State v. Weathers
| Decision Date | 01 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 56350,56350 |
| Citation | 320 So.2d 895 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Paul Charles WEATHERS a/k/a Sammy R. Allen. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William M. Bass, Houma, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norval J. Rhodes, Dist. Atty., Alexander L. Doyle, Asst. Diat. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant Paul Charles Weathers, was charged by bill of information with the crime of armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. He was tried by jury, found guilty as charged, and was sentenced to serve 25 years to hard labor. On appeal, he relies upon six assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence.
Defendant alleges that the trial judge erred when he refused to sustain defense counsel's challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. Defendant exercised peremptory challenges against both of these jurors and exhausted his peremptory challenges before the completion of the panel. La.Code Crim.P. art. 800 (1966).
The first prospective juror stated that he was a member of the Terrebonne Parish School Board, which was represented by the Terrebonne Parish District Attorney's Office. In connection with school board work, he had become acquainted with the district attorney and a member of his staff. The second prospective juror stated that he was acquainted with the district attorney and that he was a 'close, personal friend' of an assistant district attorney who had no role in the prosecution of this case. Both prospective jurors, questioned by the judge as to their impartiality, responded that their acquaintance with the district attorney and members of his staff would not prevent them from reaching a just and fair verdict.
Article 797 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part:
The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:
(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or emnity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict; . . ..
This court has repeatedly held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the competency of a juror, and only when the exercise of such discretion is arbitrary or unreasonable, to the prejudicial injury of the defendant in obtaining a fair and impartial trial, will this court be warranted in setting aside a verdict. State v. Frazier, 283 So.2d 261 (La.1973); State v. Willis, 262 La. 636, 264 So.2d 590 (1972); State v. Flucas, 262 La. 625, 264 So.2d 586 (1972). In Flucas, one prospective juror was challenged because of his friendship toward the prosecuting attorney, and the second prospective juror was challenged because of his friendship with one of the testifying police authorities, and because the prosecuting attorney had done some legal work for him about on month prior to the trial. Both prospective jurors indicated that their friendship and economic relations with persons involved in the case on behalf of the state would not alter their ability to be impartial. We held that it was reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that these contacts would not influence the jurors in arriving at their verdict.
Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. The first three assignments of error lack merit.
Defendant alleges that the trial judge committed error when he permitted the state to question the victim of the robbery regarding money allegedly stolen in the robbery (S-6). On being shown the money by the state, the victim testified that the bills were of approximately the same denomination that had been taken from her on the morning of the robbery. Defendant contends that the state, by questioning the victim without having first laid a foundation for the introduction of the money into evidence, violated article 773 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Neither the state nor the defendant can be controlled by the court as to the order in which evidence shall be adduced; but when the evidence requires a foundation for its admission, the foundation must be laid before the evidence is admissible.
In State v. Isaac, 261 La. 487, 499, 260 So.2d 302, 306 (1972), we stated:
Before the admission of an object in evidence, a foundation must be laid showing that it is related to the case. The foundation testimony may consist of visual identification of the object by witnesses or by establishing a continuous chain of custody from the seizure of the object to its introduction in evidence at the trial.
The testimony of the robbery victim concerning the money taken from her was part of the state's attempt to lay a foundation for the introduction of the money into evidence. The state subsequently completed the laying of this foundation when it called the arresting officer and the chief detective of the Houma Police Department, who both identified the money and established a continuous chain of custody. The evidence was later admitted in evidence with no objection from defense counsel.
At the time that the victim testified regarding the stolen money, the state made no effort to offer it in evidence. Hence, the question regarding the money was merely preliminary. The trial judge properly overruled defense counsel's objection because the court cannot control the state's order of proof. La.Code Crim.P. art. 773 (1966); State v. Mitchell, 311 So.2d 888 (La.1975); State v. Sinclair, 258 La. 84, 245 So.2d 365 (1971). We find no merit in Assignment of Error No. 4.
Defendant contends that the trial judge permitted the state to harass defendant's alibi witness on cross-examination. The witness, who testified that defendant had been involved in a poker gram with him at the time the robbery...
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