. Upset about his ex-wife's remarriage, Watkins drank a significant amount of alcohol that night. Child and the other three children were all sleeping in her room after watching a movie. After Child had fallen asleep, she woke up to find Watkins in bed with her kissing her on the side of her head. She asked him to stop and to leave, but then he began “pinching” or “rubbing” her buttocks with his hand. Child also testified at trial and in her interview at the Children's Justice Center that Watkins “spanked [her] butt.” Watkins finally left after Child told him to leave a second time, but he then returned and gave her a $100 bill, telling her not to tell anyone about the money.

¶ 4 Following the incident, Child no longer wanted to visit Father's home while Watkins was there. After a couple of weeks, Stepmother asked Child why she did not want to visit anymore and Child finally told her that it was because Watkins had “tried to kiss her on the head.” Subsequently, Child disclosed the details of the incident to her mother, Stepmother, and Father. Father reported the incident to police, and Watkins was arrested.

¶ 5 Watkins was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, see id. The aggravating circumstance alleged by the State is that Watkins was in a position of special trust with respect to Child, see id. § 76–5–404.1(4)(h). At trial, after the State rested its case, Watkins moved to dismiss, arguing that the State had failed to prove that he was in a position of special trust with respect to Child and that he had acted with the “intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,” see id. § 76–5–404.1(2). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that “the position of trust was simply indicated by a mature adult and a 10–year–old child who had lived in the same home” and that the issue of intent was one that “the jury ought to hear.” ³ The jury convicted Watkins.

¶ 6 Prior to sentencing, Watkins moved for the trial court to arrest judgment and grant a new trial based on the affidavit of Stepmother's sister (Sister), which recounted the following conversation she had with Stepmother via text message a few days after trial:

[Stepmother:] “I could really use someone to talk to right now. I'm in a really big bind I just need someone an[d] I thought maybe you could talk sometime.”

... [Sister:] “If [you] would [have] told the judge the whole story like [Watkins] spanking the kids and [Child's little brother] was crying and no one was taking time [for] him. [Watkins] wouldn[']t be in this situation. Not everything was told in court.”

... [Stepmother:] “The kids said that they got spanked and ... [Child's little brother] fell off the bed and was crying.”

Watkins argued that because Stepmother testified at trial that Child had not told her she had been spanked, the conversation demonstrates that Stepmother lied in her testimony at trial, that a truthful answer would have corroborated his version of events, and that he was, therefore, entitled to a new trial. The trial court denied Watkins's motion and sentenced him to a term of ten years to life in prison, one of the minimum mandatory sentences for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, see Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–404.1(6) (2008).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Watkins argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. “The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case is a question of law[, which] we review for correctness.” State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ¶ 4, 988 P.2d 452. In evaluating the correctness of the trial court's ruling, “we apply the same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict.” State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 41, 70 P.3d 111. A motion to dismiss is properly denied where “the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, ¶ 5, 988 P.2d 452 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 41, 70 P.3d 111.

¶ 8 Watkins also argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial based on Stepmother's text messages. “When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.” State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 20, 114 P.3d 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we review the legal standards applied by the trial court in denying such a motion for correctness ... [and] the trial court's factual findings for clear error.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 9 Watkins argues that there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was in a position of special trust with respect to Child or that he acted with the intent to gratify a sexual desire. We disagree. First, there was sufficient evidence presented from which a jury could find that Watkins was in a position of special trust with respect to Child by virtue of his status as a cohabitant of Father. Second, the evidence of Watkins's actions toward Child is sufficient for the jury to infer intent because there is not such a reasonable alternative explanation for his behavior that a jury must necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to Watkins's intent.

A. Position of Special Trust

¶ 10 Sexual abuse of a child, which is normally a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–404.1(3), is a first degree felony where any one of several enumerated aggravating circumstances exists, see id. § 76–5–404.1(4)–(5). In this case, the State argued that aggravating circumstances existed because Watkins “occupied a position of special trust in relation to [Child],” see id. § 76–5–404.1(4)(h).

¶ 11 The fact that Watkins occupied a position of special trust may be established in two ways:

either by occupying a position specifically listed by statute ⁴ or by fitting the definition of a position of special trust, which the statute clearly defines as a “position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim.”

State v. Tanner, 2009 UT App 326, ¶ 16, 221 P.3d 901 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–404.1(4)(h) (2008)); see also State v. Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, ¶ 10, 189 P.3d 109. The State argues that there was sufficient evidence to show that Watkins was an “adult cohabitant of [Child]'s parent,” one of the positions of special trust specifically identified in the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–404.1(4)(h). Watkins argues for a narrower definition of cohabitant than the one advanced by the State and argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that he was a cohabitant of Father. ⁵

¶ 12 “ ‘[T]he term “cohabitation” does not lend itself to a universal definition that is applicable in all settings.’ Thus, ‘the meaning of [cohabitation] depends upon the context in which it is used.’ ” Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 693 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)). The jury instructions employed the definition of cohabitant found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, informing the jury that Watkins was a cohabitant of Father if either he was “related by blood or marriage to [Father]” or he “resides or has resided in the same residence as [Father].” ⁶ See Utah Code Ann. § 78B–7–102(2) (2008). However, that definition is limited to the provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act and is not necessarily applicable in other contexts. See Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868–69 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (holding that the Cohabitant Abuse Act's definition of cohabitant did not abrogate the definition of cohabitant developed by case law in the context of alimony termination).

¶ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act is significantly broader than the common definition of the word “cohabitant,” see generally Keene, 2005 UT App 37, ¶ 10, 107 P.3d 693 (“In construing the plain language of a statute, words which are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), which may mean either “to live together as or as if husband and wife” or “to live together or in...