State v. Watts-Dyson

• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Lee, C.J.
• Decision Date: 14 July 2020
• Docket Number: 52309-4-II
• Citation: State v. Watts-Dyson, 52309-4-II (Wash. App. Jul 14, 2020)
• Parties: STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JEANIA ANDREA WATTS-DYSON, Appellant

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JEANIA ANDREA WATTS-DYSON, Appellant

No. 52309-4-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

July 14, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Lee C.J.

Jeania A. Watts-Dyson^[1] appeals her convictions for unlawful possession of heroin while armed with a firearm, unlawful possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm unlawful possession of cocaine, unlawful possession of oxycodone, and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. She contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to instruct the jury on the defense of unwitting possession and that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts because the State failed to prove possession. We affirm.

FACTS

Lakewood Police Department Detective Jeff Martin arranged for a controlled buy of narcotics from Marvin Watts Watts-Dyson's husband. On the day of the arranged controlled buy, police observed Watts-Dyson, instead of Marvin, ^[2] emerge from Marvin and Watts-Dyson's home, meet the confidential informant, and exchange crack cocaine for money. Based on the controlled buy, Detective Martin obtained a search warrant for Watts-Dyson's home.

Officers executed the search warrant at around 5:20 a.m. Watts-Dyson Marvin, and Marvin's sister were inside the home when the officers entered. Marvin's sister, who also lived at the home, was in her bedroom. Watts-Dyson and Marvin were asleep on a futon in a room referred to as the "rec room." 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (June 27, 2018) at 121. Watts-Dyson was dressed in "nighttime clothing." 1 VRP (June 27, 2018) at 155. Marvin told Detective Martin that there were firearms and narcotics in the home. Marvin also said that there were scales in his vehicle and that he shared the master bedroom with Watts-Dyson.

In the rec room, officers found approximately 100 small baggies. At the foot of the futon, officers also found a black pouch. The pouch contained heroin, methamphetamine, a pill bottle containing two rocks of crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and oxycodone. Officers also located a digital scale and crystal methamphetamine on a shelf in the rec room. Officers found a firearm at the head of the futon wrapped in a t-shirt within arm's length of where Watts-Dyson was sleeping.

Also in the living room, police found another bag of methamphetamine. And in the master bedroom, officers discovered a loaded semiautomatic handgun under the mattress, as well as documents with Watts-Dyson's name on them, pictures of her, and her clothing.

In Marvin's vehicle, officers discovered two more digital scales. The vehicle was parked outside the Watts-Dyson's home.

The State charged Watts-Dyson with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, heroin, with intent to deliver while armed with a firearm; one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver while armed with a firearm; one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, cocaine; one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, oxycodone; and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The State charged Watts-Dyson as an accomplice and identified Marvin as a co-defendant. Watts-Dyson stipulated that she had a prior serious offense making it unlawful for her to possess a firearm.

During trial, Detective Martin testified consistent with the facts outlined above. Watts-Dyson testified that she would "avoid going home" and did not sleep at the home very frequently. 3 VRP (July 10, 2018) at 328. Watts-Dyson further testified that she had seen Marvin with drugs before and she, herself, had taken drugs, but she "[did] not sell drugs, no." 3 VRP (July 10, 2018) at 368. And she testified that she was not aware of any drugs or firearms in the home.

Watts-Dyson requested that the trial court instruct the jury on unwitting possession. The trial court denied her request.

Regarding possession, the trial court instructed the jury:

Possession means having a substance in one's custody or control. It may be either actual or constructive. Actual possession occurs when the item is in the actual physical custody of the person charged with possession. Constructive possession occurs when there is no actual physical possession but there is dominion and control over the substance.

Proximity alone without proof of dominion and control is insufficient to establish constructive possession. Dominion and control need not be exclusive to support a finding of constructive possession.

In deciding whether the defendant had dominion and control over a substance, you are to consider all the relevant circumstances in the case. Factors that you may consider, among others, include whether the defendant had the ability to take actual possession of the substance, whether the defendant had the capacity to exclude others from possession of the substance, and whether the defendant had dominion and control over the premises where the substance was located. No single one of these factors necessarily controls your decision.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 29.

The jury found Watts-Dyson not guilty of the charges that she possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver (one count each for heroin and methamphetamine), and instead found her guilty of the lesser included charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The jury also found Watts-Dyson guilty of two additional counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (based on cocaine, and oxycodone) and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The jury further found that Watts-Dyson was armed with a firearm at the time she unlawfully possessed the heroin and methamphetamine.

Watts-Dyson appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

Watts-Dyson argues that sufficient evidence does not support all her convictions because the State did not prove possession. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

Under both the federal and state constitutions, due process requires that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hummel, 196 Wn.App. 329, 352, 383 P.3d 592 (2016) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2D 560 (1979)). Thus, sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional law that we review de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).

2. Legal Principles

To determine whether the State has produced sufficient evidence to support the charged crime, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. at 106. Credibility determinations are made by the trier of fact and are not subject to review. State v. Miller, 179 Wn.App. 91, 105, 316 P.3d 1143 (2014). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. Id.

Because the State charged Watts-Dyson as an accomplice, it needed to prove that she, with knowledge that she was promoting or facilitating the specific crime charged, aided or agreed to aid Marvin in committing the crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(i) & (ii).

Under RCW 69.50.4013(1), to convict Watts-Dyson of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Marvin possessed a controlled substance.

Under RCW 9.41.040(1)(a), a person is guilty of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm if the person owns or has in his or her possession a firearm, after having previously been convicted of any serious offense. Here, it is undisputed that Watts-Dyson was previously convicted of a serious offense.

Under RCW 9.94A.533(3), a court must add additional time to a sentence if the defendant is found to have been armed with a firearm while committing the crime. State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 16-17, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

To establish that a defendant was armed for the purpose of a firearm enhancement, the State must prove (1) that a firearm was easily accessible and readily available for offensive or defensive purposes during the commission of the crime and (2) that a nexus exists among the defendant, the weapon, and the crime.

State v. Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wn.2d 798, 826, 425 P.3d 807 (2018). "The defendant does not have to be armed at the moment of arrest to be armed for purposes of the firearms enhancement." State v. O'Neal, 159 Wn.2d 500, 504, 150P.3d 1121 (2007).

3. Possession of Controlled Substances and Firearms

Watts-Dyson argues that the State failed to prove she was an accomplice in the possession of controlled substances and firearms to support her convictions for four counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (based on heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and oxycodone) and two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. (Br. of Appellant at 17-24) We disagree.

Possession can be actual or constructive. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 333, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002). Actual possession is where the defendant "has physical custody of the item," whereas constructive possession is where the defendant "has dominion and control over the item." Id. A person's dominion and control over the premises where drugs are found is one of the circumstances from which a jury can infer constructive possession of the drugs. State v. Shumaker, 142 Wn.App. 330, 334, 174 P.3d 1214 (2007). However, "having dominion and control over the premises containing the item does not, by itself prove...