State v. Watson
| Decision Date | 11 October 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 54799,54799 |
| Citation | 301 So.2d 653 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Henry Lee WATSON. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
John Barkley Knight, Jr., Samuel T. Singer, Winnsboro, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Don K. Carroll, Dist. Atty., S. E. Lee, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
On June 23, 1973 Elnora Morrilla was killed by a .38 caliber bullet which was fired from a weapon in the possession of the accused. The defendant claimed that the shooting was accidental.
On September 24, 1973 the defendant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Franklin Parish for murder. On October 4, 1973 the defendant pleaded not guilty. The defendant, through retained counsel, filed a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion to quash was denied and the defendant reserved an exception. The State refused to answer one item in the bill of particulars and the court refused to order the answer. To this ruling the defendant also reserved a bill of exceptions. The trial was held on November 13 and 14, 1973 and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter.
This bill was reserved when the trial judge refused to require the State to produce the oral statements made by the defendant to the police before the trial of the case. Defendant admits that the jurisprudence of this State is clear that the defendant is not entitled to pretrial discovery of his oral statements. State v. McLeod, 271 So.2d 45 (La.1973); State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So.2d 859 (1972). Defendant argues, however, that the rule which allows the defendant to discover written confessions should be extended to include oral confessions. This court has consistently refused to extend this rule which was first announced in State v. Dorsey 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945). State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585 (1949); State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So.2d 888 (1952). Discovery by defendant in criminal cases is greatly restricted. In State v. Dorsey, supra, the court realized that it was in effect creating an exception to the rule that the defendant is not allowed to discover the evidence on which the prosecution bases its case. The court specifically limited the holding to a written confession by the accused.
The rule allowing pretrial inspection of written confessions was extended to include video taped confessions, State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 218 So.2d 320 (1969), and tape recorded confessions, State v. Bendo, 281 So.2d 106 (La.1973).
Pretrial inspection of evidence, even of confessions, is not a question of constitutional proportions. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523 (1958); Leland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Welch v. Beto, 234 F.Supp. 484 (S.D.Tex.1964); Mears v. State, 422 P.2d 230 (Nov.1967) (cert. den. 389 U.S. 888, 88 S.Ct. 124, 19 L.Ed.2d 188 reh.den. 389 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 299, 19 L.Ed.2d 303. See annotation at 7 A.L.R.3d 8. There is no statute requiring the production of 'oral confessions.' Probably for the reason that the management of a scheme requiring such production would be difficult and complicated, Louisiana courts have consistently refused to extend the rule for production to oral statements of the accused.
The bill is without merit.
The defendant moved to quash the indictment on the alleged ground that the grand jury and petit jury lists were improperly constituted because they contained only a token number of members of the Negro race and because females were excluded.
This court has consistently announced that the Louisiana examption of women from jury service is constitutional under Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961). This policy will be continued until it is changed by the United States Supreme Court. See cases cited in State v. Edwards, 287 So.2d 518 (La.1973).
Defendant also argues that the jury venires were improperly constituted because members of the Negro race were included in only token numbers. The defendant must make a prima facie showing that Negroes were systematically excluded from the jury. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). However, mathematical standards are not the determinative factor. The facts of each case must be examined to determine whether systematic exclusion has occurred. Robert Lowe, Clerk of Court for Franklin Parish, testified that the various jury venires were selected at random from the voting rolls. The defense offered no evidence which showed that there was a systematic exclusion. The stipulated evidence shows that the composition of the jury venires was not in proportion to the general population of the parish. However, absent a showing of a selection system that was not racially neutral this court cannot find that the defendant has established a prima facie case on this point.
The trial judge correctly denied the motion to quash.
This bill was reserved when the trial judge, over the objection of defense counsel, allowed the prosecutor to bring out evidence on redirect examination that was not covered by the defense on cross-examination. LSA-R.S. 15:281 allows the trial judge to decide whether the prosecutor will be allowed to exceed the scope of the cross-examination on his redirect examination. This decision, being within the trial court's discretion, must be upheld unless an abuse of discretion can be shown. State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890, 899 (1904). Defendant does not show that the trial judge abused his discretion and therefore this exception is without merit.
This bill was reserved when the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce into evidence the oral statement of the defendant made at the time of his arrest. When the defendant was first found hiding in the woods behind the victim's house he told the arresting officers that someone had entered the house and shot both him and the victim. When he was taken to the police vehicle to be transported to the hospital Sheriff Parker read the defendant his 'Miranda' rights. The defendant continued to repeat this story while he was being taken to the hospital. After the defendant was released from the hospital he was taken to the sheriff's office and questioned. Before being questioned he was read and given an explanation of his 'Miranda' rights. The State introduced evidence concerning the original story told by the defendant to the police at the scene of his original detention. The trial judge properly allowed this testimony over the objection of the defense counsel. The original statement made by the accused was not solicited by the officers. It was voluntarily and spontaneously made by the accused to the officers. There is no need for the Miranda warnings in this situation. Diaz v. United States, 264 F.Supp. 937, 945 (E.D.La.1967) (aff'd per curiam, 5 Cir., 391 F.2d 392).
The evidence was properly admitted.
During the voir dire examination, one of the jurors was asked if he knew or was related to anyone in the sheriff's department. The juror stated that he knew Bill Holcomb. Officer Holcomb was not included on the list of witnesses that the State had provided the defense at the time of the voir dire examination, but was called to testify about the chain of custody of the bullet which had killed the victim. Defendant argues that if he had known that Bill Holcomb would be called by the State he would have examined this juror on his relationship with Bill Holcomb and possibly had him excused for cause. This contention is without merit. A prospective witness is not included in the list of people in C.Cr.P. 797(3). This section states that the juror is to be removed for cause if he is related to or knows the defendant, victim, district attorney or defense counsel. There is no showing that this juror was not impartial. Officer Holcomb was only put on the stand to testify as to the chain of custody of the bullet which killed the victim. No prejudice occurred.
This bill is without...
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