State v. Watts

• Citation: 186 N.W.2d 611
• Decision Date: 05 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54164,54164
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Hayden Jasper WATTS, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 611

186 N.W.2d 611

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Hayden Jasper WATTS, Appellant.

No. 54164.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 5, 1971.

Thomas C. Younggren, Keokuk, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Laughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert B. Dickey, County Atty., Lee, for appellee.

MASON, Justice.

This is an appeal from judgment following a jury verdict convicting defendant Hayden Jasper Watts of violation of parole contrary to section 247.28, Code, 1966. Watts was sentenced under this statute to the state penitentiary for a period not to exceed five years, the sentence to commence at the expiration of any existing sentence then being served by him.

For a better understanding of the questions presented we recite some preliminary background.

March 21, 1968 Watts had been committed to the state penitentiary on a larceny conviction. September 11, 1969 he was paroled by the board of parole 'upon the conditions stipulated in a certain parole agreement' signed by him. November 11, his parole was revoked and defendant was returned to the penitentiary to continue serving the sentence originally imposed on the larceny conviction.

October 8, 1969 Watts was arraigned and entered a plea of guilty to the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, an indictable misdemeanor. Section 321.281, Code, 1966. October 30 he was sentenced to pay a $300 fine and committed to the county jail for a period of six months. The jail sentence was suspended and probation granted under the supervision of the Lee county sheriff.

December 31, 1969 Watts was charged by county attorney's information with violating the provisions of his board parole on the 1968 larceny conviction in that he had been convicted upon his plea of guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.

The information was amended charging defendant with further violation of his parole by being involved in two breaking and enterings in Lee county and by carrying and using a gun on the occasion. This incident is alleged to have occurred October 26.

After defendant's motion to suppress evidence relating to his plea of guilty to the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and to the sentence imposed was overruled, trial on the parole violation charged was commenced.

At the close of the State's case defendant moved for a directed verdict and dismissal of the information challenging the constitutionality of section 247.28 as being a denial of due process. The motion was overruled.

Defendant offered no evidence and the matter was submitted to the jury. The issue of constitutionality of the statute was raised again in defendant's motion in arrest of judgment and again overruled.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence relating to his indictable misdemeanor conviction for the reason the court in that case while informing him of his constitutional right under Amendment 6 to the federal constitution to have an attorney represent him did not properly advise him that if he were indigent a lawyer would be appointed to represent him. The court also failed to advise him of his right under Amendment 5 to remain silent when called upon by the court to plead to the charge and failed to inform him such plea might be later used against him. Defendant argues therefore he did not make an intelligent and understanding waiver of these rights.

Furthermore, defendant contends section 247.28 is unconstitutional because the legislature has delegated to the state parole board the power to make violation of the rules and regulations and conditions of the parole board a felony crime in Iowa.

I. We consider first defendant's contention that the delegation of power by the legislature to the parole board renders section 247.28 unconstitutional.

The section under attack provides:

'Violation of board parole. Whoever, while on parole, shall violate any condition of his parole, or any rule or regulation of the board granting the parole, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the institution from which he had been paroled, for a term of not more than five years, his sentence under such conviction to take effect upon the completion of his previous sentence.'

Section 247.6, a related statute, provides in part:

'Rules. Said board shall have power to establish rules and conditions under which paroles may be granted.

'* * *.'

Generally, the legislature can delegate to an administrative body the right to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the objectives of the statute. Thus, it can authorize parole boards to determine how, when and where a prisoner shall serve his sentence, the length of time within the statutory maximum he shall serve and under what terms. State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 N.W.2d 428, 433. In making this determination parole boards may set up rules and regulations which are constitutionally valid. Kirkpatrick v. Hollowell, 197 Iowa 927, 196 N.W. 91, the opinion amended on other grounds in 197 Iowa 927, 198 N.W. 81; Ware v. Sanders, 146 Iowa 233, 124 N.W. 1081; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138(7).

However, this court has not determined whether the legislative enactment fixing a maximum term of five years imprisonment for breach of any regulation as determined by the parole board in their sole discretion constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of power.

Before considering defendant's contention we state 'some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality are involved.'

They are summarized in Danner v. Hass, 257 Iowa 654, 661, 134 N.W.2d 534, 539 in this manner: 'all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality, must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; if any reasonable basis may be conveived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negative all possible bases; the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and we will adopt a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation.'

In State v. Steenhoek, 182 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 1970) we said, 'Before a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must clearly appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature--that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 421, (N.D.1967); Annot., 79 L.Ed. 474, 484--487 and 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, Section 242 and cases cited in support of the text.

'Legislative power is defined in Am.Jur.2d, supra, in this manner:

"Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated has been described as the authority to make a complete law--complete as to time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable--and to determine the expediency of its enactment.

"* * *. While a legislative body cannot abdicate its general lawmaking powers it may authorize others to do things which it might properly do, but which it cannot conveniently or advantageously perform."

Only the legislature has the power to create and define crime, the only limitation being that such enactment shall not infringe on constitutional rights and privileges. This exclusive legislative function may not be delegated to any other body or agency without adequate guidelines. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308, 309; Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 155 A.2d 894, 897, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 719, 80 S.Ct. 1596, 4 L.Ed.2d 1521; Lapinski v. State, 84 Nev. 611, 446 P.2d 645, 646; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 214, 46 S.E.2d 384, 387; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138 a; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 127.

The essentials of the 'legislative function' are the determination of legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. These essentials are preserved when the legislature lays down the rule that acts contrary to regulations authorized under a statute containing sufficient standards shall entail penal sanctions. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424--425, 64 S.Ct. 660, 667, 88 L.Ed. 834, 848.

There can be no doubt that the legislature may render the violation of an agency's rules a criminal offense, the only question is whether the statute granting authority to the agency is fitted with sufficient standards.

In Pierce v. Doolittle, 130 Iowa 333, 336, 106 N.W. 751, 752, this court said:

'We think it clear that the Legislature may provide for the punishment of acts in resistance to, or violation of, the authority conferred upon such subordinate tribunal or board. 'When these boards duly adopt rules or by-laws by virtue of legislative authority such rules and by-laws, within the respective jurisdictions, have the force and effect of a law of the Legislature; and like an ordinance or by-law of a municipal corporation they may be said to be in force by authority of the state. " Among other authorities supporting this principle are State v. Phelps, 12 Ariz.App. 83, 87, 467 P.2d 923, 927; Lane v. Holderman, 40 N.J.Super. 329, 123 A.2d 56, 64, citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516--517, 31 S.Ct. 480, 482--483, 55 L.Ed. 563, 567--568; State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867, 868. The Lane case was affirmed in 23 N.J. 304, 129 A.2d 8.

The Supreme Court has said courts administering the criminal law cannot apply sanctions for violation of the mandate of an agency unless that agency's authority is clear and has been conferred in accordance with the law. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 714, 86 S.Ct. 1689,...