State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 29 June 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20400
• Citation: 261 A.3d 706,339 Conn. 452
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. James Henry WATSON
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

339 Conn. 452

261 A.3d 706

STATE of Connecticut

v.James Henry WATSON

SC 20400

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 18, 2020

Officially released June 29, 2021^*

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellant(defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, and Marc R. Durso, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee(state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.

ECKER, J.

A jury found the defendant, James Henry Watson, guilty of three distinct crimes in connection with his attack on a single victim over the course of an eight or nine hour period on a single day in October, 2016, namely, assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a)(1), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), and strangulation in the second degree in violation of General Statutes(Rev. to 2015)§ 53a-64bb (a).¹This verdict implicates the provision in § 53a-64bb (b) providing in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be found guilty of strangulation in the second degree and unlawful restraint or assault upon the same incident ...."The trial court determined that the jury's findings were not "based upon the same incident" and rendered a judgment of conviction on all three counts in accordance with the jury's verdict.The defendant appealed on the ground that the prohibition in § 53a-64bb (b) designates an element of the offense of strangulation that must be decided by the jury.SeeApprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435(2000).

In this certified appeal,²we consider whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated when the trial court rather than the jury determined that the charges of assault in the third degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree were not "upon the same incident" as that giving rise to the charge of strangulation in the second degree.SeeState v. Watson , 192 Conn. App. 353, 361, 217 A.3d 1052(2019).We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts.³On October 19, 2016, at approximately 3 p.m., the defendant, the victim and some others were "hanging out" and drinking beer on the front porch of the Bridgeport apartment building where the defendant lived.When the victim said that she needed to use the bathroom, the defendant told her that she could use his bathroom upstairs.The defendant let her into his apartment, and the victim went into the bathroom.When she was finished, she opened the bathroom door, but the defendant blocked her exit and said, "I'm going to get some of your fucking pussy."The defendant allowed the victim to leave the bathroom, but he used his body to block the apartment's exit, forcing her into the living room.He closed the curtains, grabbed the victim, and pushed her onto the smaller of the two sofas in the living room.She tried to push him off her, but he held her down, pulled off her pants and ripped off her underpants.Then he punched her and hit her in the face.

The defendant continued his assault, alternating between hitting the victim in the face and choking her.The victim described the defendant's conduct as following a pattern.He would choke her until she could not breathe, at which point she began kicking her feet, causing the defendant to loosen his chokehold a bit.Then he would resume choking and hitting her.At one point during this lengthy sequence of events, the defendant said, "I want to kill you," and, "I know I'm going to pay for this."The victim tried to fight back and pleaded with the defendant to return her cell phone, which he had taken from her, telling him that she wanted to call her son.The defendant refused to give the victim her phone and continued to hit her repeatedly.In an attempt to resist the defendant, the victim bit his pinky finger.She also tried to run toward the door in order to escape from the apartment, but the defendant prevented her from doing so by grabbing the hood of the sweatshirt she was wearing.

The defendant then moved the victim to his bedroom.He threw her on the bed and again choked and beat her.He removed her T-shirt, which she wore under the sweatshirt, and choked her with it.The defendant told her repeatedly that he wanted to kill her.The defendant moved the victim back to the living room and threw her onto the larger sofa.He resumed beating and choking her.The defendant finally stopped choking and beating the victim, but he continued to prevent her from leaving the apartment.

Many hours later—sometime after midnight—the victim, hoping to find a chance to escape, told the defendant that she wanted a type of drink called an Icee, which was sold at a nearby convenience store.He agreed and accompanied her out of the apartment.Once outside the building, the victim was able to flee.She flagged down a passing ambulance, which brought her to the hospital, where she received medical attention and spoke with the police.

The state charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(1)(sexual assault), assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-61 (a)(1)(assault), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a)(unlawful restraint), strangulation in the second degree in violation of § 53a-64bb (a)(strangulation), and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a)(1)(threatening).Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of strangulation, assault, unlawful restraint, and threatening, and found not guilty of sexual assault.Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court directed the parties to submit memoranda addressing whether and to what extent § 53a-64bb (b) applies in the present case and, if so, the appropriate remedy to be implemented by the court at the time of sentencing.

In response to the court's order, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of assault and unlawful restraint.He contended that the court was required to acquit him of those two charges pursuant to § 53a-64bb (b) because the entire sequence of events giving rise to the charges against him constituted a single transaction and therefore triggered the statute's prohibition against such guilty verdicts "upon the same incident ...."⁴In response, the state argued that the prohibition contained in § 53a-64bb (b) was not implicated because the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of unlawful restraint, assault and strangulation was supported by sufficient evidence establishing that the defendant committed separate acts supporting each of the distinct offenses.

The court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty as to the counts of assault, unlawful restraint and strangulation.The court explained: "This is not a situation [in which] the factual predicates for the convictions were so inter-twined under any view of the evidence, temporally or physically or otherwise ... as to make them, as a matter of law, one and the same incident."The court emphasized that the defendant's actions took place over an extended period of time and that the acts of assault and unlawful restraint were readily separable from the acts of strangulation.Consistent with its ruling on the motion, the court sentenced the defendant on each of the counts of conviction, imposing "a total effective term of twelve years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven years of mandatory incarceration, followed by three years of probation."State v. Watson , supra, 192 Conn. App. at 361, 217 A.3d 1052; see footnote 13 of this opinion.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the federal constitution required that the jury, not the trial court, determine whether the charges of assault in the third degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree were "upon the same incident" as the charge of strangulation in the second degree.General Statutes § 53a-64bb (b);seeState v. Watson , supra, 192 Conn. App. at 361, 217 A.3d 1052.The Appellate Court disagreed with the defendant's claim and held that, because there was no constitutional violation, the defendant's unpreserved claim failed on the third prong of State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823(1989), as modified byIn re Yasiel R. , 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188(2015).SeeState v. Watson , supra, at 363, 217 A.3d 1052.The court relied on its decision in State v. Morales , 164 Conn. App. 143, 160, 136 A.3d 278, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 916, 136 A.3d 1275(2016), to conclude that, "in the present case, it was proper for the trial court, rather than the jury, to determine whether the charges were ‘upon the same incident’ for the purposes of § 53a-64bb (b)."State v. Watson , supra, at 365, 217 A.3d 1052.This certified appeal followed.

II

A

The defendant argues that the language in § 53a-64bb (b) prohibiting a person from being found guilty of strangulation in the second degree "upon the same incident" as unlawful restraint or assault sets forth an element of the offense of strangulation and, therefore, presents a factual issue that must be decided by a jury pursuant to Apprendi .SeeApprendi v. New Jersey , supra, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348(holding that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").We disagree.

As the Appellate Court correctly observed, because the defendant did not object to the trial court determining whether the charges of assault and unlawful restraint...