State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 18 May 1966
• Citation: 414 P.2d 337,243 Or. 454,82 Or.Adv.Sh. 719
• Parties: The STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ralph B. WATSON, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 337

414 P.2d 337

243 Or. 454

The STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Ralph B. WATSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted March 1, 1966.

Decided May 18, 1966.

Paul R. Meyer and Barnes H. Ellis, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With them on the briefs was Carl R. Neil, Portland.

Robert Thomas, Sp. Deputy Dist. Atty., Klamath Falls, and James J. Clancy, Sun Valley, Cal., argued the cause for respondent. With Thomas on the brief were Sam A. McKeen, Dist. Atty., and Harry D. Lewis, Deputy Dist. Atty., Klamath Falls.

Before McALLISTER, C.J., and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN, and SCHWAB, JJ.

GOODWIN, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of a fine of $100 imposed for violating ORS 167.151 ¹ (disseminating obscene matter).

In this appeal, defendant seeks comprehensive answers to a number of state and federal constitutional questions which we do not reach. We must reverse the conviction because of error in receiving opinion evidence.

A publication is not obscene unless the state establishes that: (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Memoris of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Com. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966).

We may assume, without deciding, that a book might be so bad as to demonstrate on its face (a) its dominant theme, (b) its patent offensiveness, and (c) its utter lack of 'redeeming social value.' The state in this case, however, did not rely upon Res ipsa loquitur. The prosecution called as an expert witness the then incumbent district attorney of the county. He personally had purchased the book and had signed the complaint. The district attorney was permitted to testify, over timely objection, that in his opinion the book in question satisfied all statutory requirements (as those requirements must be interpreted in light of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), and subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) ²

It is manifest error to permit a witness, who has no special qualification so to testify, to tell the jury that in his opinion a crime had been committed. The witness revealed that he knew little of relevant contemporary community standards ³ and virtually nothing of contemporary literature. (Since 1939 or 1940, he admitted, he had read no books outside his professional field, and only the Readers' Digest, religious papers, and news periodicals in other fields. Further, he said he had not read beyond the first two chapters of the book in question.)

Since we are unable to say that the introduction of so-called expert testimony from a patently unqualified witness did not prejudice the defendant, the judgment cannot stand.

Finally, since the case may be tried again, we notice those assignments of error challenging the instructions. We need not pass upon the validity of each of the instructions at this time, because recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have rendered them obsolete. The instructions given below were apparently based upon the trial court's understanding of Roth v. United States, supra. That decision has been qualified in part by Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Com. of Massachusetts, supra. Earlier case law in this field has been further expanded by the pandering theory outlined in Mishkin v. State of New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (1966). It is not necessary at this time to speculate upon the implications of these decisions as they may apply to ORS 167.151(4).

Reversed and remanded.

PERRY, Justice (dissenting).

I am unable to agree with the majority that this case should be reversed. They reverse the case because of error in receiving purported expert testimony.

The district attorney who had purchased the book testified that in his opinion the book 'taken as a whole has a predominant theme that appeals to prurient interests.' He admitted he had never read the book in its entirety. Therefore, he could not know the whole book and should not have been permitted to state his opinion.

However, I do not believe this error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal. In my opinion, expert testimony in this field is not desirable. The jury is instructed as to prurient interests and the jurors should judge the issue on the basis of the writing itself under the instruction given. The district attorney did not testify that he was an expert on literary merit. It is in this field where 'social value' becomes an issue of fact and expert testimony becomes admissible. Note: The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis.L.Rev. at p. 126.

The book itself was introduced into evidence and read to the jury. To my knowledge I have never read a book which was more dedicated to pornography. The book having been introduced into evidence, each juror knew without a shadow of doubt that the predominant theme of the book was in its entirety an appeal to prurient interests.

The majority state that the State 'did not rely upon res ipsa loquitur.' It...