State v. Watson
| Docket Number | A-23-22 |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Parties | State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Quintin D. Watson, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Argued March 27, 2023
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division whose opinion is reported at 472 N.J.Super. 381 (App. Div. 2022).
Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender attorney; Lauren S. Michaels and Ashley T. Brooks, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the briefs).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
Joseph A. Hayden, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Joseph A. Hayden Jr., on the brief).
Ian S. Marx argued the cause for amicus curiae The Innocence Project (Greenberg Traurig and The Innocence Project, Inc., attorneys; Ian S. Marx, Caroline J. Heller (Greenberg Traurig) a member of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, M. Chris Fabricant (The Innocence Project, Inc.) a member of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Anton Robinson (The Innocence Project, Inc.) a member of the New York and Florida bars, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).
Amanda G. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Amanda G. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief).
RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal raises two principal issues: (1) the propriety of "first-time incourt identifications" -- that is, in-court identifications that are not preceded by a successful out-of-court identification -- and (2) the extent to which investigators may narrate video recordings. Defendant Quintin Watson was convicted of bank robbery based on evidence that included testimony from a teller, who identified defendant for the first time in court, and from the lead detective, who narrated a bank surveillance video for the jury. The lead detective also testified about consulting with other law enforcement agencies regarding defendant, and the propriety of that testimony under the Confrontation Clause is a third issue here.
In January 2017, an individual wearing a baseball cap and gloves robbed a bank in North Brunswick. After entering the bank, he put a note on the counter that read, "everything now"; he left with the $5,772 he received. Bank surveillance footage captured the entire 57-second robbery. In November 2017, defendant was charged in three other robberies after his former girlfriend, "Joan," identified him in a wanted photo from one of those robberies. After the office investigating the other robberies notified the North Brunswick Police Department about defendant, he became a suspect in the North Brunswick robbery as well. In September 2018, a detective showed the teller six photos, one at a time, and asked if he could identify the person who robbed the bank. The teller picked a photo of someone other than defendant and said at trial that he was 75-90 percent sure of the identification.
At trial, the prosecutor asked the teller if he could identify the robber in court. The teller identified defendant, who was seated in between his lawyers at counsel table. The teller said he was "maybe like . . . 80 percent" sure. The prosecution did not provide advance notice of the in-court identification, and defense counsel did not object to it. During cross-examination, the teller revealed that he had met with the prosecutor prior to trial and that the prosecutor had "informed [him] that the individual who was accused of committing this robbery is in court seated at the defense table." Joan also testified at trial. She was shown two still photos from the bank surveillance video and testified she was 100 percent positive that each depicted defendant.
Sergeant Frank Vitelli, Jr., testified about the investigation. Over objection, Sergeant Vitelli narrated the bank surveillance video. The prosecutor asked a series of questions while the video was played for the jury, ranging from general inquiries -"What do you see?" -- to specific ones -- "With what [did he open the door]?" The more open-ended questions invited and led to more open-ended narrative responses.
Sergeant Vitelli also testified about how his department learned about defendant. He confirmed that he had been "contacted by another law enforcement agency regarding" defendant, and that he "consult[ed] with that law enforcement agency . . . after which criminal complaints were signed against" defendant.
The jury found defendant guilty of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, 472 N.J.Super. 381, 404 (App. Div. 2022), and the Court granted certification, 252 N.J. 598 (2022).
HELD: (1) Based on the identification evidence alone, defendant's conviction cannot stand. The inherently suggestive nature of first-time in-court identifications, conducted in front of a jury, risks depriving defendants of their due process rights. The Court holds that first-time in-court identifications may only be conducted when there is good reason for them and sets forth certain practices that must be observed in connection with in-court identifications. (2) The narration evidence in this case also ran afoul of the evidence rules, which do not allow for continuous, running commentary on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a recording. The Court identifies certain safeguards to underscore the limited use of narration evidence and adds that a party intending to present narration evidence should provide opposing counsel with a written summary of the proposed testimony before trial. (3) Confrontation Clause challenges are fact-specific. The testimony here about consultation with other law enforcement agencies violated defendant's right to confrontation, and the Court provides guidance for remand.
1. In State v. Henderson, the Court revised the standard for assessing whether eyewitness identification can be admitted in individual cases. 208 N.J. 208, 218-19 (2011). As to "showups" -- "single-person lineups" in which "a single suspect is presented to a witness to make an identification" -- Henderson reaffirmed that they are "inherently suggestive." Id. at 259, 261. Henderson did not address in-court identifications. Certain factors discussed in the opinion, however, are directly relevant to a first-time in-court identification, which is essentially a live, singleperson line-up in a courtroom. Compared to a showup, the witness is given an even stronger impression that the authorities are already satisfied that they have the right man. Plus in-court identifications are conducted in the presence of a judge, lending the court's imprimatur to the procedure. Further, memory weakens with time, see id. at 218, and in-court identifications at trial invariably occur months if not years after the crime was committed. (pp. 17-22) 2. Suggestive police procedures may so irreparably "taint" identifications that a defendant is denied due process. Suggestive behavior by private actors does not implicate due process, but a prosecutor's conduct in court constitutes state action. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012), did not hold otherwise. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that a first-time in-court identification should be treated "as an in-court showup" and allowed "only where there is 'good reason' for its admission," such as when a witness is already "familiar with the defendant" from before the crime, or when "the identification merely confirms that the defendant is the person who was arrested for the" offense. Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169-70 (Mass. 2014). Tighter restrictions apply when a witness previously "failed to make a positive identification." See Commonwealth v. Collins, 21 N.E.3d 528, 536 (Mass. 2014). Connecticut has taken an even more restrictive approach to first-time in-court identifications, whereas other courts do not accord them special treatment. (pp. 22-26)
3. Asking witnesses long after a crime was committed if they can identify the culprit -- when the only person who could reasonably be the defendant would be obvious to the witness, and when it is evident the prosecution team believes the person is the culprit -- presents an even greater risk of misidentification than an out-of-court showup. The concerns outlined in Henderson therefore apply with even greater force to first-time in-court identifications. Yet first-time in-court identifications are not currently subject to advance scrutiny. It is hard to see how the court system can justify overseeing the very type of identification procedure it would likely criticize law enforcement officers for conducting. By conducting a suggestive identification procedure in a courtroom, the State may implicate due process concerns and deprive defendants of their due process rights in a way that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions can adequately address. (pp. 26-29)
4. To avoid unduly suggestive identifications of defendants that may trigger serious due process concerns under the State Constitution, the Court draws on the standard in Crayton and holds that first-time in-court identifications can be conducted only when there is "good reason" for them. See 21 N.E.3d at 169. Traditional "good reasons" for out-of-court showups no longer apply at trial. Id. at 170....
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