State v. Weakland, CR-17-0615-PR

• Citation: 434 P.3d 578,246 Ariz. 67
• Decision Date: 25 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. CR-17-0615-PR,CR-17-0615-PR
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Courtney Noelle WEAKLAND, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

246 Ariz. 67
434 P.3d 578

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Courtney Noelle WEAKLAND, Appellant.

No. CR-17-0615-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed February 25, 2019

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Mariette S. Ambri (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Dean J. Brault, Legal Defender, Robb P. Holmes (argued), Assistant Legal Defender, Pima County Legal Defender's Office, Tucson, Attorneys for Courtney Noelle Weakland

Mary C. Trejo, Tucson Public Defender, Kristina J. Bohn, Supervising Public Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Tucson Public Defender's Office

David J. Euchner (argued), Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson; and Joseph P. St. Louis, Nesci & St. Louis, P.L.L.C., Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and National College for DUI Defense

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL and JUSTICES TIMMER and GOULD joined. JUSTICE PELANDER dissented. JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, separately dissented.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:

¶1 We here consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, in a prosecution for driving under the influence ("DUI"), to admit blood evidence unconstitutionally obtained after State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609 (2013), but before State v. Valenzuela (Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299, 371 P.3d 627 (2016). We hold that the good-faith exception applies because application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances would not meaningfully deter police misconduct. Butler did not "unsettle" the law, and it is unreasonable to require police to predict a change in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do so.

I.

¶2 In February 2015, an Oro Valley police officer arrested Courtney Weakland for DUI. The officer handcuffed her, put her in the back seat of his patrol car, and read her an "admin per se" form pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1321. The form provided that Arizona law "require[d]" her to complete certain tests to determine her blood-alcohol concentration ("BAC"). She submitted to a blood draw, which revealed a BAC of .218, nearly three times the legal limit. Weakland was indicted on one count of aggravated DUI while impaired to the slightest degree and one count of aggravated DUI with a BAC of .08 or more.

¶3 Before trial, Weakland moved to suppress all evidence obtained through the warrantless search and seizure of her blood sample, arguing that the "requirement" language in the admin per se admonition coerced her consent. The trial court summarily denied her motion. Weakland was convicted on both counts.

¶4 On appeal, Weakland argued that, pursuant to Valenzuela II , her blood was obtained

434 P.3d 580

without a warrant and without valid consent, and that the good-faith exception recognized in Valenzuela II did not apply. The State implicitly conceded on appeal that Weakland’s consent to the blood draw was involuntary and, thus, invalid pursuant to Valenzuela II , but argued that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule obviated the need to suppress the blood evidence. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Weakland , 244 Ariz. 79, 418 P.3d 446 (App. 2017). The majority reasoned that, because Arizona courts had not held that the admin per se admonition was "coercive, ineffective, or otherwise [affirmatively] negated consent" until Valenzuela II , police acted in good faith when they read it to Weakland after her arrest. See id. at 83 ¶ 19, 85 ¶ 24, 418 P.3d at 450, 452. The dissent argued that although existing precedent may have justified applying the good-faith exception to the defendant’s 2012 arrest in Valenzuela II , this Court’s 2013 Butler decision placed police on notice before Weakland’s 2015 arrest that use of the admin per se admonition was constitutionally suspect. Id. at 85 ¶¶ 27–28, 418 P.3d at 452 (Eckerstrom, C.J., dissenting). The applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for cases involving use of the admin per se admonition after Butler , but before Valenzuela II , is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

II.

¶5 "We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion, considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 302 ¶ 9, 371 P.3d at 630. We review de novo the applicability of the good-faith exception. State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506, 509 ¶ 11, 389 P.3d 1251, 1254 (2017).

¶6 "The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked [solely] to deter future violations." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 308–09 ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636–37 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236–37, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ). "Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search." Davis , 564 U.S. at 236, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ). Because "a deterrence purpose can only be served when the evidence to be suppressed is derived from a search which the [police] knew or should have known was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment," United States v. Johnson , 457 U.S. 537, 565, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982) (White, J., dissenting), the rule is intended to deter only "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135, 144, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). Therefore, "when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence," the good-faith exception applies because "the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way." Davis , 564 U.S. at 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also A.R.S. § 13-3925 (codifying good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

¶7 "Real deterrent value is a ‘necessary condition for exclusion,’ but it is not ‘a sufficient’ one." Davis , 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 596, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ). "For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must [also] outweigh its heavy costs." Id. (noting that exclusion’s "bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment"). Consequently, exclusion of evidence should be a "last resort." Id. (quoting Hudson , 547 U.S. at 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159 ). The state bears the burden of establishing that the good-faith exception applies. Havatone , 241 Ariz. at 511 ¶ 19, 389 P.3d at 1256.

III.

¶8 This case turns on whether police objectively, reasonably relied on "binding appellate

434 P.3d 581

precedent" in using the admin per se admonition at the time of Weakland’s arrest after Butler but before Valenzuela II . See Havatone , 241 Ariz. at 512 ¶ 24, 389 P.3d at 1257. Stated differently, we must determine whether the law regarding the admonition was "unsettled" at the time of Weakland’s arrest, meaning law enforcement officers could not rely on precedent to authorize the illegal search. Id. at 512–13 ¶ 29, 389 P.3d at 1257–58 (citing Davis , 564 U.S. at 250, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment)). When making this assessment, we do not require police to have a "crystal ball" in determining what courts may conclude in future cases but rather require them to act in objectively reasonable reliance on then-existing authority. State v. Jean , 243 Ariz. 331, 343 ¶ 45, 407 P.3d 524, 536 (2018) ; see United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (stating that the good-faith exception requires that police have "a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits").

¶9 Mindful of tension between Havatone and Jean , we clarify the standard for the good-faith exception. We noted in Havatone that " Davis instructs that law enforcement acts in good faith if ‘binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice.’ " 241 Ariz. at 512 ¶ 24, 389 P.3d at 1257 (quoting Davis , 564 U.S. at 241, 131 S.Ct. 2419 ). Although an accurate statement, Davis did not limit the good-faith exception only to circumstances when appellate precedent specifically authorizes a police practice. In fact, in Jean , we rejected the proposition that "to qualify as ‘binding appellate precedent under Davis ,’ a case ‘must specifically authorize the precise conduct under consideration.’ " 243 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 45, 407 P.3d at 536 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163, 173–76 (3d Cir. 2014) ). Instead, we concluded that the good-faith exception applies if the search was "conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on ... binding appellate precedent ...." Jean , 243 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 47, 407 P.3d at 536 ; see also Valenzuela II ,...