State v. Watts, 85-473

• Decision Date: 17 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-473,85-473
• Citation: 717 P.2d 24,43 St.Rep. 670,221 Mont. 104
• Parties: The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald Charles WATTS, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 24

717 P.2d 24

221 Mont. 104

The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald Charles WATTS, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

No. 85-473.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 20, 1986.

Decided April 17, 1986.

Cannon & Sheehy, Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Helena, for defendant and appellant.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Barbara Claassen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mike McGrath, Co. Atty., Carolyn Clemens, Deputy Co. Atty., Helena, for plaintiff and respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

Charles Watts, Jr. appeals the order of the District Court of the First Judicial District revoking Watts' previously suspended sentence arising from an earlier guilty plea to the felony offense of sexual intercourse without consent.

Affirmed.

The issues we are called upon to decide are:

1. Whether defendant's constitutional rights under Art. II, Sec. 24 of the Montana Constitution were violated when the State, after filing charges of aggravated kidnapping and assault, elected to dismiss those charges and proceed on a revocation of parole of defendant's suspended sentence.

2. Whether the District Court arbitrarily and capriciously concluded that defendant's suspended sentence should be revoked.

In August 1981, Watts pled guilty to felony sexual intercourse without consent and was sentenced to 20 years in Montana State Prison with ten years suspended. One condition for the suspension was that Watts remain a law-abiding citizen during the term of his sentence. On April 26, 1985, Watts was charged with aggravated kidnapping and misdemeanor assault. These charges stemmed from the incidents of the evening of March 22, 1985 and the early morning of March 23, 1985. On that night, Watts was alleged to have intimidated Robert McClelland, by holding him against his will in Watts' automobile, and beating him with his fists.

On May 23, 1985, the State petitioned the District Court to revoke Watts' suspended sentence. At the June 6, 1985 hearing on the revocation petition, Watts moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that his rights under Art. II, Secs. 24 and 26 of the Montana Constitution were violated. Those sections guarantee respectively the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings and the right to trial by jury. Watts contended to the District Court, and now contends to this Court, that because the State had filed an information against him, criminal proceedings against him had been initiated. Once instituted, these criminal proceedings give rise to the rights under Art. II, Secs. 24 and 26. The State should not be allowed to circumvent these constitutional guarantees, argues Watts, by filing a petition to revoke his suspended sentence. The District Court rejected Watts' argument and refused to dismiss the petition. On August 13, 1985 that court revoked the suspension of the last ten years of Watts' sentence for sexual intercourse without consent. The State later dropped the kidnapping and assault charges pending against Watts.

We reject Watts' claims that his Montana constitutional right to jury trial and his rights as an accused have been violated. Watts would have us combine into one action two completely separate proceedings against him. Certainly the State, by filing an information charging kidnapping and assault, instituted criminal proceedings against him. However, the action to revoke his previously suspended sentence is not a criminal adjudication. State v. Robinson (Mont.1980), 619 P.2d 813, 37 St.Rep. 1830; State v. Oppelt (1979), 184 Mont. 48, 601 P.2d 394. A defendant given a suspended sentence lives knowing that "a fixed sentence for a definite term hangs over him." Roberts v. United States (1943), 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41; Oppelt, 184 Mont. 48, 601 P.2d 394. Suspension of sentence is a discretionary act of grace by a district court. Section 46-18-201, MCA; Oppelt, 184 Mont. 48, 601 P.2d 394. In contrast to the proof required to convict Watts on the information charged, in order to revoke his suspended sentence the State need only show Watts failed to live up to the requirement that he remain law-abiding. That requirement conditioned the suspension of a portion of a sentence, which had been imposed only after Watts had been tried, and convicted, with all the rights secured to him by our constitution attaining in the proceeding.

Watts essentially argues that the State, in order to punish him for the alleged new offenses of kidnapping and assault, chose to proceed through the revocation hearing instead of through full trial. This argument fails to take into account that as a convicted felon, his liberty was already conditioned by the requirements of the original sentencing court. Watts' argument that the State punished him without trial for a new offense by...