State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 04 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-325,83-325
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rodney Eugene WATSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 879

686 P.2d 879

211 Mont. 401

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rodney Eugene WATSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 83-325.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted March 15, 1984.

Decided Aug. 3, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1984.

James Park Taylor and John E. Riddiough argued, Public Defenders, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Kimberly Kradolfher argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Robert L. Deschamps, III, County Atty., Missoula, Robert Sullivan argued, Deputy County Atty., Missoula, for plaintiff and respondent.

WEBER, Justice:

Defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault and burglary. The court designated him a dangerous offender and a persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to 100 years imprisonment on each count without possibility of parole or furlough. Defendant raises two issues on appeal:

(1) Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on the law of mental disease and defect?

(2) Was it cruel and unusual punishment to sentence the defendant to 300 years imprisonment without possibility of parole or furlough after finding that the defendant suffers from a serious mental disorder?

We affirm the conviction and the sentencing order.

These facts are undisputed. Defendant began drinking beer and smoking marijuana during the afternoon of October 2, 1982. Later that evening, he entered a Missoula apartment, stole some pocket change and a hunting knife, and left when the occupant awakened. He then entered another apartment, took a purse, and left. He returned to the second apartment, entered a bedroom, and stabbed a sleeping women 35 times with the stolen knife. When a man entered the room, the defendant stabbed him in the leg and fled.

Andrew Floberg's leg had a four-inch puncture wound, which developed a large blood clot. Although 33 of Melissa Smith's 35 stab wounds were superficial, it took approximately four hours for an emergency room surgeon to suture them. The combination of substantial blood loss and a collapsed lung made her injuries life threatening, but she survived. Defendant was arrested wearing a jacket stained with Melissa Smith's blood.

After receiving Miranda warnings and signing an acknowledgement of advice of rights, the defendant gave a recorded statement to the police. His confession included unpublicized details of the crime and an admission that he entered Melissa Smith's apartment twice--first taking her purse, then returning with intent to have sexual intercourse with her. According to his statement, he stabbed Ms. Smith to subdue her resistance. Defendant's taped confession was admitted into evidence at trial. It contained no mention of any demon spirit.

Defendant was charged by information with attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault and burglary. He pleaded not guilty and noticed his intent to rely on mental disease or defect. Upon requests from prosecution and defense counsel, the court ordered five psychiatric/psychological examinations of the defendant prior to trial. Defendant was found fit to proceed.

Trial by jury began February 2, 1983. Both the State and the defense presented lay and expert witnesses, who testified regarding defendant's mental condition. Defense witnesses testified regarding the defendant's past involvement in Satanic worship and defendant's belief that the demon spirit Asmodeus was in possession of his body on the night he stabbed Melissa Smith and Andrew Floberg.

The judge instructed the jury on the elements of each of the crimes charged, burdens of proof, reasonable doubt and mental disease or defect. The jury was given special verdict forms, allowing them to find the defendant guilty, not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. On February 10, 1983, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty on each count.

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court received recommendations in a pre-sentence investigation report and evaluations by one psychiatrist, four clinical psychologists and a medical doctor. The sentencing court found that the defendant suffers from a serious mental disorder, but that the defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

Based upon the court's designation of defendant as a persistent felony offender, the defendant was sentenced to 100 years imprisonment for each of the three felony offenses, sentences to run consecutively. These sentences are within the statutory maximum terms. See section 46-18-502(2) & (4), MCA.

Based upon the court's designation of defendant as a dangerous offender and for the protection of society, the court specified that the defendant shall be ineligible for parole or participation in the supervised release program. This restriction on defendant's sentence is authorized by section 46-18-202(2), MCA.

In the sentencing order, the court transferred custody of the defendant to Montana State Prison and requested that the Warden transfer the defendant to Warm Springs State Hospital or any other facility deemed appropriate by the Warden. After a suicide attempt in May 1983, defendant was in fact transferred from Montana State Prison to Warm Springs State Hospital.

The record contains a letter from a psychiatrist and a psychologist at the Warm Springs State Hospital Forensic Unit indicating that the defendant petitioned for return to Montana State Prison from the Hospital on June 15, 1983. The Forensic Unit doctors agreed to his request based upon the following factors:

"1) The patient stated he can 'make it' in the prison as long as he is given residence in the maximum security area. Says things are on a smaller scale there and he can handle that.

"2) He claimed he would not put up with the larger group setting in the prison and would use suicide to escape that situation. It is our opinion this choice is based on his preferential reasoning, and value judgment, and his view of the Bible. It is not based on psychotic delusions or the commands of voices or hallucinations. Thus, upon return to MSP, we recommend this individual remain in the maximum security area for a long time.

"3) In short, this individual's problem behaviors and his threat to harm himself is not based on mental illness, and does not require hospitalization at this time."

Defendant remains at Warm Springs State Hospital pending this appeal.

I

The insanity defense to criminal responsibility evolved from the concept that punishing those who are blameless for their actions is morally unacceptable and does nothing to serve the basic objectives of criminal law, i.e. rehabilitation and deterrence. "Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." Holloway v. United States (D.C.Cir.1945), 148 F.2d 665, 666-67.

The English Crown first employed the insanity defense as a tool of pardon in the 13th Century. Pardons were replaced by the concept of the "King's Grace," which was granted to mitigate punishment, not guilt. By the 16th Century, a legal rationale developed that absolved certain offenders from criminal responsibility based on a lack of moral capacity. "The insane were perceived as infants or 'beasts' in their moral and cognitive abilities. Deprived of understanding and memory, such a man could not know what he was doing, nor could be the object of punishment." N. Fink & N. Larene, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 62 Mich.B.J. 199 (March 1983). The test for criminal responsibility was whether the accused "does not know what he is doing, no more than ... a wild beast." Rex v. Arnold (1724), 16 How.St.Tr. 695, 764.

"Later, English courts began to focus on whether the accused could distinguish between right and wrong. They also began to hear medical testimony. The landmark M'Naghten case made both these trends a standard part of English and American law." Washington v. United States (D.C.Cir.1967), 390 F.2d 444, 445.

Daniel M'Naghten held the delusionary belief that there was a widespread Tory plot aimed at his ultimate destruction. In "self-defense," M'Naghten attempted to assassinate the Tory leader, British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, but shot and mistakenly killed the Minister's secretary, who happened to be riding in the Minister's carriage at the time. During a lengthy trial, it was established that M'Naghten's actions were based upon delusionary, irrational beliefs and that he suffered from what today might be termed paranoia schizophrenia. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Under M'Naghten, the test for insanity was whether the accused was laboring under such a defective reason from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of what he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. Daniel M'Naghten's Case (1843), 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718. The M'Naghten Rule relieves a person from criminal responsibility if he was "laboring under such a defective reason."

Throughout much of the 20th Century, the M'Naghten Rule continued to be the dominant test for establishing an insanity defense. A combination of the M'Naghten rule and the irresistible impulse rule was followed in Montana until 1967, when a modified version of the Model Penal Code was enacted. See State v. Noble (1963), 142 Mont. 284, 384 P.2d 504; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169.

Sixteen states continue to use the M'Naghten standard of insanity. I. Keilitz & J. Fulton, The Insanity Defense and Its Alternatives at 22 (National Center for State Courts 1983). Several jurisdictions excuse criminal responsibility for conduct that resulted from an "irresistible impulse" or a person's inability to control his actions. Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico and Virginia use combinations of the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse standards.

The American Law Institute insanity standard is used in twenty-five state jurisdictions...