State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 12 January 1898
• Citation: 20 R.I. 354,39 A. 193
• Parties: STATE v. WATSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

39 A. 193

20 R.I. 354

STATE

v. WATSON.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 12, 1898.

Francis C. Watson was convicted of the crime of adultery, and he petitions for a new trial, and moves in arrest of judgment. Petition denied, and motion overruled.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Stearns, for the State.

Dennison & McKenna, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The defendant, who has been convicted of the crime of adultery with one Mary A. Watson, now petitions for a new trial on numerous grounds, the substance of which, so far as we are able to understand them from the confused statement thereof, is that the verdict is against the evidence, and that the court erred in certain rulings which will be hereinafter mentioned.

The uncontradicted testimony offered by the stale shows that the defendant lived with the said Mary A. Watson as his wife for nearly six years, during two of which he lived with her in Hopkinton, in this state, and that he had three children by her. While the defendant does not attempt to deny that he lived with said Mary as his wife, yet he contends, and sets up as a defense to the indictment, that such cohabitation was not adulterous, because, as he alleges, he had obtained a divorce from his former wife, and that he was lawfully married to said Mary at that time; and the vital question, therefore, is as to the validity of said divorce. The facts are these: In 1870 the defendant was lawfully married to Melinda Buddington, in the state of Connecticut. On the 21st day of May, 1889, the superior court of Windham county, Conn., upon a petition filed by him, granted a decree divorcing him from his said wife. On the 23d day of May, 1889, two days after the said decree was granted, the defendant married said Mary A. Watson, in Sterling, Conn., and subsequently lived with her as his wife, as aforesaid. Shortly after said divorce was granted, the respondent therein filed a petition in said superior court, asking that said decree be set aside, and the case reentered upon the docket, which motion, after notice and hearing, was on the 18th day of June, 1889, granted, the court finding that the respondent therein was prejudiced by the decree; that she had a good defense to the action, and was prevented, by mistake and accident, from appearing to oppose the same. The court also found that said respondent had employed counsel to oppose the granting of the petition for divorce, and that her counsel had actually appeared to defend the suit, but had not entered his appearance upon the docket; and also that the petitioner knew that the respondent had so appeared. In view of these facts, the court (Douglas, J.) charged the jury in the case at bar that said Melinda Watson continued to be the wife of this defendant from the time of said firstmentioned marriage, in 1870, except, at most, during the interval from the 21st of May, 1889, to the 18th of June, 1889; and that what the relations of the parties were under the law of Connecticut during the term at which the decree of divorce was entered it was not necessary for the jury to consider, as it did not affect the case.

The defendant's counsel requested the court to charge as follows: (1) "That a man who in good faith marries a woman when he was divorced from his former wife, and the divorce was believed by both of them (parties to the second marriage) to be valid and conclusive, he cannot be convicted of adultery with her (second wife) if neither he nor she were married persons, but single, at the time of their marriage to each other, unless they had been divorced from each other since their marriage, and before the alleged adultery." (2) "After a divorce from a former wife, a man does not, by cohabiting as man and wife under his second marriage, or by having carnal knowledge of the body of Ms second wife, commit the crime of adultery. But the indictment should allege the second marriage, and all the other facts constituting bigamous cohabitation, if the second marriage took place in another state; and, if the jury find these facts to be true, there is a variance between the evidence and the pleadings, and verdict should be 'Not guilty.'" In reply to these requests, the court said: "I understand the first request to apply in this way: That if, during the time that the decree of divorce was in force,—that is to say, from May 21st, 1889, to the 18th of June, 1889—that on the 23rd of May, when the ceremony of marriage was gone through, these parties were not living in adultery. I will charge you for the purposes of this case that that is so. But you see that is not the time that this indictment charges them with having committed adultery." "The second is that, after the divorce from the former wife, the man does not, by cohabiting as man and wife under his second marriage, or by having carnal knowledge of the body of his second wife, commit the crime of adultery. That I refuse." We do not see that the defendant has any ground to complain of this instruction. After the decree of divorce was set aside in manner aforesaid, it is clear that the firstmentioned marriage was in full force; and therefore the defendant was a married man and had a wife living at the time of the commission of the alleged crime of adultery, if, indeed, such was not the case at the date of his second marriage.

It is evident, from an inspection of the record of the divorce proceedings, that the Connecticut court was imposed upon and deceived by the defendant in connection with the granting of said decree,—in short, that the decree was obtained by fraud; and, upon this fact being shown by the respondent in that case, said court promptly righted the wrong thus perpetrated, and placed the parties to the suit where they were before. That, as a general proposition, courts have power to set aside, vacate, modify, or amend their judgments for good cause, no one will question; such power being inherent in the court, as a part of its necessary machinery for the due administration of justice. And whenever a judgment is obtained by the fraud of the party in whose favor it is rendered, and the other party is not implicated therein, of course this constitutes a good and sufficient cause for vacating the judgment. Decrees in divorce suits are not exempted from the operation of this rule, although courts are more reluctant to disturb a decree of divorce, especially after a second marriage involving the interest of third persons. A full discussion of the general question involved may be found in the cases cited in 2 Bish. Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1552, note 3; also, 1 Black, Judgm. § 320. In Bradstreet v. Insurance Co., 3 Sumn. 604, Fed. Cas. No. 1,793, Story, J., says: "I know of no case where fraud, if established by competent proofs, is not sufficient to overthrow any judgment or decree, however solemn may be its form and promulgation." In Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388, which is a leading case upon the subject under consideration, Bellows, C. J., says: "This doctrine in regard to impeaching judgments and decrees for fraud has been applied in numerous cases to decrees in divorce suits and suits for nullity of marriage, and the weight of authority is greatly in favor of such application. Upon principle, there is no solid ground for any distinction between decrees in divorce suits and other judgments; or, if there be any, it is to be found in the much greater danger of fraud and imposition in divorce cases, as compared with others; thus adding largely to the necessity and...