State v. Watson
| Decision Date | 29 November 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-KA-2227,81-KA-2227 |
| Citation | 423 So.2d 1130 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Willie WATSON, Jr. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Morel, Jr., Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Kurt Sins, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Ralph R. Miller, Norco, John L. Diasselliss, III, Gross, Diasselliss & Tillman, LaPlace, for defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of death. Although we affirm the conviction, we must reverse the death sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing, because the trial judge erroneously instructed the jurors that they were required to impose a death sentence if they found that the evidence established the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances.
On the evening of April 5, 1981, defendant abducted Kathy Newman at gunpoint as she arrived at her apartment in the Carrollton section of New Orleans. Defendant forced her back inside her car and required her to drive into an isolated area of St. Charles Parish, where he robbed her of her jewelry and raped her vaginally and anally. After defendant told Miss Newman to dress herself, he shot her in the back of the head as she did so. Defendant later stated that he killed her because he was afraid that she would recognize him.
The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed Miss Newman with the specific intent to kill and that he was engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated rape and an armed robbery. 2 R.S. 14:30.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. Defendant based his motion on two newspaper articles which reported that he had been booked with additional charges for sex crimes after being identified by victims who had recognized him from television and newspaper reports of this murder.
In a motion for change of venue, defendant must prove that prejudice exists in the collective minds of the people in the community to the extent that a fair trial is impossible. State v. Bell, 315 So.2d 307 (La.1975). Defendant failed to carry that burden here.
This case, involving a murderer and a victim who both resided in Orleans Parish, did not generate substantial pretrial publicity in St. Charles Parish. While many of the persons called as potential jurors had heard or read about the incident, very few had a great deal of knowledge about the facts, and virtually none had formed any impression from pretrial publicity which would prevent their according defendant the presumption of innocence. Moreover, the articles complained of were published within two weeks of the crime and were not current news items at the time of trial.
Thus, there was no inordinate amount of publicity in the case, and government officials apparently had no connection with the release of the publicity that did occur. The record further does not indicate any factors which would affect the attitude of the community toward the defendant or which would affect the candor and veracity of prospective jurors on voir dire. Accordingly, the motion was properly denied.
In a related assignment, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for individual voir dire and for sequestration during jury selection. Counsel argues that voir dire in groups, in the presence of other prospective jurors, discouraged accurate and sincere responses to questioning.
The trial court has the discretion to permit individual voir dire when the defendant demonstrates that special circumstances are present. State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 (La.1981). The fact that the case is a captial case is only one of the considerations in determining whether special circumstances require individual voir dire in order to insure a fair trial. State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La.1981). The record in this case does not present any additional special circumstances which would warrant individual voir dire of the jurors.
Defense counsel, however, argues that the voir dire conducted in the presence of other potential jurors enabled persons seeking to avoid jury service to learn avoidance techniques. While this problem possibly occurs in all cases of jury selection, defendant failed to establish how he was prejudiced by this effect of usual voir dire examination. This assignment of error is without merit.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his confession.
The night after the murder, defendant was arrested in connection with an unrelated felony. After the police recovered Miss Newman's car and found defendant's fingerprints on the car, defendant confessed to the murder and signed a written statement.
At the hearing on the pretrial motion, the officers who obtained the confession testified that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights prior to the interview, that he read and signed the form waiving those rights, that he first gave an oral statement, and that after another advice of rights he gave and signed a written statement. 3 All officers denied any beating, intimidation, coercion, threats or promises.
On the other hand, defendant denied receiving the Miranda advice and asserted that he was beaten and threatened with a pistol. Defendant also testified the officers refused his request for an attorney and induced his statement with promises to talk to the district attorney on his behalf.
The conclusions of the trial court on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntariness of the confession are entitled to great weight and will not usually be disturbed on appeal, unless the conclusions are not supported by the evidence. State v. Dison, 396 So.2d 1254 (La.1981). In the present case, the testimony of the officers clearly established the voluntary and knowledgeable nature of defendant's statement, and the officers flatly and specifically denied defendant's protestations to the contrary. After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court made a credibility determination and accepted the officers' testimony over the directly contrary testimony of the defendant. On this record, we cannot say that there was error in the trial court's determination of credibility.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment in a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. Defense counsel argues that the warrant was not based on probable cause because of errors in the affidavit relating only to the dates on which various events occurred.
The affidavit, based on facts obtained from defendant's confession, asserts that the shooting occurred on Sunday, April 5, that the victim was discovered on Sunday, April 6, and that the autopsy was conducted on Monday, April 7. There are additional references to Sunday, April 6 and Monday, April 7, and the typed date of April 8 appears below the judge's signature at the bottom of the warrant.
The date on which the warrant was actually issued (and which should have appeared above the judge's signature) was April 7. Furthermore, Sunday was April 5 and Monday was April 6, contrary to several notations on the affidavit. The confusion over the dates was clearly not the result of an intentional misrepresentation. All of the information in the affidavit was otherwise correct, and the dates in the affidavit were in no way critical to the application for the warrant or to the establishment of probable cause. We conclude that the unintentional errors in the dates had no effect on the validity of the warrant and that the motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant was properly denied. 4
Defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to plead not guilty to the offense, because the overwhelming evidence of his guilt in the first phase of the trial prejudiced the jury against him in the penalty phase.
C.Cr.P. Art. 557 prohibits the court from accepting an unqualified plea of guilty in a capital case. 5 In effect, defense counsel suggests that he should be allowed to enter a bifurcated plea which would establish guilt in the guilt phase, but would allow him to challenge the prosecution's seeking capital punishment in the penalty phase.
Defense counsel has not established any prejudice from the trial court's ruling in this case. In the guilt phase, he did not present any evidence to the jury which challenged the prosecution's evidence of guilt. In opening argument of the penalty phase, he could have pointed out the foregoing fact to the jury and argued that the only issue from the outset was life or death, pointing out that he was required by law to plead not guilty in the first phase in order to contest that issue in the penalty phase. We conclude...
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...was imposed upon an erroneous standard. Consequently, the matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Watson, (1982) La., 423 So.2d 1130, 1134-36. In addition to being convinced that the sentence was imposed upon an erroneous standard, I am also convinced that the provi......
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